United States v. Civella
Decision Date | 27 January 1975 |
Docket Number | Crim. A. No. 23562-3. |
Citation | 416 F. Supp. 676 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Nicholas CIVELLA et al., Defendants. |
Gary Cornwell, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
James P. Quinn, Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT NICHOLAS CIVELLA FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
In the late afternoon of January 24, 1975, defendant Nicholas Civella, through his counsel, filed a motion and affidavit pursuant to Section 144, Title 28, United States Code, and Section 455, Title 28, United States Code, requesting therein that the undersigned District Judge "voluntarily" disqualify himself in this cause, or in the alternative, requiring disqualification for personal bias and prejudice. The completion of the evidentiary hearing on the validity of a wiretap is scheduled for completion on January 28, 1975, and final pretrial hearings and jury trial are set to begin on February 6, 1975.
The affidavit states three grounds.
The first ground of the affidavit is as follows:
The second ground of the affidavit is as follows:
The third ground of the affidavit is as follows:
Counsel for the defendant Nicholas Civella filed a certificate in the following language:
"I the undersigned, counsel of record in the above entitled cause, hereby certify that I believe the above affidavit made by the said Nicholas Civella, was made in good faith."
This certificate of counsel is qualified by the following language over the signature of counsel:
If the affidavit and certificate are sufficient in substance and timely filed the Court cannot deny the motion for disqualification even if the facts stated are demonstrably false. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921). The penalties for perjury and disbarment are considered a sufficient guaranty against unfounded allegations and motions made in bad faith. Note, Disqualification Of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 Harv.L. Rev. 1435 (1966). On the other hand, when the affidavit of bias or prejudice does not meet the statutory requirements the judge has an obligation not to disqualify himself. United States v. Anderson, 433 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1970).
The motion to require disqualification will be denied for the following separate and independent reasons:
These reasons for denying the motion will be discussed hereinafter.
Before discussing separately the above reasons for denying the motion, it is noted generally that "one of the reasons for allowing the district judge to rule on the sufficiency of the affidavit in the first place is to prevent parties from using section 144 as a means of delay." 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1435, 1440 (1966). This comment is particularly applicable to grounds two and three quoted above.
The certificate of counsel does not certify to the good faith of counsel in filing the motion and affidavit as required by Section 144 as construed by the majority of courts. 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1435 (1966); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961). A less strict interpretation is followed by some courts. Flegenheimer v. United States, 110 F.2d 379 (3rd Cir. 1936). There are valid arguments for each of these diverse views. For the majority view it can be said that the restraint provided by the requirement that the lawyer certify his own good faith as well as that of his client provides an added guaranty against frivolous or false affidavits. It may be a permissible view to construe an unconditional certificate by counsel of good faith of his client, as an implied certificate of good faith of counsel. Freed v. Inland Empire Insurance Co., 174 F.Supp. 458, 465 (D.Utah 1959). But here we cannot make the implication because of the expressed disavowal by counsel in the quoted part of the suggestions. In this case the value of this requirement is more apparent than in most reported cases. On the other hand, there is some logic for the view that the lawyer's bona fide apprehension of bias should not deprive his client of the opportunity to present his bona fide beliefs. Cf. 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1435, 1441-1443 (1966). The certificate of counsel in this case is deficient under both divergent lines of authority.
In respect to the third ground, in this case, counsel has been deprived of an opportunity to...
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