Goldstein v. California 8212 1192

• Decision Date: 18 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 71,71
• Citation: 412 U.S. 546,37 L.Ed.2d 163,93 S.Ct. 2303
• Parties: Donald GOLDSTEIN et al., Petitioners, v. State of CALIFORNIA. —1192
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

412 U.S. 546

93 S.Ct. 2303

37 L.Ed.2d 163

Donald GOLDSTEIN et al., Petitioners,

v State of CALIFORNIA.

No. 71—1192.

Argued Dec. 13, 1972.

Decided June 18, 1973.

Syllabus

Petitioners, convicted for committing acts of 'record piracy' or 'tape piracy' in 1970—1971, challenge the California statute proscribing such practices, as violative of the 'Copyright Clause,' Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, and the federal statutes enacted thereunder. The state appellate court upheld the validity of the statute. Held:

1. Article I, § 8, cl. 8, does not expressly or by inference vest all power to grant copyright protection exclusively in the Federal Government. Pp. 552—561.

(a) Although the objective of the Copyright Clause was to facilitate the granting of rights national in scope, it does not indicate that all 'Writings' are of national interest or that protective state legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded. Pp. 555—558.

(b) No substantially prejudicial interstate conflicts result where some States grant copyright protection within their own jurisdictions while other States do not. Pp. 558—559.

(c) Conflicts will not necessarily arise between state enactments and congressional policy when States grant copyright protection. P. 559.

(d) Unless Congress determines that the national interest requires federal protection or freedom from restraint as to a particular category of 'Writings,' state protection of that category is not precluded. P. 559.

(e) The durational limitation imposed by the Copyright Clause on Congress does not invalidate state laws, like the one here, that have no such limitation. Pp. 560—561.

2. The California statute does not violate the Supremacy Clause by conflicting with federal copyright law. Pp. 561—570.

(a) Congress did not, in passing the Copyright Act of 1909, determine that recordings, as original writings, were unworthy of all copyright protection. Pp. 563—566.

(b) Nor did Congress in 17 U.S.C. § 4, which provides that 'the works for which copyrights may be secured under this Act shall include all writings of an author,' or in § 5, pre-empt state control over all works to which the term 'writings' might apply. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed.2d 661; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234, 84 S.Ct. 779, 11 L.Ed.2d 669, distinguished. Pp. 567—569.

3. Although in 1971, the federal copyright statutes were amended to allow federal protection of recordings, such statutory protection was not intended to alter the legal relationships governing recordings 'fixed' prior to February 15, 1972. Until and unless Congress takes further action with respect to recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, California remains free to proscribe acts of record or tape piracy such as those involved here. Pp. 570—571.

Affirmed.

Arthur Leeds, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners.

David M. Schacter, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review petitioners' conviction under a California statute making it a criminal offense to 'pirate' recordings produced by others.

In 1971, an information was filed by the State of California, charging petitioners in 140 counts with violating § 653h of the California Penal Code. The information charged that, between April 1970 and March 1971, petitioners had copied several musical performances from commercially sold recordings without the permission of the owner of the master record or tape.¹ Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that § 653h was in conflict with Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Con- stitution,² the 'Copyright Clause,' and the federal statutes enacted thereunder. Upon denial of their motion, petitioners entered pleas of nolo contendere to 10 of the 140 counts; the remaining counts were dismissed. On appeal, the Appellate Department of the California Superior Court sustained the validity of the statute. After exhausting other state appellate remedies, petitioners sought review in this Court.

I

Petitioners were engaged in what has commonly been called 'record piracy' or 'tape piracy'—the unauthorized duplication of recordings of performances by major musical artists.³ Petitioners would purchase from a retail distributor a single tape or phonograph recording of the popular performances they wished to duplicate. The original recordings were produced and marketed by recording companies with which petitioners had no contractual relationship. At petitioners' plant, the recording was reproduced on blank tapes, which could in turn be used to replay the music on a tape player. The tape was then wound on a cartridge. A label was attached, stating the title of the recorded performance—the same title as had appeared on the original recording, and the name of the performing artists.⁴ After final packaging the tapes were distributed to retail outlets for sale to the public, in competition with those petitioners had copied.

Petitioners made no payments to the artists whose performances they reproduced and sold, or to the various trust funds established for their benefit; no payments were made to the producer, technicians, or other staff personnel responsible for producing the original recording and paying the large expenses incurred in production.⁵ No payments were made for the use of the artists' names or the album title.

The challenged California statute forbids petitioners to transfer any performance fixed on a tape or record onto other records or tapes with the intention of selling the duplicates, unless they have first received permission from those who, under state law, are the owners of the master recording. Although the protection afforded to each master recording is substantial, lasting for an unlimited time, the scope of the proscribed activities is narrow. No limitation is placed on the use of the music, lyrics, or arrangement employed in making the master recording. Petitioners are not precluded from hiring their own musicians and artists and recording an exact imitation of the performance embodied on the master recording. Petitioners are even free to hire the same artists who made the initial recording inorder to duplicate the performance. In essence, the statute thus provides copyright protection solely for the specific expressions which compose the master record or tape.

Petitioners' attack on the constitutionality of § 653h has many facets. First, they contend that the statute establishes a state copyright of unlimited duration, and thus conflicts with Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution. Second, petitioners claim that the state statute interferes with the implementation of federal policies inherent in the federal copyright statutes. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. According to petitioners, it was the intention of Congress, as interpreted by this Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed.2d 661 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234, 84 S.Ct. 779, 11 L.Ed.2d 669 (1964), to establish a uniform law throughout the United States to protect original writings. As part of the federal scheme, it is urged that Congress intended to allow individuals to copy any work which was not protected by a federal copyright. Since § 653h effectively prohibits the copying of works which are not entitled to federal protection, petitioners contend that it conflicts directly with congressional policy and must fall under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Finally, petitioners argue that 17 U.S.C. § 2, which allows States to protect unpublished writings,⁶ does not authorize the challenged state provision; since the records which petitioners copied had previously been released to the public, petitioners contend that they had, under federal law, been published.

We note at the outset that the federal copyright statutes to which petitioners refer were amended by Con- gress while their case was pending in the state courts. In 1971, Pub.L. 92—140, 85 Stat. 391, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e), was passed to allow federal copyright protection of recordings. However, § 3 of the amendment specifically provides that such protection is to be available only to sound recordings 'fixed, published, and copyrighted' on and after February 15, 1972, and before January 1, 1975, and that nothing in Title 17, as amended is to 'be applied retroactively or (to) be construed as affecting in any way any rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before' February 15, 1972. The recordings which petitioners copied were all 'fixed' prior to February 15, 1972. Since, according to the language of § of the amendment, Congress did not intend to alter the legal relationships which govern these recordings, the amendments have no application in petitioners' case.⁷

II

Petitioners' first argument rests on the premise that the state statute under which they were convicted lies beyond the powers which the States reserved in our federal system. If this is correct, petitioners must prevail, since the States cannot exercise a sovereign power which, under the Constitution, they have relinquished to the Federal Government for its exclusive exercise.

A

The principles which the Court has followed in construing state power were stated by Alexander Hamilton in Number 32 of The Federalist:

'An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether depend- ent on the general will. But as the plan of the (Constitutional) convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three...