Commonwealth v. Vernille
| Decision Date | 27 February 1980 |
| Citation | 418 A.2d 713,275 Pa.Super. 263 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Anthony VERNILLE, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Submitted April 12, 1979. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Joseph Paul Valentino, Sharon, for appellant.
David B. Douds, Asst. Dist. Atty., Mercer, for Commonwealth appellee.
Before PRICE HESTER and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of theft by receiving stolen property. [1] After denial of post-trial motions, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two to five years. He appeals to this court contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury and in admitting certain evidence, and that the sentence was an abuse of judicial discretion and excessive. Finding no merit in any of these contentions, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
In weighing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and determine whether it is sufficient to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Smith, 484 Pa. 71, 398 A.2d 948 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 485 Pa. 542, 403 A.2d 521 (1979). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt through the use of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Harper, 485 Pa. 572, 403 A.2d 536 (1979); Commonwealth v. Dawson, 464 Pa. 254, 346 A.2d 545 (1975).
Viewed in this fashion, the evidence upon which appellant's conviction was predicated consisted of the following facts. The charge of receiving stolen property arose out of the theft of a 1977 Ford Ranger pickup truck from Robbins Ford and Mercury, a dealership in Mercer, Pennsylvania, sometime between December 18 and 28, 1976. The stolen truck was discovered in Farrell, Pennsylvania at the residence of appellant's father on March 7, 1977, by Captain Timko of the Farrell Police Department. Upon first seeing the truck, Captain Timko realized it fit the description of a vehicle that had been reported stolen, and he recorded the license plate number and vehicle identification number located on the door. When he discovered upon a subsequent check of these numbers that the vehicle had been stolen from Robbins Ford and Mercury, he had it towed away.
Appellant and his father appeared later at the Farrell Police Department and gave Captain Timko an Ohio certificate of title to the truck and the ignition key. During questioning by Captain Timko, appellant explained that he had acquired the truck from a stranger who had come to his workplace and asked if he was interested in buying a truck. Appellant stated that he believed the man's name was Paul Glasco and that he operated a car dealership in Youngstown, Ohio. Appellant agreed to meet this man at the L & K Restaurant in Niles, Ohio, and he there concluded a deal to purchase the truck for $6,000 cash by tendering the money to Glasco and receiving title. Glasco was not produced as a witness at trial.
Following the introduction of the certificate of title into evidence, Trooper Richard L. Thompson of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified concerning defects contained in that certificate. First, he remarked that the date title issued, which is filled in by the clerk of court at the time that the title is issued, was blank. Second, while the title indicated that Mayberry Ford Truck Sales, Springfield, Ohio was the previous owner, it did not contain the previous owner's title number or the initials "MSO" to indicate that it was purchased new from a dealership. Trooper Thompson explained that "MSO" stands for "manufacturer's statement of origin," which is proof of the dealer's ownership of the vehicle. This statement was absent from appellant's title. Other testimony showed that the title number on appellant's certificate was actually registered to a Mercury Cougar owned by Floyd Dugan Ford, Inc., and not Mayberry Ford. Moreover, the certificate of title listed $6,395 as the purchase price, although appellant testified that he paid $6,000, and listed appellant's address in Springfield, Ohio, when he admitted in his testimony that he had never lived there.
Three employees of the Robbins Ford and Mercury dealership testified to appellant's prior connections with the stolen truck. Ronald Sopko, a salesman, testified that appellant spoke to him about pickup trucks sometime in December. A second salesman, Nick Sicillian, testified that about December 16, 1976, appellant returned and asked for Mr. Sopko. Since Mr. Sopko was out at the time, Mr. Sicillian took from a keyboard the two keys for the truck that was later stolen and gave them to appellant. Mr. Sicillian did not accompany him to look at the truck and did not see him again that day. A third employee, Douglas Moreland, recalled that appellant had received a set of keys for the stolen truck during a visit sometime around December 16 and had returned the keys to him. After the truck disappeared, Mr. Moreland saw the keys to it on the manager's desk and inspected them. His examination revealed that one of the keys had grind and cut marks on the teeth, and he concluded that only one was an original factory key and that the other was a copy.
The only element of the offense of receiving stolen property that appellant disputes was adequately proven is the requirement that the possessor know that the property has been stolen. Commonwealth v. Peluso, 481 Pa. 641, 393 A.2d 344 (1978). An inference can be made that the accused in fact knew the property was stolen if it can be shown that he had reasonable cause to know that the property received was stolen, and circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support this inference. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 258 Pa.Super. 109, 392 A.2d 708 (1978). Although evidence of possession of stolen property is not sufficient alone to prove theft, Commonwealth v. Henderson, 451 Pa. 452, 304 A.2d 154 (1973); Commonwealth v. Burke, 229 Pa.Super. 176, 324 A.2d 525 (1974), it may combine with other circumstances surrounding the theft to form sufficient evidence to warrant an inference of guilty knowledge, Commonwealth v. Bailey, 250 Pa.Super. 402, 378 A.2d 998 (1977).
In the instant case, the facts of appellant's prior connection with the stolen vehicle-through his visits to the dealership, his possession of a key to the vehicle (the original of which was shown to have been reproduced), his suspicious description of the sale, and his acceptance of a title certificate with defects apparent on its face despite his prior experience with transferring titles to vehicles-all combine to sufficiently support the inference that appellant had reasonable cause to know that the vehicle was stolen. The evidence supports the jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant's second and third assignments of trial error concern the charge to the jury. The portion of the charge to which he objects reads as follows:
It is well established in Pennsylvania that the trial judge has the discretion to summarize the evidence adduced at trial. Commonwealth v. Crawford, 452 Pa. 326, 305 A.2d 893 (1973). In addition, he may properly refer to the issues involved and the possible inferences to be drawn from the facts. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 148 Pa.Super. 169, 24 A.2d 656 (1942). It is also among the judge's prerogatives to express his own opinion on the evidence, including the weight and effect to be accorded it and its points of strength and weakness, provided that the statements have a reasonable basis and it is clearly left to the jury to decide the facts, regardless of any opinion expressed by the judge. Williams v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 370, 203 A.2d 665 (1964); Commonwealth v. Collura, 183 Pa.Super. 17, 128 A.2d 101 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957, 77 S.Ct. 864, 1 L.Ed.2d 908 (1957).
Clearly, no error is shown on this record. Although appellant claims that the judge emphasized and instructed the jury on facts not in evidence, this contention is unfounded. The judge openly and distinctly stated that no evidence was given as to the witness' intonation. He merely suggested the different inflections of the voice that could have been present and left the choice entirely to the jury as to which quality was used and the import it should be accorded.
Appellant's third assignment of error is in the same vein. He contends that the court's comment concerning price negotiations during his meeting with Mr. Glasco also emphasized a fact not in the record. The judge instructed the jury in this language:
(N.T. at 161) (emphasis added).
Again, the court unmistakably instructed the jury that there was no...
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