Ross v. Moffitt 8212 786

• Decision Date: 17 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73,73
• Parties: Fred R. ROSS and North Carolina, Petitioners, v. Claude Franklin MOFFITT. —786
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

417 U.S. 600

94 S.Ct. 2437

41 L.Ed.2d 341

Fred R. ROSS and North Carolina, Petitioners,

v Claude Franklin MOFFITT.

No. 73—786.

Argued April 22, 1974.

Decided June 17, 1974.

Syllabus

Respondent, an indigent, while represented by court-appointed counsel, was convicted of forgery in state court in two separate cases, and his convictions were affirmed on his appeals of right by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. In one case he was denied appointment of counsel for discretionary review by the North Carolina Supreme Court, and in the other case, after that court had denied certiorari, was denied appointment of counsel to prepare a petition for certiorari to this Court. Subsequently, Federal District Court denied habeas corpus relief, but the United States Court of Appeals reversed, holding that respondent was entitled to appointment of counsel both on his petition for review by the State Supreme Court and on his petition for certiorari in this Court. Held:

1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require North Carolina to provide respondent with counsel on his discretionary appeal to the State Supreme Court. Pp. 609—611.

(a) As contrasted with the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, a defendant appealing a conviction needs an attorney, not as a shield to protect him against being 'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt, the difference being significant since, while a State may not dispense with the trial stage without the defendant's consent, it need not provide any appeal at all. Pp. 610—611.

(b) The fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that the State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way, but unfairness results only if the State singles out indigents and denies them meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. P. 611.

2. Nor does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking discretionary appeals to the State Supreme Court. Pp. 611—616.

(a) A defendant in respondent's circumstances is not denied meaningful access to the State Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court, since at that stage, under North Carolina's multi-tiered appellate system, he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of the trial proceedings, a brief in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and frequently an opinion by that court disposing of his case, materials which, when supplemented by any pro se submission that might be made, would provide the Supreme Court with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review under its standards of whether the case has 'significant public interest,' involves 'legal principles of major significance,' or likely conflicts with a previous Supreme Court decision. Pp. 614—615.

(b) Both an indigent defendant's opportunity to have counsel prepare an initial brief in the Court of Appeals and the nature of the Supreme Court's discretionary review make the relative handicap that such a defendant may have in comparison to a wealthy defendant, who has counsel at every stage of the proceeding, far less than the handicap borne by an indigent defendant denied counsel on his initial appeal of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811. P. 616.

(c) That a particular service might benefit an indigent defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required, the duty of the State not being to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant, as was done here, an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process. Pp. 616.

3. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require North Carolina to provide counsel for a convicted indigent defendant seeking to file a petition for certiorari in this Court, under circumstances where the State will have provided counsel for his only appeal as of right, and the brief prepared by such counsel together with one and perhaps two state appellate opinions will be available to this Court in order to decide whether to grant certiorari. Pp. 616—618.

(a) Since the right to seek discretionary review in this Court is conferred by federal statutes and not by any State, the argument that the State having once created a right of appeal must give all persons an equal opportunity to enjoy the right, is by its terms inapplicable. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, and Douglas v. California, supra, distinguished. P. 617.

(b) The suggestion that a State is responsible for providing counsel to an indigent defendant petitioning this Court simply because it initiated the prosecution leading to the judgment sought to be reviewed is unsupported by either reason or authority. Pp. 617—618.

4 Cir., 483 F.2d 650, reversed.

Jacob L. Safron, Raleigh, N.C., for petitioners.

Thomas B. Anderson, Jr., Durham, N.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are asked in this case to decide whether Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), which requires appointment of counsel for indigent state defendants on their first appeal as of right, should be extended to require counsel for discretionary state appeals and for applica- tions for review in this Court. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that such appointment was required by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹

I

The case now before us has resulted from consolidation of two separate cases, North Carolina criminal prosecutions brought in the respective Superior Courts for the counties of Mecklenburg and Guilford. In both cases respondent pleaded not guilty to charges of forgery and uttering a forged instrument, and because of his indigency was represented at trial by court-appointed counsel. He was convicted and then took separate appeals to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, where he was again represented by court-appointed counsel, and his convictions were affirmed.² At this point the procedural histories of the two cases diverge.

Following affirmance of his Mecklenburg County conviction, respondent sought to invoke the discretionary review procedures of the North Carolina Supreme Court. His court-appointed counsel approached the Mecklenburg County Superior Court about possible appointment to represent respondent on this appeal, but counsel was informed that the State was not required to furnish counsel for that petition. Respondent sought collateral relief in both the state and federal courts, first raising his right-to-counsel contention in a habeas corpus petition filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina in February 1971. Relief was denied at that time, and respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was dismissed by stipulation in order to allow respondent to first exhaust state remedies on this issue. After exhausting state remedies, he reapplied for habeas relief, which was again denied. Respondent appealed that denial to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

Following affirmance of his conviction on the Guilford County charges, respondent also sought discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme Court. On this appeal, however, respondent was not denied counsel but rather was represented by the public defender who had been appointed for the trial and respondent's first appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari. ³ Respondent then unsuccessfully petitioned the Superior Court for Guilford County for court-appointed counsel to prepare a petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, and also sought post-conviction relief throughout the state courts. After these motions were denied, respondent again sought federal habeas relief, this time in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, 341 F.Supp. 853. That court denied relief, and respondent took an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The Court of Appeals reversed the two District Court judgments, holding that respondent was entitled to the assistance of counsel at state expense both on his petition for review in the North Carolina Supreme Court and on his petition for certiorari to this Court. Reviewing the procedures of the North Carolina appellate system and the possible benefits that counsel would provide for indigents seeking review in that system, the court stated:

'As long as the state provides such procedures and allows other convicted felons to seek access to the higher court with the help of retained counsel, there is a marked absence of fairness in denying an indigent the assistance of counsel as he seeks access to the same court.'⁴

This principle was held equally applicable to petitions for certiorari to this Court. For, said the Court of Appeals, '(t)he same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals.'⁵

We granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 1128, 94 S.Ct. 864, 38 L.Ed.2d 752, to consider the Court of Appeals' decision in light of Douglas v. California, and apparently conflicting decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits.⁶ For the reasons hereafter stated we reverse the Court of Appeals.

II

This Court, in the past 20 years, has given extensive consideration to the rights of indigent persons on appeal. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), the first of the pertinent cases, the...