Schmidt v. Lessard 8212 568, 73
Citation | 414 U.S. 473,94 S.Ct. 713,38 L.Ed.2d 661 |
Decision Date | 14 January 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 73,73 |
Parties | Wilbur SCHMIDT, Director of Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, et al. v. Alberta LESSARD —568 |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
In October and November 1971, appellee Alberta Lessard was subjected to a period of involuntary commitment under the Wisconsin State Mental Health Act, wis.Stat. § 51.001 et seq. While in confinement, she filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, on behalf of herself and all other persons 18 years of age or older who were being held involuntarily pursuant to the Wisconsin involuntary-commitment laws, alleging that the statutory scheme was violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since both declara- tory and injunctive relief were sought, a District Court of three judges was convened, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281.
After hearing argument and receiving briefs, the District Court filed a comprehensive opinion, declaring the Wisconsin statutory scheme unconstitutional. 349 F.Supp. 1078. The opinion concluded by stating that
Over nine months later, the District Court entered a judgment, which simply stated that
'It is Ordered and Adjudged that judgment be and hereby is entered in accordance with the Opinion heretoforce entered . . ..'
The defendants-appellants now seek to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. That statute provides that
'Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.'
In response, the appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Relying upon this Court's decision in Gunn v. University Committee to End the War, 399 U.S. 383, 90 S.Ct. 2013, 26 L.Ed.2d 684 she claims that the District Court's judgment did not constitute 'an order granting or denying' an injunction.
In Gunn, a statutory three-judge court had found a Texas breach of the peace statute unconstitutional. There, as here, the opinion of the District Court concluded by stating that the plaintiffs 'are entitled to . . . injunctive relief.' University Committee to End the War v. Gunn, 289 F.Supp. 469, 475 (W.D.Tex.). The District Court in Gunn, however, entered no further order or judgment of any kind; the concluding paragraph of the opinion was the only mention of injunctive relief. Thus, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, because of the total absence of any order 'granting or denying' an injunction.
Although the language of the District Court opinion here parallels that in Gunn, there is thus an important distinction between the two cases. While the record in Gunn was devoid of any order granting injunctive relief, there was in the present case a judgment entered 'in accordance with the Opinion.' Since the opinion of the District Court by its own terms authorizes the granting of injunctive relief to the appellee, we believe that the judgment here is sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Yet, although sufficient to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, the District Court's order provides a wholly inadequate foundation upon which to premise plenary judicial review. Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
'Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained . . ..'
The order here falls far short of satisfying the second and third clauses of Rule 65(d). Neither the brief judgment order nor the accompanying opinion is 'specific' in outlining the 'terms' of the injunctive relief granted; nor can it be said that the order describes 'in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be restrained.' Rather, the defendants are simply told not to enforce 'the...
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Smith, Matter of
...Schmidt, 349 F.Supp 1078, 1103 (E.D.Wis., 1972), vacated and remanded for more specific injunction sub.nom., Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). I therefore view In re Hutchinson as a case dealing directly with the denial of due process although unfortunat......
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Donahue v. Rhode Island Dept. of Mental Health
...(three-judge court); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D.Wis.1972) (three-judge court), vacated & remanded, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974); Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F.Supp. 1265, 1268 (D.Conn.1972) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911......
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Johnson v. Solomon
...is indigent." Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, 1097 (E.D.Wis.1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). See also In re Barnard, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 302, 310, 455 F.2d 1370, 1378 (D.C.Cir.1971); Heryford v. Parker, 296 F.2d 383 (10th Ci......
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...fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed." Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S.Ct. 713, 715, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (174). The problem of framing an appropriate order may be particularly acute in trade secret cases, see Syntex Ophth......
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