United States v. Calandra 8212 734
| Decision Date | 08 January 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 72,72 |
| Citation | 414 U.S. 338,38 L.Ed.2d 561,94 S.Ct. 613 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. John P. CALANDRA. —734 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
When respondent's place of business was being searched by federal agents under a warrant issued in connection with a gambling investigation and specifying that the object of the search was to discover and seize bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia, one agent, knowing of a pending federal investigation of loansharking activities, discovered and seized a suspected loansharking record. Subsequently, a grand jury investigating loansharking activities subpoenaed respondent to query him on the seized evidence, but he refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. After the Government then requested transactional immunity for respondent, the District Court granted respondent's suppression motion on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant, and further ordered that respondent need not answer any of the grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: A witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. Pp. 342 355.
(a) The exclusionary rule, under which evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the fruits of such evidence cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure, is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect on future unlawful police conduct, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Pp. 347—348.
(b) Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the rule does not proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons, and its application has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are though most efficaciously served. P. 348.
(c) Allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious dis- charge of the grand jury's duties, and extending the rule to grand jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative and minimal advance in deterring police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the grand jury's role. Pp. 349—352.
(d) Grand jury questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure involve no independent governmental invasion of privacy, but rather the usual abridgment thereof common to all grand jury questioning. Such questions are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure and work no new Fourth Amendment wrong. Pp. 353—355. 6 Cir., 465 F.2d 1218, reversed.
Louis F. Claiborne, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Robert J. Rotatori, Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent.
This case presents the question whether a witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. The issue is of considerable importance to the administration of criminal justice.
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calandra's place of business, the Royal Machine & Tool Co. in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued in connection with an extensive investigation of suspected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the object of the search was the discovery and seizure of bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia. A master affidavit submitted in support of the application for the warrant contained information derived from statements by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), from physical surveillance conducted by FBI agents, and from court-authorized electronic surveillance.1
The Royal Machine & Tool Co. occupies a two-story building. The first floor consists of about 13,000 square feet, and houses industrial machinery and inventory. The second floor contains a general office area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary. On December 15, 1970, federal agents executed the warrant directed at Calandra's place of business and conducted a thorough, four-hour search of the premises. The record reveals that the agents spent more than three hours searching Calandra's office and files.
Although the agents found no gambling paraphernalia, one discovered, among certain promissory notes, a card indicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making periodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an affidavit that he was aware that the United States Attor- ney's office for the Northern District of Ohio was investigating possible violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 892, 893, and 894, dealing with extortionate credit transactions, and that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a 'loansharking' enterprise then under investigation. The agent concluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized along with various other items, including books and records of the company, stock certificates, and address books.
On March 1, 1971, a special grand jury was convened in the Northern District of Ohio to investigate possible loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The grand jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him questions based on the evidence seized during the search of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 1971, but refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Government then requested the District Court to grant Calandra transactional immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2514. Calandra requested and received a postponement of the hearing on the Government's application for the immunity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search.
Calandra later moved pursuant to Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 41(e) for suppression and return of the seized evidence on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On August 27, the District Court held a hearing at which Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer questions based on the seized materials. On October 1, the District Court entered its judgment ordering the evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. 332 F.Supp. 737 (1971). The court held that 'due process . . . allows a witness to litigate the question of whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for the questions asked of him before the grand jury has been obtained in a way which violates the constitutional protection against unlawful search and seizure.' Id., at 742. The court found that the search warrant had been issued without probable cause and that the search had exceeded the scope of the warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the District Court had properly entertained the suppression motion and that the exclusionary rule may be invoked by a witness before the grand jury to bar questioning based on evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure.2 465 F.2d 1218 (1972). The offer to grant Calandra immunity was deemed irrelevant. Id., at 1221.
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari, 410 U.S. 925, 93 S.Ct. 1357, 35 L.Ed.2d 585 (1973). We now reverse.
The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history. 3 In England, the grand jury served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn to discover and present for trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this country the Founders thought the grand jury so essential to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only be instituted by 'a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.' Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361—362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). The grand jury's historic functions survive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686—687, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2658—2659, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972).
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates in secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. 'It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.' Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919).
The scope of the grand jury's powers reflects its special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime...
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