Wagner v. United States, 22112.
Decision Date | 19 November 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 22112.,22112. |
Citation | 418 F.2d 618 |
Parties | Raymond John WAGNER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Raymond John Wagner, in pro. per.
Wm. Matthew Byrne, Jr., U. S. Atty., Robert L. Brosio, Asst. U. S. Atty., Crim. Div., Ronald S. Morrow, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before BARNES, DUNIWAY and ELY, Circuit Judges.
On February 14, 1957, Wagner was adjudged guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2114. He and two others were found to have held up and robbed two postal officials in a car carrying postal funds to a bank. A possible eye witness was a man in a "7-Up" truck nearby, who gave one of the victims the license number of the get-away car. The government declined to give the name and address of this witness to Wagner before trial. On appeal, we held that this was not error, and affirmed. Wagner v. United States, 9 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 524.
On October 25, 1965, Wagner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The trial judge denied it, without hearing, on November 2, 1965. On December 20, 1965, Wagner filed a motion for reconsideration in which, for the first time, he alleged that there had been "illegal suppression of evidence favorable to his defense by the government." The motion was denied. On appeal, we affirmed the November 2 order, and declined to consider the motion for reconsideration, saying:
Wagner v. United States, 9 Cir., 1967, 374 F.2d 86, 87.
In response to our views, Wagner filed a new § 2255 motion on March 29, 1967. To the moving papers was attached an affidavit containing the allegations quoted in the margin.1 The trial court, without a hearing, dismissed the motion with leave to amend within 30 days. The material parts of the court's order are set out in the margin.2 Wagner filed an amendment.3 The court dismissed, by written order.4 Wagner appeals. We reverse.
On appeal from his conviction, Wagner claimed only that the court should have required the government to disclose the name and address of the "7-Up" man. He made no such claim as is now advanced. It is one thing to say that the government need not, before trial, give the defendant the name and address of an eye-witness to the offense. It is quite another to say that the government, knowing that a witness' testimony may help the defense, can tell the witness not to tell anyone what he knows, and to stay away from court. See Lee v. United States, 9 Cir., 1968, 388 F.2d 737. Compare Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 9 Cir., 1965, 354 F.2d 9. There has been no decision on the merits of this "ground" for relief. Cf. Sanders v. United States, 1963, 373 U.S. 1, 16, 19-20, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed.2d 148; Gomez v. United states, 9 Cir. 1968, 396 F.2d 323, 326.
The case turned primarily upon identification. One government witness testified that Wagner did not have a mask on, another that Wagner's mask had slipped down. If the "7-Up" man's story was that he could not identify Wagner (see note 1), and that both men, Wagner and co-defendant, wore masks during the entire course of the robbery (see note 3), it would have been very helpful to Wagner. As it was, it took two trials to convict, the first jury having been unable to reach a verdict. And if the U.S. Attorney and postal inspectors instructed the "7-Up" man to avoid giving statements or testimony in the case, as Wagner alleges that they did (see note 1), there was indeed suppression of evidence.
The rule that merely conclusionary statements in a § 2255 motion are not enough to require a hearing does not mean that the moving party must detail his evidence. It means only that he must make factual allegations, as Wagner has done. See Wilson v. Wilson, 9 Cir., 1967, 372 F.2d 211; Pembrook v. Wilson, 9 Cir., 1966, 370 F.2d 37. Compare Norris v. Wilson, 9 Cir., 1967, 378 F.2d 324.
What we have said does not mean that the trial court must immediately order a hearing. It may require the government to file a reply, permit the government to direct interrogatories to Wagner, impose sanctions if Wagner declines to answer, provide for deposing the witnesses named by Wagner, including the "7-Up" man, and take such other pre-hearing steps as may be appropriate. In the particular circumstances of this case, we believe that Wagner should be represented by counsel, and the court may, of course, appoint such counsel even though there is now no authorization for his compensation in a civil proceeding such as this. It can then decide whether a hearing in open court is required.
Wagner claims that the trial judge was disqualified because he had tried the case and also passed on the first § 2255 motion. The rule in this circuit is to the contrary. King v. United States, 9 Cir., 1968, 402 F.2d 58, 60; Dukes v. United States, 9 Cir., 1969, 407 F.2d 863.
The order appealed from is reversed; the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This petitioner has been before this court twice before. Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524 (1959). The denial of his earlier § 2255 petition was affirmed. Wagner v. United States, 374 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1967).
In Wagner's appeal from his conviction, one of the grounds claimed for reversal was that the trial court erred in not directing the Government to give Wagner the name and address of a Seven-up truck driver. Cf.Wagner, supra, 264 F.2d 524 at 537. With the long transcript of the trial available to our reviewing panel, this issue was considered and determined adversely to appellant.
On February 6, 1967, a panel of this court (Judges Barnes, Ely and Peckham, the latter sitting by assignment, with Judge Ely writing the per curiam opinion) affirmed a denial of relief under § 2255, saying the same three errors urged in the petition "had been rejected by our court on the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction."
Appellant then filed a second § 2255 petition which did not raise the same three questions by use of the same language utilized on his first motion, but which did, in my opinion, raise a precisely similar issue to that raised on the direct appeal, i. e., the testimony of the Seven-up driver.
In disposing of that same issue, the panel on the original appeal (Judges Chambers, Barnes and Hamley, with Judge Hamley the author) stated as follows:
The majority of this panel now reverse the trial judge on the claim the Seven-up driver's testimony was suppressed; despite the vague, uncertain and conclusionary nature of a petition that does not relate a single circumstance that establishes any suppression; is not supported by any affidavits made by any witness as to what they could or would testify to; and merely alleges, in purely conclusionary language of the petitioner himself, without detailed description as to what, how, when or where:
(1) that he saw "documentary...
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