Li v. Wong
| Decision Date | 15 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 93688 |
| Citation | 162 Mich.App. 767,413 N.W.2d 493 |
| Parties | Chen LI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chu-Fen WONG, Chou Yu-Feng Wong, and Becky Jane Belknap, Defendants, and Kenneth Feldt, individually and as operations engineer of the City of Ann Arbor, John Robbins, individually and as director of transportation of the City of Ann Arbor, and the City of Ann Arbor, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. 162 Mich.App. 767, 413 N.W.2d 493 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[162 MICHAPP 768] Pauline R. Rothmeyer, Ann Arbor, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ronald J. Plunkett, Kenneth Feldt and John Robbins, Ann Arbor, for City of Ann Arbor.
Before SAWYER, P.J., and SULLIVAN and THOMAS, * JJ.
The instant case arises out of an automobile accident which occurred in 1983 in which plaintiff was a passenger in the front seat of a vehicle driven by defendant Chou Yu-Feng Wong and owned by defendant Chu-Fen Wong, who was a passenger in the back seat at the time of the accident. According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant Chou Yu-Feng Wong drove through a red light at the intersection of Pontiac Trail and Barton Drive in Ann Arbor, striking the vehicle [162 MICHAPP 769] driven by defendant Becky J. Belknap. Apparently, defendant Wong saw the light change but decided it would be unsafe to attempt to stop and, according to plaintiff, negligently attempted to proceed through the intersection.
Plaintiff commenced this action on March 11, 1986, alleging, inter alia, negligence on the part of defendants City of Ann Arbor, John Robbins, the city's transportation director, and Kenneth Feldt, the city's operations engineer, in the maintenance and repair of the traffic signal located at the intersection. Plaintiff further claimed that defendant city had created and maintained a nuisance by improperly timing the light.
Defendants city, Robbins, and Feldt moved for summary disposition on the grounds that plaintiff's suit, filed two years and ten months after the accident, was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and that plaintiff had not given the city a verified notice of her injuries pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 691.1404; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(104). Thereafter, by leave of the court, plaintiff amended her complaint and alleged that her injuries were caused in part by the city's deliberate and intentional acts of setting the timing of the signal, which constituted an intentional nuisance. The trial court thereafter heard defendants' motion for summary disposition and ruled that plaintiff's negligence action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that plaintiff's pleadings did not constitute a nuisance claim, but were a mere restatement of her negligence cause of action.
Plaintiff now appeals and we reverse with respect to the intentional nuisance claim.
Plaintiff first argues that her negligence claim is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in M.C.L. Sec. 691.1411(2); M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(111)(2) [162 MICHAPP 770] because the statutory period was tolled until she discovered her cause of action. We disagree.
The period of limitations for claims arising under the statutory defective-highways exception to governmental immunity is two years. M.C.L. Sec. 691.1411(2); M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(111)(2). The statute does not provide for a discovery rule. However, case law has created a so-called discovery rule which provides that a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or should have known that he has a possible cause of action. Bonney v. The Upjohn Co., 129 Mich.App. 18, 342 N.W.2d 551 (1983).
We are not aware of any decision which has extended the discovery rule to defective-highway cases. However, we do not believe it necessary to determine whether it is appropriate to extend the discovery rule to this class of cases as we believe that, even if the discovery rule were applicable to the case at bar, plaintiff's suit would nevertheless be barred under the statute of limitations. More specifically, we believe that plaintiff knew or should have known that she had a cause of action based upon the defective signal light at the time of or soon after the accident itself.
Plaintiff's theory of a defective highway is based upon the signal light's being improperly timed. Plaintiff claims that she did not discover that the light was improperly timed until reading an article concerning the problem in the local newspaper. However, we believe that plaintiff could have discovered the improper timing of the light prior to reading the newspaper article inasmuch as the timing of the light could not be regarded as a closely held secret. Indeed, by the very nature of a signal light, the timing of the light would be displayed for all the world to see merely by passing through or near the intersection. Thus, plaintiff could have returned to the intersection later [162 MICHAPP 771] on the day of the accident and observed the functioning of the signal light and discovered whether the light was improperly timed. While the local newspaper article may have brought to public attention a fact which the public had previously ignored, the article did not bring to the public awareness a fact previously held secret.
Accordingly, even if the discovery rule were to be applied to this case, since plaintiff could have discovered the timing of the light immediately after the accident, plaintiff's claim accrued even under the discovery rule at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff's suit based upon the defective-highways statute was barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's next argument, however, is meritorious. Plaintiff claims that she properly pled an action of intentional nuisance and pled facts in avoidance of immunity. We agree. In plaintiff's amended complaint, she charged that the city created an intentional nuisance by programming and maintaining a traffic signal at the intersection of Pontiac Trail and Barton Drive. Her well-pled allegations of intentional nuisance read as follows:...
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Li v. Feldt
...had stated a valid intentional-nuisance claim, and that intentional nuisance was an exception to governmental immunity. 162 Mich.App. 767, 413 N.W.2d 493 (1987). Defendants applied for leave to appeal in this Court. On May 31, 1988, this Court remanded 2 the case to the Court of Appeals for......
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Li v. Feldt
...of Appeals initially reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings regarding Li's claim of intentional nuisance. 162 Mich.App. 767, 413 N.W.2d 493 (1987). This Court vacated and remanded in light of Hadfield v. Oakland Co. Drain Comm'r., 430 Mich. 139, 422 N.W.2d 205 (1988), in whic......
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Scameheorn v. Bucks, 93145
...not have signed the Eyde Brothers opinion so long as it employed the Ford standard. In my authored opinion in Li v. Wong, 162 Mich.App. 767, 773, 413 N.W.2d 493 (1987), I indicated that the Veeneman-Garcia standard was correct. This is the position I hold now and have always held. To the ex......
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Li v. Feldt
...but concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on plaintiff's intentional nuisance claim. Li v. Wong, 162 Mich.App. 767, 413 N.W.2d 493 (1987). The Supreme Court thereafter vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to this Court for reconsi......