Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist.

• Citation: 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210,164 P.3d 630,42 Cal.4th 201
• Decision Date: 20 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. S133687.,S133687.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: Linda SHIRK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. VISTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210

42 Cal.4th 201

164 P.3d 630

Linda SHIRK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. VISTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S133687.

Supreme Court of California.

August 20, 2007.

Ronquillo & Corrales and Manuel Corrales, Jr., San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Zalkin & Zimmer, Irwin M. Zalkin, Devin M. Storey, San Diego; Kiesel, Boucher & Larson and Raymond P. Boucher, Beverly Hills, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Stutz, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz, Daniel R. Shinoff, Jack M. Sleeth, Jr., William C. Pate, San Diego, Jeffrey A. Morris and Paul V. Carelli IV for Defendant and Respondent.

Hennigan, Bennett & Dorman, J. Michael Hennigan and Lee W. Potts, Los Angeles, for Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

KENNARD, J.

In 2002, the Legislature added a statutory provision that "revived" for the calendar year 2003 those causes of action for childhood sexual molestation that would otherwise have been barred "solely" by expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (c).)¹ Does that provision also apply when a plaintiff suing a public entity has failed to first present a timely claim to the entity, as required by the government claims statute (Gov.Code, § 911.2)? Our answer is "no."

I

Because this appeal arises from a ruling on a demurrer, we treat the demurrer as admitting all properly pleaded material facts. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 810, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal. Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.) The facts set out here are those alleged in plaintiffs complaint.

Plaintiff Linda Shirk was born on June 22, 1962. In September 1977, when she was 15 years old, the Vista Unified School District (School District) assigned her to an English class taught by Jeffrey Paul Jones. Jones began flirting with her on the first day of school; in May 1978, Jones initiated their first sexual encounter. In the ensuing months, Jones and plaintiff engaged in sexual conduct both on and off school premises. Their last sexual contact occurred in November 1979. In the following months plaintiff neither notified the School District of her abuse nor presented a claim to it.

In June 2001, when plaintiffs 15-year-old daughter was attending Vista High School, plaintiff began to encounter teacher Jones at high school band tournaments. That same month, having become "very upset" by her long-ago molestation by Jones, she filed a report with the local sheriffs office. In February 2002, she met with Jones and surreptitiously recorded a conversation in which he admitted to sexual conduct with her and with another student.

On September 12, 2003, a licensed mental health practitioner interviewed plaintiff and concluded that she was still suffering psychological injury from her sexual abuse by Jones. That same day, plaintiff presented a claim to the School District for personal injury stemming from her sexual abuse by its employee Jones. When, as here, the defendant is a public entity, such claim presentation is required under the government claims statute (Gov.Code, § 900, et seq.), sometimes referred to as the Tort Claims Act. Government Code section 911.2 requires timely notice to a public entity before commencing legal action against it.

On September 23, 2003, plaintiff, then 41 years old, sued teacher Jones and the School District. Pertinent here are two causes of action for negligent tortious conduct against the School District, alleging that it "knew or should have known" that Jones was "a sexual predator" who "was engaging in inappropriate sexual misconduct" with his students, including plaintiff. On a form complaint, plaintiff entered the date of the act complained of as "Sept. 12, 2003 (per CCP 340.1(c))," and she checked two boxes indicating compliance with the government claims statute.

The School District demurred to plaintiffs complaint, asserting that the negligence causes of action were barred by her belated claim presentation. The trial court agreed; it concluded that plaintiffs causes of action accrued as of the last act of sexual molestation, which was in November 1979, but that they were barred because of plaintiffs failure to first present a claim to the School District "at some point in 1980," as statutorily required. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and it entered a judgment of dismissal as to the School District.

Plaintiff appealed, arguing that she had "timely presented her government tort claim" to the School District on September 12, 2003, when her statutory cause of action under subdivision (c) of section 340.1 accrued, because it was only then that "she discovered the cause of her adult psychological injuries." The Court of Appeal agreed. It reasoned that the Legislature's addition in 1998 of provisions making entities liable for sexual abuse committed by their employees (§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2) & (3)) coupled with its failure "to make special rules regarding the application of [government] claims requirements," indicated legislative intent not to differentiate between public entity defendants and private entity defendants. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that in 2002, when the Legislature enacted the revival provision to open a one-year window for childhood sexual abuse plaintiffs to bring statutorily lapsed causes of action, it also extended the government claims statute's deadline for presenting a claim to a public entity defendant. The Court of Appeal reasoned that, because plaintiff only discovered on September 12, 2003, that the cause of her psychological injury was the teacher's sexual abuse of her more than two decades earlier, the claim she presented to the School District on that same day was timely.

We granted the School District's petition for review to resolve a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeal in this case and a nearly contemporaneous decision of a different Court of Appeal in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1269, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 445 (County of Los Angeles). That case held that the Legislature's 2002 amendment of section 340.1 did not reflect the Legislature's intent "to excuse victims of childhood sexual abuse" from complying with the government claims statute when suing a public entity defendant. We reach the same conclusion here, thus reversing the Court of Appeal in this case.

II

Below we summarize the pertinent provisions of section 340.1, which sets forth deadlines for bringing a lawsuit for childhood sexual abuse, and Government Code section 911.2, which sets forth a deadline for presenting a claim to a public entity and is a prerequisite to the filing of a lawsuit against the entity.

A. Section 340.1

At the time of plaintiffs sexual molestation in 1978-1979, the applicable statute of limitations for sexual molestation was one year. (Former § 340, subd. (3).) In 1986, the Legislature enacted section 340.1, which expanded to three years the statute of limitations for sexual abuse by a relative or household member of a child under 14 years of age. (Former § 340.1, added by Stats.1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165-3166.)

In 1990, the Legislature amended section 340.1 to make it applicable to anyone who sexually abused a child, regardless of that person's relationship to, or residence with, the victim. It also extended the statute of limitations to eight years from the date the victim "attains the age of majority," or three years from the date the victim "discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse." (§ 340.1, subd. (a).) A plaintiff over the age of 26 years had to provide a certificate of merit from a mental health practitioner. (Former § 340.1, subds. (a), (b), & (d), as amended by Stats.1990, ch. 1578, § 1, pp. 7550-7552.)

In 1994, the Legislature again amended section 340.1 by expressly providing that the 1990 amendments "apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the period of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby reviving those causes of action which had lapsed or technically expired under the law existing prior to January 1, 1991." (Former § 340.1, subd. (o), added by Stats.1994, ch. 288, § 1, p.1930.)

In 1998, there was another amendment to section 340.1, acknowledging the vicarious liability of a "person or entity" whose negligent or intentional acts were a "legal cause" of a child's sexual abuse. (§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2) & (3), added by Stats.1998, ch. 1032, § 1.) Causes of action against such persons or entities had to be brought before the victim's 26th birthday. (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(1), amended by Stats.1998, ch. 1032, § 1.)

In 1999, the Legislature again amended section 340.1, clarifying that its 1998 changes relating to the liability of nonabuser persons or entities were prospective— that is, its provisions applied only to actions begun on or after January 1, 1999, or if filed before that time, actions still pending as of that date, "including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999." (§ 340.1, subd. (u), added by Stats.1999, ch. 120, § 1.)

In 2002, the Legislature yet again amended section 340.1, this time reviving for the calendar year 2003 those causes of action based on childhood sexual abuse brought against a person or an entity that had "reason to know" or was "on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of...