People v. Morales

Decision Date14 June 1977
Parties, 366 N.E.2d 248 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Melvin MORALES, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Joseph A. Monica, New York City, for appellant.

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. (Daniel J. Sullivan, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

JASEN, Judge.

This case is here for the second time. In the early morning hours of October 4, 1964, Addie Brown was viciously stabbed to death in the elevator of her Bronx County apartment building. There were no eyewitnesses to the murder and an extensive police investigation failed to uncover any direct evidence as to the identity of the killer. Yet the police did learn that Melvin Morales, a known narcotics addict, had frequented the building, had been inside the building at the time of the homicide, and had not been seen since the murder. Morales' mother was a tenant in the building and Morales sojourned with her from time to time. Further, the building was the scene of frequent narcotics activity in which Morales allegedly participated. The police attempted to contact Morales through his mother. On October 13, 1964, nine days after the killing, Mrs. Morales received a telephone call from her son. She informed him that the police desired to question him. Morales agreed to appear at his mother's beauty parlor, her place of business. The police, who had seen previous efforts to contact Morales through his mother fail, had staked out the premises. When Morales arrived, the police advised him that they desired to speak to him. Morales replied, "Yes, I know." He was placed in a police car and driven to the precinct house. At the station house, Morales was informed of his constitutional rights and was questioned. Within 15 minutes, he confessed to the murder.

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction (27 A.D.2d 904, 280 N.Y.S.2d 520) and a further appeal was taken to our court. We sustained the conviction. It was conceded that the record would not support a conclusion that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant at the time he was taken into police custody. Further, the record on appeal did not establish that the defendant consented to being detained and questioned by the police. However, in a case of first impression, we held "that a suspect may be detained upon reasonable suspicion for a reasonable and brief period of time for questioning under carefully controlled conditions protecting his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights." (People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 64, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 907, 238 N.E.2d 307, 314.)

This court recognized that interrogation of persons with knowledge of the facts is the principal means of solving crimes and that the public interest in bringing to justice perpetrators of serious crimes required that interrogation not be completely forbidden. It was emphasized that police inquiry must be kept within reasonable limits and that the rights of the suspect must be fully regarded. Yet, brief detention for questioning is essential to criminal investigation and a suspect, detained for questioning only, may not construe such detention as constituting an arrest for, and formal charge of, criminal activity. A suspect, advised of his constitutional rights, has a clear choice. He may elect to co-operate with the inquiry or he may decline to speak. If the suspect chooses to stand on his rights, the police must release him from custody unless they have probable cause to arrest him for a specified crime.

In applying these rules to defendant Morales, we concluded that the police conduct was justified under the exceptional circumstances of the case. A brutal and heinous felony had been committed. All of the indications raised by the "checkerboard square" of police investigation pointed at the defendant. Interrogation of the defendant was the only practical investigative technique open to the police. The period of detention was brief and defendant, experienced in police procedures, was fully advised of his constitutional rights.

Defendant took an appeal from our decision to the United States Supreme Court. That court elected "not to grapple with the question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a fullfledged arrest." (Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 105-106, 90 S.Ct. 291, 293, 24 L.Ed.2d 299.) While the court concluded that Morales' confession was voluntary, it vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a further evidentiary hearing. "Given an opportunity to develop in an evidentiary hearing the circumstances leading to the detention of Morales and his confessions, the State may be able to show that there was probable cause for an arrest or that Morales' confrontation with the police was voluntarily undertaken by him or that the confessions were not the product of illegal detention." (396 U.S. at p. 105, 90 S.Ct. at p. 293.) In compliance with the mandate of the Supreme Court, we remitted the case to Supreme Court, Bronx County, for further proceedings. (26 N.Y.2d 844, 309 N.Y.S.2d 592, 258 N.E.2d 90.)

After conducting a suppression hearing, the court held that the defendant's confessions were constitutionally admissible. The court concluded that the police did have probable cause to arrest the defendant for the murder of Addie Brown. On the issue of probable cause, the only additional proof introduced at the supplemental hearing that was not contained in the original record was that a young boy had observed the defendant sitting on a park bench in front of the apartment building shortly before the murder was committed. From this vantage point, defendant would have been able to see the deceased enter the building. The court also placed reliance upon Mrs. Morales' false and evasive responses when questioned by the police as to her son's whereabouts.

Secondly, the court ruled that the defendant had voluntarily acquiesced to his detention by the police. "I further find from the credible evidence that the defendant voluntarily appeared at his mother's place of business, expected to see police officers there, and anticipated being questioned by the police about the homicide. Thus, after a conversation with his mother, during which she told him that the police wanted to speak to him, the defendant affirmatively responded that he would come over to see them. And after the defendant did appear, and the police told him they wanted to speak to him, the defendant replied that he knew they wanted to speak to him and voluntarily accompanied the police officers to the station house."

The hearing court also concluded that the confessions were not related in any way to his detention at the police station, but, rather, "constituted a voluntary unburdening of his guilty conscience." Finally, it was held that a detention for a brief period of time for investigatory purposes did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.

The Appellate Division, by a fractionated court, affirmed the order of the trial court. (52 A.D.2d 818, 383 N.Y.S.2d 608.) Two Justices agreed fully with the opinion by Trial Term and two Justices agreed with the result but filed concurring opinions. Both of the concurring Justices agreed that the evidence adduced at the supplemental hearing, as well as contained in the entire record, was insufficient to sustain the finding of probable cause. However, one Justice took the view that the defendant had voluntarily confronted the police and, thus, the confessions were not suppressible. (52 A.D.2d at pp. 818-819, 383 N.Y.S.2d at p. 609 (Lupiano, J., concurring).) The other Justice believed that the evidence was insufficient to establish consent but was for affirmance on the authority of the prior Court of Appeals holding in this case. (52 A.D.2d at pp. 819-820, 383 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 609-610 (Birns, J., concurring).) One Justice dissented and voted to reverse, taking the view that neither probable cause nor consent had been established and that the Court of Appeals holding on the first appeal had been undercut by Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 and People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662, 376 N.Y.S.2d 469, 339 N.E.2d 162. (52 A.D.2d at pp. 821-824, 383 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 611-614 (Murphy, J., dissenting).) Defendant was granted leave to appeal to our court.

We begin with the issue of probable cause. Although the hearing court concluded that the police did have probable cause to arrest Morales for the Brown murder, this finding was expressly rejected by three Justices at the Appellate Division. We, therefore, are presented by a finding by the intermediate appellate court that probable cause to arrest was lacking. The question of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Determination of the facts and circumstances bearing on the issue, which hinges primarily on questions of witness credibility, is a question of fact. However, it is a question of law whether the facts found to exist are sufficient to constitute probable cause. (E. g., People v. Oden, 36 N.Y.2d 382, 384, 368 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510, 329 N.E.2d 188, 190.) Where more than one inference may be drawn from the facts, the question of probable cause is primarily one of fact over which our court has limited powers of review. (E. g., People v. Rizzo, 40 N.Y.2d 425, 430, 386 N.Y.S.2d 878, 881, 353 N.E.2d 841, 844; People v. Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 678, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482, 339 N.E.2d 170, 172, cert. den., 425 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1507, 47 L.Ed.2d 762; People v. Alexander, 37 N.Y.2d 202, 204, 371 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877, 333 N.E.2d 157, 158.)

In this instance, we cannot conclude that the Appellate Division erred as a matter of law. The only additional evidence produced at the supplemental hearing which was not contained in the original record was that the police had been informed, prior to Morales' detention, by a young boy that he had seen defendant outside...

To continue reading

Request your trial
50 cases
  • State v. Jackson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • 7 Julio 1983
    ...request of the police. Dunaway v. New York, supra, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). See People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 366 N.E.2d 248, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018, 98 S.Ct. 739, 54 L.Ed.2d 765 (1978). Unlike the defendant in Dunaway, Jackson wa......
  • U.S. v. Tucker
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • 23 Octubre 1979
    ...most, Dunaway limits the holding of these cases to their own, and substantially similar, fact situations. People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587, 366 N.E.2d 248 (1977), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018, 98 S.Ct. 739, 54 L.Ed.2d 765 (1978), held that "(l)aw enforcement officials may d......
  • People v. Elwell
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • 6 Mayo 1980
    ...from noncriminal detail was made. We have applied or referred to Draper in a number of other cases. 14 In People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 135, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587, 366 N.E.2d 248 and People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129, 136, 303 N.Y.S.2d 33, 250 N.E.2d 323, supra we recognized its rule but he......
  • People v. Dyla
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • 30 Diciembre 1988
    ...homicide prosecution (see also, People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 510 N.Y.S.2d 552, 503 N.E.2d 108, supra People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 137, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587, 366 N.E.2d 248; People v. Minley, 112 A.D.2d 712, 492 N.Y.S.2d 199, affd. 68 N.Y.2d 952, 510 N.Y.S.2d 87, 502 N.E.2d In this con......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT