Mujahid v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 27 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-36038.,03-36038.
• Citation: 413 F.3d 991
• Parties: Sabil M. MUJAHID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles A. DANIELS, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

413 F.3d 991

Sabil M. MUJAHID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles A. DANIELS, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 03-36038.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2005.

Filed June 27, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen R. Sady, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, for the petitioner-appellant.

Kenneth C. Bauman and Craig J. Casey, Assistant United States Attorneys, Portland, OR, for the respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-02-01719-GMK/JMS.

Before BEEZER, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

BEEZER, Circuit Judge.

Sabil Mujahid appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP" or "Bureau") interpretation of the maximum good time credit a federal prisoner can receive under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Mujahid asserts that the Bureau's interpretation, which allows a prisoner serving a ten-year sentence to earn a maximum of 470 days credit, contradicts the statute's stated allowance of 54 days of credit per year. We affirm.

I

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. In 1995, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska sentenced Mujahid to ten years imprisonment, plus three years supervised release, upon his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm). He began his term in custody on March 21 of that year.

In 2002, while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon ("FCI-Sheridan"), Mujahid filed this challenge to the Bureau's interpretation of the good time statute. Mujahid's petition, which he filed in the District of Oregon, named as respondent the warden at FCI-Sheridan. The magistrate judge reviewing the petition disagreed with the assertion that the Bureau's interpretation deprived Mujahid of good time credit. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendations (with one modification not relevant here) and denied Mujahid's petition on November 4, 2003. Mujahid timely appealed.

The government represents that Mujahid began his three-year term of supervised release on January 6, 2004.¹

II

As an initial matter, we determine whether events subsequent to the district court's denial of Mujahid's petition deprive this court of jurisdiction or render this appeal moot. The government contends that Mujahid's placement onto supervised release prevents us from providing any relief. We disagree.

A

The government's first contention, marginally raised in its briefing and argued at length during oral argument, is that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because Mujahid is no longer imprisoned by the named respondent-warden.² Established principles of habeas procedure suggest otherwise.

When Mujahid filed his petition, he was incarcerated in Oregon. He filed his petition in district court, in the District of Oregon. He named as respondent the warden of the institution where he was imprisoned. These steps properly complied with habeas procedure. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2720, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004). Mujahid's subsequent transfer and placement onto supervised release do not alter this analysis. As the government recognizes, a habeas petitioner remains in the custody of the United States while on supervised release. Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir.2002). And as we stated in Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), "jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change."

B

The next government challenge asserts mootness. "The burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy one." Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2001). The government has not met that burden.

An appeal is moot "when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant." Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement renders a habeas petition moot. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). "This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The government argues that we are unable to provide any relief to Mujahid because he completed his term of imprisonment and was placed on supervised release. The government relies on United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 54, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000), to support its position. We agree that Johnson holds that a prisoner who wrongfully serves excess prison time is not entitled to an automatic reduction in his term of supervised release. Id. at 60, 120 S.Ct. 1114. But our post-Johnson precedent does not support construing Johnson in the manner advocated by the government.

We addressed this very issue in Gunderson v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.2001). Although the petitioner in Gunderson challenged an agency practice affecting the length of his sentence, we recognized that the court was unable to order any reduction in prison time because he would not be eligible for such relief until his term of imprisonment expired. We held this fact did not render the petition moot, however, because the petitioner's sentence included a term of supervised release. The "possibility" that the sentencing court would use its discretion to reduce a term of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) was enough to prevent the petition from being moot. Id.; see also United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir.2001) (holding a defendant on supervised release retained a personal stake in the appeal of his sentence because, if he prevailed, "he could be resentenced to a shorter period of supervised release").

Gunderson controls our mootness inquiry. There "is a possibility" that Mujahid could receive a reduction in his term of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). 253 F.3d at 1153. Gunderson does not require more.

The government's attempt to distinguish Gunderson is unavailing. The government maintains that the Gunderson petitioner, unlike Mujahid, sought habeas relief in the same court in which he was originally sentenced. This supposed fact allegedly differentiates Gunderson because Mujahid's habeas court (in the District of Oregon) has no control over the decision to modify the supervised release terms, which rest with the sentencing court (in the District of Alaska).

We cannot accept this argument. Gunderson, like Mujahid, followed general habeas procedure in naming as respondent the warden of the prison where he was incarcerated at the time of filing his petition. Gunderson, 268 F.3d at 1152-53; see also Padilla, 124 S.Ct. at 2720. The Gunderson opinion does not state that the petitioner was seeking habeas relief before the same court in which he was sentenced, and there is no indication that its mootness analysis turned on such a fortuitous occurrence.³

C

Mujahid filed his habeas petition in the proper district court, naming the proper respondent. See Padilla, 124 S.Ct. at 2718. He remains in "custody" for habeas purposes. Matus-Leva, 287 F.3d at 761. His petition asserts an injury due to the duration of his sentence and seeks relief through a possible reduction of his term in custody. Gunderson, 268 F.3d at 1153. This appeal is properly before us and is not moot.

III

We now turn to the merits of Mujahid's challenge to the BOP's interpretation of the federal good time statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Mujahid asserts that the BOP's interpretation erroneously reduces the amount of good time credit available on a ten-year sentence from 540 to 470 days. Although Mujahid's reading of the statute is arguably plausible, we have previously held that the BOP's contrary interpretation is reasonable and subject to deference. Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir.2001). This determination is controlling.

A

At issue in this appeal is the 1995⁴ version of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), which states in relevant part (emphasis added):

(b) Credit toward service of sentence for satisfactory behavior.—

(1) A prisoner ... who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than one year, other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner's life, shall receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of fifty-four days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, unless the Bureau of Prisons determines that, during that year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with ... institutional disciplinary regulations.... The Bureau's determination [of satisfactory compliance] shall be made within fifteen days after the end of each year of the sentence. Credit that has not been earned may not later be granted. Credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.

The Bureau and Mujahid disagree on whether "term of imprisonment" as used in the italicized portion of the statute means time actually served (BOP interpretation) or sentence imposed (Mujahid interpretation). The BOP implementing regulation provides:

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3624(b), as in effect for offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987 but before April 26, 1996, an inmate earns 54 days credit toward service of sentence (good conduct time credit) for each year served. This...