Torbit v. Ryder System, Inc., 03-3621.

Decision Date28 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-3621.,03-3621.
Citation416 F.3d 898
PartiesRonald C. TORBIT, Susan Torbit, Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. RYDER SYSTEM, INC., Defendant, GACS, Inc., formerly known as Delavan Industries, Inc., formerly known as Ryder Automotive Carrier Group, Inc., formerly known as Ryder Automotive Operations, Inc., formerly known as Ryder Automotive Carrier Services, Inc., formerly known as Ryder Automotive Carrier Division, Defendant — Appellant, General Motors Corporation, C.F. Bender Company, Defendants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

David E. Larson, argued, Kansas City, MO. (Thomas R. Larson and Jimmy E. Allen, Jr., on the brief), for appellant.

James R. Dowd, argued, St. Louis, MO. (Brian M. Wendler of Collinsville, IL., on the brief), for appellee.

Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

GACS Incorporated ("GACS") appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding plaintiffs Ronald C. Torbit ("Torbit") and his wife, Susan Torbit, substantial damages in this product-liability action. Torbit, a truck driver, suffered serious injuries to his shoulder and neck resulting from his use of a GACS ratchet system to secure vehicles to a vehicle-hauling trailer. GACS claims the District Court erred by 1) admitting evidence of other truck drivers' injuries that were not substantially similar to Torbit's injuries, 2) refusing to submit a comparative-fault instruction to the jury, and 3) permitting Torbit's testimony regarding his loss of future income. We affirm.

I.
A.

The trial record, read in a manner favorable to the jury verdict, McGuire v. Tarmac Envtl. Co., 293 F.3d 437, 439 (8th Cir.2002), supports the following summary of the facts. Torbit worked for nearly eighteen years as a driver of specialized trucks used to haul new vehicles from the factory to the dealership. Torbit's duties required him to drive multiple vehicles onto the deck of a tractor trailer and secure each vehicle to the deck using a chain and ratchet system, then reverse the process upon reaching each vehicle's destination. On October 23, 1998, while using a tie-down bar to untie a vehicle secured by the ratchet system, Torbit felt a jerking motion and a slapping sensation between his neck and shoulder. Over the next few days, the pain became excruciating. Torbit was later diagnosed with a torn labrum1 in his shoulder and three herniated discs in his cervical spine.2

While on medical leave from his job as a car hauler, Torbit underwent three surgeries to correct or alleviate his injuries. These surgeries included two cervical-fusion operations to repair his herniated discs and an operation to repair his torn labrum. After his first cervical-fusion operation, Torbit's doctor imposed medical restrictions that prevented him from returning to his job as a car hauler because the job required lifting and loading. After a lengthy search for comparable employment, Torbit finally secured a driving job with another employer that required no lifting or loading, but at a fraction of the salary he had earned as a car hauler. Torbit worked at the new job until the pain he experienced became intolerable. Torbit then underwent the second cervical-fusion operation, and while he was recuperating he was terminated from his car-hauling job.

Then fifty-one years old, Torbit was particularly distressed that after having worked eighteen years toward his pension as a unionized car hauler, he could not work the additional two years required for his pension to partially vest. Further, Torbit's pension would have fully vested in seven years, after he reached twenty-five years of employment. Torbit therefore offered to sweep floors for his original employer to get the additional work time, but his offer was declined.

Torbit then persuaded his doctor to lift Torbit's medical restrictions, and he attempted to be rehired by his original employer as a car hauler. The employer, however, sent Torbit to a company doctor who refused to allow Torbit to return to work. Finally, Torbit invoked the union collective bargaining agreement and consulted a doctor designated by the union to determine Torbit's employability. Torbit literally begged this doctor to allow him to work for the two years necessary to receive his partial pension, and the doctor struck a deal with Torbit. He would be allowed to work, but if the pain prevented Torbit from working effectively, the medical restrictions would be renewed. His employer subsequently rehired Torbit as a car hauler.

Torbit's surgeries have left him with no flexibility in his neck and with aggravated pain in his shoulder when he attempts overhead lifting or pulling. Torbit currently takes Darvocet, Ibuprofen, and Excedrin on a daily basis to relieve his pain. Still, Torbit continues to work as a car hauler and has refused to seek further medical restrictions until he reaches the twenty-year employment mark.

B.

Alleging a design defect in the ratchet system, Torbit sued GACS, the designer and manufacturer of the ratchet system, based on a theory of strict product liability. Torbit claimed the ratchet system was defective because it required a driver to exert dangerously high force levels to utilize the system, and he claimed this defect caused his injuries. The matter was first tried before a jury in October 2001. The first trial ended when the District Court granted a motion by GACS for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 The basis for the ruling was that Torbit's expert lacked the qualifications necessary to give an opinion as to any defect in the ratchet system, and therefore no defect was shown. In granting GACS's motion, the District Court also granted Torbit's motion for a new trial.

A second trial was held before a jury in November 2002.4 At that trial, Torbit called a different expert who testified about injuries to drivers using a ratchet system similar to the ratchet system Torbit used.5 Over GACS's continuing objection, the expert offered two charts that not only summarized injuries from tying and untying the ratchet system but also summarized completely unrelated injuries such as slipping and falling on ice, foreign bodies in the driver's eye, etc. The expert used these charts in explaining her opinion that the GACS ratchet system was defective. Also over GACS's objection, Torbit testified about his desire to work until his pension vested and about the amount of future income he would lose because of his injuries. GACS presented evidence to show Torbit had over-tightened the chain at the time of his injury and to show Torbit had failed to adhere to his training while untying the vehicle from the trailer.

At the close of evidence, GACS requested jury instructions based on comparative fault for Torbit's alleged over-tightening and failure to adhere to his training. GACS also requested a jury instruction that Torbit's testimony as to his loss of future income be disregarded given that Torbit was still working. The District Court allowed a comparative-fault instruction based on the over-tightening of the chain, but refused to give the instruction based on Torbit's failure to adhere to his training. The District Court also refused the instruction to disregard Torbit's testimony as to his loss of future income.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Torbit, finding that the GACS ratchet system was defective and that the defect had caused Torbit's injuries. The jury started with a base award of $770,000 for Torbit's damages. It then reduced that amount by ten percent for Torbit's comparative fault in over-tightening the chain, resulting in a total award for Torbit of $693,000. In addition, the jury awarded $30,000 to Susan Torbit for loss of consortium, which also was reduced by ten percent for Torbit's comparative fault in over-tightening the chain. GACS appeals.

II.

GACS first claims it was error to admit the two charts offered by Torbit's expert witness summarizing driver injuries because there was no showing that those driver injuries were substantially similar to Torbit's injuries.6 We review the District Court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Mems v. City of St. Paul. Dep't of Fire & Safety Servs., 327 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.2003) (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S.Ct. 1052, 157 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004). An abuse of discretion occurs in the context of admitting evidence only where the error is clear and prejudicial to the outcome of the proceeding. Lovett ex rel. Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R., 201 F.3d 1074, 1080 (8th Cir.2000). Evidence of other injuries or accidents attributable to an allegedly defective product must be substantially similar to the injury or accident in the case at bar in order to be admitted in a product-liability case. Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 496, 508 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir.1988)).

We hold that the District Court did not commit a clear and prejudicial abuse of its discretion when it allowed Torbit's expert to use the charts. The expert stated that "a large percentage of the [total] injuries incurred by drivers were incurred during the tying and untying process." Trial Tr. vol. IV at 61.7 She testified that the ratchet systems involved in the tying/untying injuries summarized by the charts were "substantially similar" to the GACS ratchet system Torbit was using when he suffered his injuries. Id. at 64. She also testified that from the injury records she was able to "call out those [injuries] that relate to exerting force on a tie-down bar on a manual ratchet system." Id. at 60. The charts summarized 3,459 injuries from tying/untying the ratchet systems between 1987 and 1995, and they summarized 1,184 injuries in 1990 from tightening...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Adams v. Toyota Motor Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 11, 2017
    ...focus is on all of the "circumstances" surrounding the OSI evidence, not necessarily any specific similarity. See Torbit v. Ryder , 416 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) ; Hale , 756 F.2d at 1332 ; see also U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd. , 582 F.3d 1131, 1147–48......
  • Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • July 2, 2021
    ...954 F.3d at 1079. "We review for abuse of discretion the District Court's decision to refuse [an] instruction." Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc. , 416 F.3d 898, 903–04 (8th Cir. 2005). Under any standard of review—de novo, abuse of discretion, or plain error5 —Thurairajah's challenges to the dist......
  • Adams v. Toyota Motor Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • June 9, 2017
    ...is on all of the "circumstances" surrounding the OSI evidence, not necessarily any specific similarity. See Torbit v. Ryder System, Inc., 416 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2005); Hale, 756 F.2d at 1332; see also U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131, 1147-......
  • Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 23, 2008
    ...see no principled distinction in the appeals presently before us that would counsel for a different result. See Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 416 F.3d 898, 902-06 (8th Cir.2005) (affirming a jury verdict on a design defect claim that a ratchet system used on a car-hauling rig was defective be......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2015 Part IV - Demonstrative Evidence
    • July 31, 2015
    ..., 834 N.E.2d 549, 295 Ill.Dec. 968 (2005), §9.503 Tona, Inc. v. Evans, 590 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1991), §9.512.1 Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 416 F.3d 898 (2005), §42.301 Torres v. White , 685 F.Supp.2d 1283 (N.D.Okla., 2010), §24.203 Tracy v. Cotterell, 524 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va. 1999), §22.408 Tradema......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2014 Part IV - Demonstrative Evidence
    • July 31, 2014
    ..., 834 N.E.2d 549, 295 Ill.Dec. 968 (2005), §9.503 Tona, Inc. v. Evans, 590 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1991), §9.512.1 Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 416 F.3d 898 (2005), §42.301 Torres v. White , 685 F.Supp.2d 1283 (N.D.Okla., 2010), §24.203 Tracy v. Cotterell, 524 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va. 1999), §22.408 Tradema......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • August 2, 2016
    ..., 834 N.E.2d 549, 295 Ill.Dec. 968 (2005), §9.503 Tona, Inc. v. Evans, 590 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1991), §9.512.1 Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 416 F.3d 898 (2005), §42.301 Torres v. White , 685 F.Supp.2d 1283 (N.D.Okla., 2010), §24.203 Tracy v. Cotterell, 524 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va. 1999), §22.408 Tradema......
  • Maps, charts, graphs and diagrams
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Is It Admissible? Part IV. Demonstrative Evidence
    • May 1, 2022
    ...508 N.W.2d 694 (Iowa 1993). 20 Kimble v. Earle , 830 N.E.2d 814, 358 Ill.App.3d 400, 294 Ill.Dec. 402 (2005); Torbit v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 416 F.3d 898 (2005); Strong v. State , 805 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1990); Schenck v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate , 803 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1990); McAuliffe v. Cashio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT