Com. v. Marquetty

• Decision Date: 18 November 1993
• Citation: 416 Mass. 445,622 N.E.2d 632
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. William M. MARQUETTY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 632

622 N.E.2d 632

416 Mass. 445

COMMONWEALTH v. William M. MARQUETTY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Bristol.

Argued Sept. 14, 1993.

Decided Nov. 18, 1993.

James A. Couture, Goshen, for defendant.

Elspeth B. Cypher, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

A jury in the Superior Court convicted the defendant, William M. Marquetty, of murder in the first degree on the basis of deliberate premeditation and with extreme atrocity or cruelty. Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant claims error because: (1) the Commonwealth introduced testimony concerning a knife seized from the defendant's automobile, but did not produce the knife at trial; (2) the prosecutor's closing argument unfairly evoked sympathy for the victim; and (3) defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance at trial. The defendant further requests that the court exercise its power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1992 ed.), and order a new trial. We conclude that the conviction should be affirmed and that there is no reason to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, in the defendant's favor.

The jury could have found the following facts. On February 9, 1987, the victim was found in the early evening hours on a snow covered street in New Bedford. Sergeant John Silva arrived at the scene shortly after 8 P.M. He observed the accumulation of a light dusting of snow on the victim's body. Her clothing was in disarray, with her jacket pulled up around her chin, her sweater pulled up to her breasts, her right leg unclad except for a sock, and her pants and underwear pulled down around her lower left leg. Her left foot was booted. Her right boot was lying between her legs. There was a large amount of blood on the victim's upper torso and there were several holes in her sweater.

The defendant's automobile, which was usually parked in the driveway between 193 and 197 Weld Street, was not there between approximately 6:30 P.M. and 10 P.M. on February 9, 1987. A reddish brown stain was found beneath the seat cover on the foam cushion of the rear seat, and a folding buck knife was discovered under the "headliner" of the automobile. There was no visible blood on the knife and tests for occult blood (blood not visible to the naked eye) proved negative.

Sergeant James Sylvia recovered from under the front passenger seat a "large survival-type knife," which he placed in a brown paper bag. The Commonwealth did not produce this knife at trial.

Detective Richard Ferreira testified that, prior to his arrest, the defendant acknowledged that the victim lived upstairs from him, stated that she was a prostitute, and that he did not like prostitutes because they were not considered good for society. He confirmed that Sergeant Sylvia had found a large hunting knife, which was sharp on one edge and serrated on the other, under the front passenger's seat.

A forensic pathologist determined that the victim had bled to death due to multiple stab wounds. He opined that, assuming the victim was alive when placed in the snow, the snow and cold would have the effect of prolonging the moment of death.

Forensic testing produced traces of occult blood on all four exterior door handles. Visible bloodstains were found in the rear of the driver's seat, on the interior of the left rear door, on the rear floor rug, on the left side of the seat belt retainer cover, and on the foam cushion under the rear seat cover of the defendant's automobile. Chemical testing also located areas on the vinyl seat covers which were positive for blood where fresh green paint had been applied. Occult blood was detected on a yellow-brown carpet which was removed from the automobile's trunk.

A forensic chemist concluded that the blood found in the rear seat was not the defendant's but was consistent with the victim's blood. A special agent examiner in the hair and fibers unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory testified that fibers found on the victim were consistent with fibers removed from the carpeting in the defendant's automobile. She also testified that a pubic hair taken from the defendant was consistent with one found on the victim's pants.

1. Admission of testimony regarding physical evidence not produced at trial. The defendant argues that allowing a witness to testify regarding a knife recovered during the search of the defendant's automobile, but never produced at trial, amounted to prejudicial error because it put before the jury "very damaging evidence of the existence of a potential murder weapon while never producing the object itself." Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony about this knife and did not cross-examine on the subject. The substance of Sergeant Sylvia's testimony pertaining to discovery of the knife was also introduced through Detective Ferreira's testimony, which was not objected to at trial or challenged on appeal. Detective Ferreira testified further regarding the details of the knife found by Sergeant Sylvia, describing it as "sharp on one edge and serrated edges on the other." Since there was no objection to this testimony, we review the claim of error only pursuant to our obligation under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there is a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 231, 588 N.E.2d 643 (1992).

"The fact that, at or about the time of a crime, a defendant had a weapon that could have been used in committing the crime is admissible in the judge's discretion." Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 356, 480 N.E.2d 19 (1985). "[I]t is commonly competent to show the possession by a defendant of an instrument capable of being used in the commission of the crime, without direct proof that the particular instrument was in fact the one used." Commonwealth v. O'Toole, 326 Mass. 35, 39, 92 N.E.2d 618 (1950). Testimony regarding the discovery of a weapon, even if it is not the murder weapon, may be admitted to show familiarity with the type of weapon. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 398 Mass. 535, 541-542, 499 N.E.2d 822 (1986); Commonwealth v. Toro, supra at 356-357, 480 N.E.2d 19; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 373 Mass. 1, 7, 364 N.E.2d 808 (1977). Relevant items recovered from the scene of a crime are admissible. Commonwealth v. Westmoreland, 388 Mass. 269, 279, 446 N.E.2d 663 (1983).

The record fails to reveal whether the knife was simply not introduced at trial, lost, or destroyed. The Commonwealth never claimed that the knife found by Sergeant Sylvia was the murder weapon. The testimony concerning the knife was brief and the prosecutor did not mention it in either his opening or closing statements to the jury. Defense counsel in his closing noted that the Commonwealth had not claimed to have uncovered the murder weapon. The defendant does not contend that the missing knife was exculpatory. In view of the plethora of evidence connecting the defendant's automobile with the commission of the crime, Sergeant Sylvia's testimony concerning the missing knife did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

2. The prosecutor's closing argument. The defendant contends that he was so prejudiced by the prosecutor's closing argument that a new trial is required. The prosecutor's statements are set forth in the margin. ¹ The defendant contends that these remarks irremediably created sympathy for the victim, and influenced the jury to find the defendant guilty on that basis.

Defense counsel did not object specifically to anything in the closing nor did he make a request for a curative instruction. ² Failure to object to the closing and to ask for a curative instruction waives the right to claim error on appeal, limiting our inquiry to whether the prosecutor's statements are such that they create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Cosme, 410 Mass. 746, 750, 575 N.E.2d 726 (1991); Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518 n. 8, 505 N.E.2d 519 (1987); Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 416, 381 N.E.2d 123 (1978); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 469, 373 N.E.2d 951 (1978), S.C., 381 Mass. 340, 409 N.E.2d 732 (1980), and 411 Mass. 692, 584 N.E.2d 629 (1992). We analyze the remarks in "light of the 'entire argument, as well as in light of the judge's instruction to the jury and the evidence at trial.' " Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 746, 550 N.E.2d 378 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 432, 467 N.E.2d 95 (1984). "The prosecutor is entitled to argue the evidence and fair inferences to be drawn therefrom." Commonwealth v. Paradise, 405 Mass. 141, 152, 539 N.E.2d 1006 (1989). Counsel may also suggest conclusions to be drawn from the evidence as an attempt to assist the jurors in analyzing the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 431, 467 N.E.2d 95 (1984); Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 381 Mass. 306, 316, 409 N.E.2d 188 (1980). While generally great latitude is permitted in argument, Commonwealth v. Pettie, 363 Mass. 836, 840, 298 N.E.2d 836 (1973), counsel must be careful to avoid misstating principles of law, infringing or denigrating constitutional rights, and provoking undue sympathy or bias. Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 557, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 806, 501 N.E.2d 1154 (1986).

The prosecutor's reference to the victim's selfish desire to live and the fact that she was not just having a bad day, although of little relevance to anything in issue, were innocuous in the context of producing undue sympathy or bias. Furthermore, we assume that the jury have a reasonable measure of sophistication and are capable of sorting out hyperbole and speculation. See Commonwealth v. Good, 409 Mass. 612, 626, 568 N.E.2d 1127 (1991); Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, supra, 406 Mass. at 746, 550 N.E.2d 378.

The attempted analogy between the prosecutor's...