Florida Senate v. Graham, 61,877
| Decision Date | 06 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 61,877,61,877 |
| Citation | 412 So.2d 360 |
| Parties | The FLORIDA SENATE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable D. Robert GRAHAM, Governor of the State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Thomas W. McAliley and James R. Hubbard of Beckham & McAliley, Miami, and Neal P. Rutledge, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Betty J. Steffens, Gen. Counsel for Governor Graham, Tallahassee, for respondent.
Barry Richard of Roberts, Baggett, LaFace, Richard & Wiser, Tallahassee, for Fla. House of Representatives, interested party.
The Senate of the State of Florida has filed a petition for declaratory judgment, writ of mandamus or other extraordinary relief questioning the constitutional authority of Governor D. Robert Graham to limit to less than thirty days a special apportionment session called pursuant to article III, section 16(a), Florida Constitution. The proclamation for the special apportionment session in issue in this proceeding limited the session to three days and two hours, the specific period being from 10:00 a. m., Friday, March 26, 1982, through noon, Monday March 29, 1982. The House of Representatives of the State of Florida has been allowed to appear as an interested party in support of the validity of the Governor's proclamation. The question presented is a matter of law, there being no factual disputes to be resolved. It is a matter that requires prompt resolution to avoid mootness and prevent an adverse effect on the functions of government. See Brown v. Firestone, 382 So.2d 654 (Fla.1980).
Jurisdiction of this Court is sought under article V, section 3(b)(5) (mandamus) and section 3(b)(7) (all writs), Florida Constitution (1980). We conclude that we need not consider the appropriateness of directing an alternative writ of mandamus to the chief executive of this state because there is an independent basis for jurisdiction in this case.
We find jurisdiction to entertain this matter is vested under article V, section 3(b)(7), which provides in pertinent part that the Supreme Court "(m) ay issue ... all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." By the extraordinary provisions of article III, section 16(b), (c) and (f), Florida Constitution (1968), this Court is vested with jurisdiction in the second year following each decennial census to either review a legislative plan of apportionment or actually devise a plan of apportionment depending upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of certain conditions precedent. The mode in which the Court will entertain apportionment is dictated by action or inaction of the legislature in adopting a joint resolution of apportionment, but, irrespective of its action, we will entertain the issue each ten years. Because jurisdiction of the issue of apportionment will vest in this Court with certainty in this year we have the jurisdiction conferred by article V, section 3(b)(7), to issue all writs necessary to the complete exercise and in aid of the ultimate jurisdiction imposed by article III, section 16(b), (c) and (f). Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So.2d 865 (Fla.1968). Petitioner alleges the invalidity of the Governor's action in calling the special apportionment session for a term of less than thirty days. If that call be constitutionally defective then the manner in which we entertain apportionment is directly affected. Furthermore, the validity of the special apportionment session could presumably be raised by the parties in the eventual proceedings before this Court pursuant to article III, section 16. For the foregoing reasons we exercise our discretion to invoke jurisdiction of this cause under article V, section 3(b)(7), Florida Constitution (1980).
After receiving expedited briefs and oral argument, we held in our order of March 27, 1982, that "the Governor has no authority to limit the apportionment session to less than thirty consecutive days and his only discretion is to determine when the period will commence within thirty days after the regular session adjourns." Florida Senate v. Graham, 412 So.2d 359 at 359 (Fla.1982). This opinion expresses the reasons for our holding.
The constitutional provision in issue is article III, section 16(a), which provides:
Section 16. Legislative apportionment.-
(a) SENATORIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS. The legislature at its regular session in the second year following each decennial census, by joint resolution, shall apportion the state in accordance with the constitution of the state and of the United States into not less than thirty nor more than forty consecutively numbered senatorial districts of either contiguous, overlapping or identical territory, and into not less than eighty nor more than one hundred twenty consecutively numbered representative districts of either contiguous, overlapping or identical territory. Should that session adjourn without adopting such joint resolution, the governor by proclamation shall reconvene the legislature within thirty days in special apportionment session which shall not exceed thirty consecutive days, during which no other business shall be transacted, and it shall be the mandatory duty of the legislature to adopt a joint resolution of apportionment. (Emphasis added.)
The Governor contends that he has the authority to limit a special apportionment session, called pursuant to article III, section 16(a), to any length of time within the constitutionally-defined maximum period, just as he has the authority, delineated in In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 206 So.2d 212 (Fla.1968), to limit special sessions called pursuant to article III, section 3(c) and (d), Florida Constitution. He also contends that the history of article III, section 16, justifies his position. The Senate, on the other hand, contends that the Governor has no authority to limit a "special apportionment session" to less than thirty days because this type of session is called under the unique provisions of article III, section 16(a), and is quite different from a section 3 "special session."
We must reject the position of the Governor because in our view the two constitutional provisions dealing with special legislative sessions are different both in purpose and in content and the legislative history does not support the Governor's interpretation. The Governor contends that our construction and interpretation of article III, section 3(c) and (d), pertaining to other special sessions, as set forth in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 206 So.2d 212 (Fla.1968), by analogy gives the governor authority to limit a special apportionment session under section 16(a). We agree that he can limit a special session under section 3, but find that section is different from section 16. The governor is authorized, under article III, section 3(c) and (d), to call special legislative sessions, whenever he desires, to deal with any matters, other than apportionment, that he deems necessary. That section provides as follows:
(c) SPECIAL SESSIONS.
(1) The governor, by proclamation stating the purpose, may convene the legislature in special session during which only such legislative business may be transacted as is within the purview of the proclamation, or of a communication from the governor, or is introduced by consent of two-thirds of the membership of each house.
(2) A special session of the legislature may be convened as provided by law.
(d) LENGTH OF SESSIONS. A regular session of the legislature shall not exceed sixty consecutive days, and a special session shall not exceed twenty consecutive days, unless extended beyond such limit by a three-fifths vote of each house. During such an extension no new business may be taken up in either house without the consent of two-thirds of its membership. (Emphasis added.)
This section grants to the governor the absolute discretionary power to call a special session and also gives him the power to identify and limit the special session to a particular subject. Section 3(d) does place a maximum time limit on a special session by stating that this type of "special session shall not exceed twenty consecutive days." We construed this language in our advisory opinion to Governor Kirk, in which we concluded that, in view of the governor's total discretionary authority both to determine whether or not to call the legislature into session and to determine the subject matter of the call, he also had the discretion, exercised in the public interest, to specify that the session would last for a period of less than twenty days. 206 So.2d at 213-14. It should also be noted that the governor has traditional veto control over the product of a section 3(c) special session whereas he exercises no veto control over the product of a special apportionment session.
Article III, section 16(a), is limited to apportionment proceedings. This provision is distinctive because the governor has a mandatory duty to call a special apportionment session; he has no discretion as to the subject matter of the session; and, he has no authority to require the legislature to consider matters other than apportionment during the session. The purpose of the special apportionment session provision was clearly to grant the legislature one last opportunity to reach a legislative accord upon apportionment before transferring that function to the judicial branch. We emphasized, in In Re Apportionment Law, Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 263 So.2d 797 (Fla.1972), that apportionment under our present constitutional scheme is principally a matter for legislative consideration. Once the session is called, the governor is no longer involved in the apportionment process since the legislature's joint apportionment resolution is not subject to gubernatorial veto. Further, this Court acts only in a legal supervisory role unless the legislature fails to reach an agreement. If this occurs, the constitution provides that this Court then becomes the body that must establish an...
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