People v. Fernandez, Docket No. 98521
| Decision Date | 21 January 1988 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 98521 |
| Citation | 164 Mich.App. 485,417 N.W.2d 540 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stephen Rafel FERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant. 164 Mich.App. 485, 417 N.W.2d 540 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[164 MICHAPP 486] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Crim. Div., Research, Training and Appeals, and Thomas M. Chambers, Detroit, for People.
James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by Susan Meinberg Thomas, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before BEASLEY, P.J., and J.H. GILLIS and GRIBBS, JJ.
On appeal, the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of this Court 1 and held that a [164 MICHAPP 487] mandatory life sentence is required on conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder under M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1). The Supreme Court further provided as follows:
"We remand the case to the Court of Appeals for briefing and decision on whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration under MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) and, if so, the proper retroactive effect of such a decision." 2
The "lifer law" set forth in M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4) provides as follows:
"A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years, other than prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has served 10 calendar years of the sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole by the parole board, subject to the following conditions: ...."
Both defendant and the prosecutor agree that after serving ten years defendant is eligible for parole consideration under M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4) where, as here, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The lifer law statute does not specifically exclude persons convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment from the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving ten calendar years of the sentence. The conspiracy statute, M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1), provides for punishment by penalty [164 MICHAPP 488] equal to that which could be imposed if defendant had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit. The first-degree murder statute, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, provides that a person convicted of first-degree murder shall be punished by imprisonment for life. This statute does not, however, state that such a sentence of life imprisonment is nonparolable. What makes first-degree murder a nonparolable life offense is M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4). In other words, first-degree murder is nonparolable because it is specifically excluded from the above statute, while conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is not.
Furthermore, Proposal B does not preclude application of the lifer law to persons convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. In 1984, in People v. Johnson, 3 the Supreme Court held that Proposal B had no application to fixed or life sentences. Therefore, as the Supreme Court recognized in the within case:
"Thus, there is no apparent restriction arising from Proposal B on application of the 'lifer law' to a life sentence imposed for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder." 4
We agree with both defendant and the prosecutor and conclude that a person sentenced to life for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving ten calendar years.
We further believe that this decision, which is essentially a restatement and clarification of existing law, should receive full retroactive effect. 5
[164 MICHAPP 489] J.H. GILLIS, J. (dissenting).
I dissent and I would hold that a person convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder must be sentenced to mandatory, nonparolable life in prison.
M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1) provides in part:
M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4) provides:
"A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years, other than prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has served 10 calendar years of the sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole by the parole board, subject to the following conditions...." (Emphasis supplied.)
M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1) became effective on March 10, 1967. M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4), as it pertains to the nonparolability of those convicted of first-degree murder, has been in effect since 1948. Although M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. [164 MICHAPP 490] 28.2304(4) has been amended since 1948, including 1978, this language has not been altered.
While the majority argues that M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4) is unambiguous, I believe other rules of statutory construction are more properly applied to this case. First, I note that the Legislature is charged with knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject when it promulgates new laws. See, e.g., People v. Buckley, 302 Mich. 12, 21, 4 N.W.2d 448 (1942). Second, an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute is given great weight due to the expertise of the agency with respect to the subject under its jurisdiction. PSB State Bank v. Comerica Inc., 151 Mich.App. 452, 460, 391 N.W.2d 371 (1986). Third, the Legislature's re-enactment of a statute which was interpreted in a particular manner gives rise to an inference that the Legislature approved that interpretation. See, e.g., Wayne Co v. Auditor General, 250 Mich. 227, 237, 229 N.W. 911 (1930). Fourth, the primary goal of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the Legislature; therefore, it is important to consider the general purpose sought to be accomplished by a statute in determining its meaning. PSB State Bank, supra, 151 Mich.App. at 460, 391 N.W.2d 371.
As defendant concedes, the present conspiracy statute was enacted following the Legislature's dissatisfaction with the lenient...
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...substantive offense. Jones, supra, 167 Mich.App. at pp. 426-427, 423 N.W.2d 590. See also People v. Fernandez (On remand), 164 Mich.App. 485, 489, 417 N.W.2d 540 (1987) (Gillis, J., dissenting). However, this presumption is contradicted by the fact that until relatively recently, there was ......
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