Clifton v. Eubank

• Decision Date: 08 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 00-CV-2555-JLK.,00-CV-2555-JLK.
• Citation: 418 F.Supp.2d 1243
• Parties: Pamela CLIFTON, Plaintiff v. Nurse Ilona EUBANK, in her individual capacity; Officer Dawn Anaya, in her individual capacity; and Officer Ira Wilks, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

Page 1243

418 F.Supp.2d 1243

Pamela CLIFTON, Plaintiff v. Nurse Ilona EUBANK, in her individual capacity; Officer Dawn Anaya, in her individual capacity; and Officer Ira Wilks, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 00-CV-2555-JLK.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

March 8, 2006.

David Arthur Lane, Killmer & Lane, LLP, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Thomas J. Lyons, Hall & Evans, Denver, CO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, District Judge.

This civil action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Pamela Clifton, an inmate of the Colorado Department of Corrections Women's Correctional Facility in Canon City, Colorado, who seeks declaratory relief and damages against defendants, Nurse Ilona Eubanks, Officer Dawn Anaya, and Officer Ira Wilks. The action arises out of the stillbirth of Plaintiff Clifton's fetus. Clifton claims that the deprivation of her constitutional rights, in the form of improper medical care received in prison, resulted in the loss of her fetus. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing the suit is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq., which states, in part, "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Plaintiff has responded with a Motion to Recognize the Constitutional Rights of Prison Inmates, asserting that if the PLRA bars her suit it should be found unconstitutional. Both motions are pending.

I. Background.

For purposes of the summary judgment motion, I assume the following facts to be true unless otherwise stated. On the morning of December 25, 1998, Pamela Clifton, an inmate housed by the Colorado Department of Corrections at the Women's Correctional Facility in Canon City, Colorado, went into labor. Compl. at ¶1; and Clifton Dep., p. 19 at 11. 1-3. At the time, Clifton was approximately eight months pregnant. Clifton Dep., p. 36, 11. 5-7. Four days earlier, on December 21, 1998, at an appointment with Dr. Mark Sindler, Sindler had reported that Clifton's pregnancy was proceeding normally. Clifton Dep., p. 35, ll. 3-9.

Upon experiencing contractions, Clifton told Defendant Anaya, a guard at the correctional facility, that she was in labor and needed medical assistance. Compl. at ¶1. Defendant Anaya did not provide Clifton with medical assistance at that time, but instead sent Clifton back to her unit. Id.; and Clifton Dep. p. 19, ll. 2-7. At lunchtime, Clifton then told Defendant Wilks that she was in labor and needed help. Compl. at ¶1; and Clifton Dep., p. 25, ll. 15-20. Defendant Wilks also declined to provide Clifton with medical assistance and told Clifton to return to her unit. Compl. at ¶1; and Clifton Dep., p. 26, ll. 1-3. Upon Clifton's third request for medical assistance, another prison guard sent Clifton to the facility's medical unit. Compl. at ¶1; and Clifton Dep., p. 29, ll. 2-5.

At the facility's medical unit, Defendant Nurse Eubanks examined Clifton. Compl. at ¶1. Nurse Eubanks reported finding no evidence that Clifton's water had broken. Id. Clifton asked Defendant Eubanks to send her to the hospital despite the absence of amniotic fluid because with prior pregnancies she had required assistance with smooth induction of labor and breaking her water. Id. However, Nurse Eubanks called Clifton's labor a "false alarm" and sent her back to her unit rather than to the hospital. Id. During the examination, Nurse Eubanks did not use a fetal heart monitor to evaluate the status of Clifton's fetus, apparently because she did not know how to use the monitor. Id.

The next day, another prison guard noticed Clifton's distress and sent her to the medical unit. Id. At this point, Clifton reported sensing no fetal movement. Id. She was sent from the prison to a hospital, where it was determined that her fetus was dead. Id. Clifton was required to undergo a stillbirth. Id. Clifton claims that proper treatment, which was denied by the defendants, would have resulted in the healthy, live birth of her child. Id.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, evidence is viewed, and reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the Plaintiff. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Services, 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.1999). Defendants, as the moving parties, have the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If Defendants carry this burden, then the burden of production shifts to Plaintiff to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At least one court has held that on summary judgment motions regarding claims potentially barred by the PLRA's physical injury requirement where physical injuries could have resulted from the deprivations alleged, leave to amend a prisoner's complaint to include a statement of physical injuries suffered is warranted. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 534 (3d Cir.2003) (leave to amend prisoner's mental and emotional injury complaint to include statement of physical injuries he suffered as result of deprivation of food, drink, and sleep for four days was warranted for purpose of meeting physical injury requirement of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), as physical injuries could have resulted from deprivations alleged).

III. Merits

Plaintiffs claims survive summary judgment because the PLRA's physical injury requirement does not bar a prisoner's claim for damages for violations of her constitutional rights when she alleges a deprivation of medical care that resulted in the loss of her fetus. The relevant section of the PLRA, entitled "Limitations on Recovery," states, "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Defendants argue the loss of a fetus requiring the mother to undergo a stillbirth does not constitute a physical injury that satisfies the physical injury requirement of the PLRA. The Plaintiff argues regardless of the presence or absence of physical injury attendant to undergoing a stillbirth, the PLRA should be deemed unconstitutional if it bars a claim in these circumstances. I address both arguments in turn, positing that delayed labor, resulting in stillbirth, constitutes a physical injury to the mother sufficient to satisfy the PLRA's physical injury requirement, and, furthermore, regardless of the presence or absence of physical injury, the PLRA does not bar the constitutional claims of a woman who alleges improper medical care resulted in the death and stillbirth of her fetus. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and Plaintiffs Motion to Recognize the Constitutional Rights of Prison Inmates is moot.

A. The prolonged labor and stillbirth Plaintiff alleges she suffered satisfy the physical injury requirement of the PLRA.

The PLRA provides no statutory definition for the term "physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq. Appeals courts confronting the issue have held that although a de minimis showing of physical injury does not satisfy the PLRA's physical injury requirement, an injury need not be significant to satisfy the statutory requirement. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 536 (3rd Cir.2003) (surveying the authorities and finding "the courts of appeals have read 1997e(e) to require a lessthan-significant-but-more-than-de minimis physical injury as a predicate to allowing the successful pleading of an emotional injury."); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir.2002) ("for all claims to which it applies, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis"); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) ("the physical injury must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant"); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.1999) ("physical injury required by § 1997e(e) must simply be more than de minimis"); and Siglar v Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). Physical pain, standing alone, is a de minimis injury that may be characterized as a mental or emotional injury and, accordingly, fails to overcome the PLRA's bar; but, when paired with allegations of physical effects, physical pain may support a claim under the PLRA. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir.2005); Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir.2000). To define the contours of those more significant injuries that, standing alone, satisfy the PLRA, courts have looked to principles of tort law. Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1322-1323 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997). While there may be some room for debate about the degree to which the pain of prolonged labor and an attendant stillbirth constitute a "physical injury" for tort purposes, many holdings support the notion that experiencing prolonged labor and stillbirth constitutes a physical injury to the mother, and, thus, provide a sufficient basis for surmounting the prior physical injury showing requirement of the PLRA.

1. Pain paired with allegations of more tangible physical effects, such as a...