Webb v. Standard Oil Company

• Citation: 414 F.2d 320
• Decision Date: 27 August 1969
• Docket Number: No. 25615.,25615.
• Parties: J. P. (Pat) WEBB, Appellant, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

414 F.2d 320 (1969)

J. P. (Pat) WEBB, Appellant, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 25615.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 24, 1969.

Rehearing Denied August 27, 1969.

Ed G. Barham, Valdosta, Ga., W. D. Knight, Nashville, Ga., Franklin Barham, Coleman, Elliott & Blackburn, Valdosta, Ga., for appellant.

Kirk, McAlpin, Atlanta, Ga., Cam U. Young, Valdosta, Ga., Charles M. Kidd, A. Felton Jenkins, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., Young, Young & Ellerbee, Valdosta, Ga., King & Spalding, Atlanta, Ga., of counsel, for appellee.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, TUTTLE, Circuit Judge, and FISHER, District Judge.

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

The damage claim asserted in this diversity case arises from personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Webb in a fall from the defendant oil company's storage tank. Webb appeals from the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

In this Circuit the "high mortality rate" of dismissals on the "barebones pleadings" is a well-publicized fact. See, e. g., Banco Continental v. Curtiss National Bank, 5 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 510; Mizell v. North Broward Hospital District, 5 Cir., 1968, 392 F.2d 580, 581; Barber v. M/V Blue Cat, 5 Cir., 1967, 372 F.2d 626, 1969 A.M.C. 211; cf. Keating v. Jones Development, Inc., 5 Cir., 1968, 398 F.2d 1011. On motion to dismiss, the complaint must be measured by the familiar, and very liberal, test of Conley v. Gibson, 1957, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80.¹ Although this is a close case, and certainly a great deal closer than so many interred here, we conclude that the dismissal here, like so many others, cannot be sustained.

The "facts" of this case are simple, because there are none. Rather, there are at this point only allegations — both specific and general. A summary of the allegations of Webb's complaint is as follows:

Webb was a "commissioned agent" for the sale of Standard's products, and one of his duties was to measure the number of gallons of petroleum products required to fill a particular perpendicular type tank located at Standard's bulk plant. The tank was approximately 30 feet tall, and in order to make the required measurement, Webb had to climb a steel ladder constructed of metal rungs welded to pieces of angle iron. The angle iron forming the stay posts of the ladder was too large to be grasped by a man's hand, and there were no handrails, guardrails, landing or other protective devices attached to the ladder. In June 1965, while performing his duty to measure the amount of product in the tank, Webb was climbing the ladder at a point 20 to 30 feet above the ground when he fell and sustained severe physical injuries.

Webb had from time to time complained to Standard's agents that the ladder was unsafe. In response, these agents had assured Webb that the company had under study and consideration changes that would lessen the dangers attendant to the use of said ladder and had instructed him to continue to use it until the changes and safety devices could be installed.

It was, and is, Webb's contention that defendant's negligent refusal to provide a safe ladder or to install handrails or safety devices was the proximate cause of his injuries.

In his original petition in the District Court, Webb made some attempt to characterize his relationship with Standard Oil as that of landlord-tenant, but in this appeal he takes the position, and we think correctly, that their true relationship was that of principal and agent. Webb's theory of recovery is that the failure of the defendant-principal to provide safe working conditions to the plaintiff-agent constituted a breach of the codal duty imposed on the defendant by their relationship.²

This simple opener is almost lost as the successive contentions and counter contentions of the parties are successively matched as a sort of juridical vingt-et-un.

Thus, in support of its motion to dismiss in the Court below, Standard responded with the doctrine of assumption of risk³ and contended that its application barred Webb's recovery. With his turn to draw, Webb invoked a Georgia exception to the general Georgia rule of assumption of risk — that the servant is not barred by the defense of assumption of risk if he has pointed out the obvious danger to the master, and the master commands the servant to proceed and assures him that there is no danger or that some measures will be taken to make the condition safer.⁴ With scarcely a riffle Standard pulled out a Georgia exception to that exception: where there is an obvious danger, but the servant fails to exercise ordinary care and rashly exposes himself to the danger, he cannot recover from the master even though his actions were sanctioned or commanded by the master.⁵

In the view of this Court, this case breaks down into two significant questions. The first — the issue of assumption of risk — clearly appears to have been eliminated as a pleading obstacle by reason of quite specific allegations which anticipate these Georgia principles. In the early case of Bush v. West Yellow Pine Co., 1907, 2 Ga.App. 295, 58 S.E. 529, the Georgia Court, analyzing this particular facet of the law of master-servant liability, stated:

"The servant, recognizing that the risk is on himself, says to the master, `This instrumentality furnished by you to me is unsafe\'. The master replies: `Use it. It is safe\'. Or `Use it temporarily, and I will repair it and make it safe.\' The servant obeys the order and is injured. What effect will the law give to such transactions? In the first, where the master says, `It is safe\', the law will construe these words as such a warranty that a breach of it will release the servant from the assumption of the risk. In the other case, where the master says, `Use it; I will repair it and make it safe\'; — the law implies an agreement on the master\'s part that the temporary use pending the time necessary to get the repairing done shall be at his risk, and not at that of the servant, who has complained of the instrumentality."

In the case before us, Webb alleged that when he complained to Standard's agents, they assured him that measures were being studied that would make the ladder safer and instructed him to continue to use the ladder until repairs could be made. We think that these statements, if made, or other facts and circumstances proved from which similar inferences could be drawn, would fit the Georgia notion of an implied agreement to bear the risk of accident during the time prior to accomplishment of the repairs.⁶ Thus, if these or comparable facts were proved, the defense of assumption of risk would go out of the case.

That brings us to the second question. For still undaunted, Standard sets its second line of defense in the doctrine of contributory negligence.⁷ The company argues, and the District Court presumably held, that the allegations of Webb's complaint⁸ establish, as a matter of law, that Webb acted "rashly,"⁹ or at least negligently in such a quality as to deny recovery.

Slippery as are these undulating Georgia principles of some-time momentary shifting liabilities or defenses, the problem is not with the law. The difficulty is that we are asked as Judges to rule as a matter of law that the ladder, once characterized by Webb as "extremely dangerous and unsafe," was so dangerous that no reasonable man could ever conclude that its attempted use could be anything less than "rash". But where do we get these powers of divination? We don't even have a picture of the ladder. And the "word" picture set forth by the scrivener in the pleadings is anything but a revealing one. It is chock-full of conclusory statements. What does the ladder look like? What sort of handholds does it have?

Bear in mind that in the story set forth (and admitted) in the pleadings the employer (Standard) did two things. First, it instructed Webb to continue to use the ladder. Next, it gave assurance that, while the company was looking into possible corrective improvements, the ladder was safe to use. If an employer, under the heavy Georgia duty to provide safe working conditions, takes those steps with an employee, how could a Judge — trial or appellate — say that an employee could not credit the employer's appraisal of the device's relative safety?

All of the issues of liability and defense — partial or complete — are open for factual development to determine what the facts are, not what lawyers say they are, or worse, undertake to characterize their legal significance. This is but a reminder that the "reasonable man" is indeed an elusive character, and, as Standard concedes, ordinarily the question of negligence — either primary or contributory — is one for the jury.¹⁰ And unless reasonable men would be compelled to hold Standard not negligent or Webb negligent to a degree denying recovery, the case would have to go to the jury. See Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 1969, 411 F.2d 365 (en banc).

The upshot is that we have decided that what Webb says is so is or may be enough. But this may turn out to have been a sterile exercise. "What will come of this only the facts will tell. It now goes back two years later to find out what they are." Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 5 Cir., 1969, 407 F.2d 549, 551.

From both a substantive standpoint and that of judicial administration, what we've earlier said bears...