United States v. Haughton

• Citation: 413 F.2d 736
• Decision Date: 23 July 1969
• Docket Number: No. 23556.,23556.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Lonnie Leroy HAUGHTON, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

413 F.2d 736 (1969)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Lonnie Leroy HAUGHTON, Appellant.

No. 23556.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

June 19, 1969.

Rehearing Denied July 23, 1969.

David R. Hood (argued), Seattle, Wash., for appellant.

J. S. Obenour (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Eugene G. Cushing, U. S. Atty., Tacoma, Wash., for appellee.

Before CHAMBERS and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District Judge.^*

SOLOMON, District Judge:

Lonnie Leroy Haughton appeals his conviction of wilfully refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462.

Haughton's claim for conscientious objector status was rejected by his local board on May 18, 1967. On May 26, Haughton informed the board that he wished to appeal. The regulations required the board to forward Haughton's file to the State Director's office within five days following the thirtieth day after his claim was denied. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.13, 1626.14. Washington State Headquarters Memorandum No. 5 (Nov. 4, 1948; amended Dec. 14, 1961). The board properly forwarded the file on June 22, 1967, and on July 6 the State Director's office sent Haughton's file to the appeal board. The appeal board retained Haughton in I-A. On November 7, 1967, Haughton refused to submit to induction.

Haughton first argues that his induction order was invalid because he did not receive a Department of Justice hearing on his conscientious objector claim. Prior to June 30, 1967, the law provided:

"Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of * * * conscientious objections shall, if such claim is not sustained by the local board, be entitled to an appeal to the appropriate appeal board. Upon the filing of such appeal, the appeal board shall refer any such claim to the Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing. The Department of Justice, after appropriat inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and good faith of the objections of the person concerned, and such person shall be notified of the time and place of such hearing." Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6, 62 Stat. 609.

The Department of Justice was then required to make recommendations to the appeal board based on its findings.

The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j), deletes the Department of Justice hearing. Haughton claims that he was entitled to a hearing because the prior law granted one "upon the filing of such appeal" and he filed his appeal on May 26, 1967, more than a month before the new Act took effect. We disagree.

We believe Congress intended that the Department of Justice process only those files actually under investigation on June 30, 1967. Haughton's file did not reach the appeal board until July 6. The House-Senate Conference Report (June 8, 1967) on the 1967 Act states:

"The conferees have been advised by the Attorney General that there are currently approximately 2,700 conscientious objector cases being processed by the Department of Justice. The House-Senate conferees believe that the processing of these cases should be completed despite the change in the law and advisory opinions referred to the individual appeal boards * * *." U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 1360 (1967).

Statutes effecting procedural changes, which do not otherwise alter substantive rights, generally are considered immediately applicable to pending cases. Beatty v. United States, 191 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.1951); Hiersche v. Seamless Rubber Co., 225 F.Supp. 682 (D.Or. 1963); Schurgast v. Schumann, 156 Conn. 471, 242 A.2d 695 (1968).

The Department of Justice also believed deletion of the hearing requirement applied retroactively. It returned all unprocessed files, including those received prior to July 1, 1967. "When faced with a problem of statutory construction," a court should show "great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). We conclude that Haughton was not entitled to a Department of Justice hearing.

Haughton next claims his local board had no basis in fact to deny his request for a I-O classification. He cites Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132 (1953), for the proposition that a local board must actually "build a record" supporting its conclusion.¹

In Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir.1966), we rejected this interpretation of Dickinson. In Parrott, we quoted the majority opinion in Dickinson:

"The task of the courts in cases such as this is to search the record for some affirmative evidence to support the local board\'s overt or implicit finding that a registrant has not painted a complete or accurate picture of his activities." 346 U.S. at 396, 74 S.Ct. at 157.

We interpreted this language to mean that

"since in Dickinson all evidence before the board established the exemption, the registrant had met the statutory criteria, and the board could not, without any contrary evidence, simply say it disbelieved him, `even in the absence of any impeaching or contradictory evidence.\'" 370 F.2d at 391 (quoting Dickinson at 396, 74 S.Ct. 152).

Dickinson involved a ministerial exemption. Conscientious objection requires a different approach "because the ultimate question * * * is the sincerity of the registrant in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form." Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381, 75 S. Ct. 392, 396, 99 L.Ed. 428 (1955). The Sixth Circuit, after reviewing Witmer and Dickinson, said: "Where, however, the veracity of the registrant is the principal issue, disbelief will suffice. But even in the latter situation, the record must contain some statement of this disbelief if the classification is to be upheld on judicial review." United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37, 39 (6th Cir.1968). See also Witmer v. United States, at 382, 75 S.Ct. 392; United States v. St. Clair, 293 F.Supp. 337, 341 (E.D.N.Y.1968). Inconsistent statements or actions or a finding of insincerity may support the denial of conscientious objector status. Parrott v. United States, supra; see Witmer v. United States at 382, 75 S.Ct. 392. The local board, however, must state the reasons for its denial of a requested classification when a registrant has "met the statutory criteria" (Parrott, supra, at 388) for that classification or, in the language of Dickinson, has placed himself "prima facie within the statutory exemption." 346 U.S. at 397, 74 S.Ct. at 158.² Kessler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151, 156 (5th Cir.1969). Otherwise a court cannot determine whether a board's denial of a requested classification was based on a belief that the registrant's statements, even if true, did not entitle him to the classification, or on the reasonable disbelief of certain allegations necessary to the registrant's prima facie case. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 416-417 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd sub nom United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed.2d 733 (1965). Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.1954). Batelaan v. United States, 217 F.2d 946 and note 1 (9th Cir.1954). United States v. St. Clair, supra, at 344, Cf. Schuman v. United States, 208 F.2d 801, 805 (9th Cir.1953).

We must review Haughton's form 150 in light of these principles and of the Supreme Court's statement in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-185, 85 S.Ct. 850, 863, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965):

"* * * it must be remembered that in resolving these exemption problems one deals with the beliefs of different individuals who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. In such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of a registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight. * * * The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant\'s `Supreme Being\' or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government. * * * Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them `incomprehensible.\' Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious."

Haughton states he believes in a Supreme Being, but his form 150 indicates that he does not believe in an anthropomorphic God.³ Rather, he believes that "leading a religious existence is equivalent to a `belief in a Supreme Being.'" "Religious" men are those "who direct their whole lives according to the dictates of a goal or belief that they have themselves assumed as being superior to a common existence." "Leading this religious existence necessarily involves `duties which are superior to those arising from any human relation'" and the "prime duty of a religious individual is to keep himself true to his ideal."

Haughton relates the following training:

"a. Teaching and training under the Christian faith including Methodist, Baptist, and unorthodox training.

b. A personal reading of the Old and New Testaments (except for the book of Revelation) of the Holy Bible.

c. A personal reading of K. Gibran\'s The Prophet.

d. A personal study of the philosophy of existentialism. * * *

e. A personal study of Eastern religions, especially Zen Buddhism.

f. Teaching Sunday School in a Baptist Church."

Haughton lists the following principles drawn from his religious training and belief:

"a. Reverence for human life as being that form of life which is able to experience spiritual understanding.

b. A belief that living according to spiritual principles of good is my only way of giving meaning to my experience.

c. A knowledge that right and wrong is a relative, personal concept for each individual.

d. A belief that I cannot give myself as a participant in any organization,

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