418 F.2d 1319 (2nd Cir. 1969), 86, United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette
|Docket Nº:||86, 32323.|
|Citation:||418 F.2d 1319|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES ex rel. Joseph RANDAZZO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. FOLLETTE, Warden of Green Haven Prison, Stormville, New York, Respondent-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||December 04, 1969|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit|
Argued Nov. 14, 1969.
Peter Lushing, New York City (Milton Adler, The Legal Aid Society, New York, New York, of counsel), for appellant.
Joel H. Sachs, Asst. Atty. Gen (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Hillel Hoffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank I. Strom, II, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., of State of New York, of counsel), for appellee.
Before MOORE, KAUFMAN and HAYS, Circuit Judges.
HAYS, Circuit Judge:
A judgment of conviction was entered against appellant Joseph Randazzo in 1962 in Supreme Court, New York County upon a plea of guilty 1 to a charge of violation of the statutes dealing with narcotics. 2 Before he pleaded
guilty, appellant moved to suppress evidence consisting of thirty-one ounces of heroin seized at the time of his arrest, claiming that this evidence was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. After a hearing, the motion was denied. People v. Randazzo, 37 Misc.2d 80, 234 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup.Ct.1962). Appellant appealed to the Appellate Division, People v. Randazzo, 20 A.D.2d 850, 248 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1st Dept. 1964) and, upon the denial of that appeal, to the Court of Appeals where the judgment was again affirmed. People v. Randazzo, 15 N.Y.2d 526, 254 N.Y.S.2d 99, 202 N.E.2d 549 (1964) (Fuld, J. dissenting). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Randazzo v. New York, 381 U.S. 953, 85 S.Ct. 1810, 14 L.Ed.2d 725 (1965).
Appellant then applied to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus. The court dismissed the petition, United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F.Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1968), but granted a certificate of probable cause. This appeal was taken from the order dismissing the writ.
Appellant was a parolee under the supervision of the New York State Division of Parole at the time of his arrest. 3 On or about July 8, 1962 Senior Parole Officer John J. McCarthy received information from what he testified was a reliable source that appellant had consorted with a convicted felon; that he maintained late hours; that he apparently was not working; that he had visited a bar late at night; and that he might be involved in the narcotics traffic.
Any one of these activities was sufficient to constitute a violation of parole. 4
McCarthy brought the situation to the attention of Area Director Paul D. Travers who issued a 'Warrant for Retaking and Detaining a Paroled Prisoner' 5 on July 10, 1962. The warrant was turned over to William Quinn, a parole officer, on July 12, 1962 with instructions to execute it in cooperation with Officer D'Apre of the New York City Police Department.
On that day, at about 5:10 P.M., Quinn, D'Apre and another officer took up a position outside appellant's residence. Appellant arrived by taxicab about a half hour later and was approached by Quinn and one of the officers. They accompanied appellant to his third floor apartment where he admitted having consorted with a known criminal. Quinn then arrested appellant, searched his person and asked him 'what room do you sleep in?' Appellant pointed to his bedroom. Quinn searched the room
and found in it the thirty-one ounces of heroin. 6
Appellant contends on this appeal that the search and subsequent seizure of the heroin violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. We do not agree and affirm on the ground that the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest. 7
Appellant was arrested in his apartment pursuant to a 'Warrant for Retaking and Detaining a Paroled Prisoner.' Such a warrant is designated as 'administrative.' Its issuance does not depend upon a showing of probable cause. Appellant argues that these factors prevent us from upholding the search and seizure as incident to a lawful arrest.
The standards for the issuance of such a warrant are set out in the statute:
'If the parole officer having charge of a paroled prisoner * * * shall have reasonable cause to believe that such prisoner has lapsed, or is probably about to lapse, into criminal ways or company, or has violated the conditions of his parole in an important respect, such parole...
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