42 N.W. 473 (Minn. 1889), State v. Winona & St. Peter Land Company
| Citation | 42 N.W. 473, 40 Minn. 512 |
| Opinion Judge | Mitchell, J. |
| Party Name | State v. Winona & St. Peter Land Company |
| Case Date | May 24, 1889 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Page 473
40 Minn. 512 at 515.
Original Opinion of January 31, 1889, Reported at: 40 Minn. 512.
OPINION
Page 474
[40 Minn. 515] ON REARGUMENT.
These proceedings, which were certified to this court pursuant to Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, § 80, having been inadvertently submitted at the late October term without argument, and some of the points intended to be raised not having been considered or decided, the decision filed therein (41 N.W. 465,) was vacated, and the case set for reargument at the present term. The lands in question are included in that part of the land grant of the Winona & St. Peter Railroad Company to which the "Barney party" and their successor in interest, the Winona & St. Peter Land Company, was entitled under the agreement of October 31, 1867, (Ex. W,) already several times before this court. These lands were conveyed from time to time (beginning with the year 1869) by the state to the railroad company, in which the legal title remained until March, 1887, although the equitable title passed immediately, under the agreement referred to, to the Barneys or their successor. None of the lands were assessed or any steps taken to enforce any taxes against them until 1886, when, in pursuance of the provisions of Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, § 113, as amended by Laws 1881, c. 5, and Laws 1885, c. 2, § 23, the county auditor entered them upon the assessment and tax books, assessed them, and extended taxes against them, on the tax-list for the current year, for each year subsequent to the dates when the lands were conveyed by the state to the railway company, and included in the amount of such taxes interest thereon from the time they would have become delinquent had they been assessed in the proper years. The taxes remaining unpaid and having become delinquent, these proceedings were instituted in January, 1888, to enforce collection by obtaining judgment against the lands. That these lands became taxable immediately upon their conveyance by the state to the railroad company is no longer an open question in this court. State v. Winona & St. Peter R. Co., 21 Minn. 472c; County of Brown v. Winona & St. Peter Land Co., 38 Minn. 397, (37 N.W. 949;) County of Brown v. Winona [40 Minn. 516] & St. Peter Land Co., 39 Minn. 380, (40 N.W. 166.) The constitutionality of the statute under which these taxes for past years were assessed is now attacked upon grounds not raised or not specially urged in former cases. These are, in brief, three: First, that it violates section 1, art. 9, of the constitution of the state, which requires equality and uniformity of taxation; second, that it violates section 7, art. 1, of the same instrument, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law; third, that, even if this mode of assessment can be sustained, the provision requiring 7 per cent. interest to be added from the time the tax would have become delinquent if assessed in the proper year is invalid, as being unequal taxation.
1. The burden of appellant's argument in support of the first proposition seems to be that the legislature has no power to authorize a tax for past years upon property theretofore omitted, when all the purposes of taxation for such years have been fully subserved; that taxes can only be levied to defray the expenses of the state and local government; and that if these back taxes are levied and collected, there is now no object to which they could be applied; that they would be a mere idle surplus in the treasury; that the fact that in past years lands have been omitted cannot be made the basis of present taxation. The grand fallacy in this argument is in assuming that statutes like the one under consideration are acts authorizing original taxation. The tax was a debt or liability which the land owed in the year when it ought to have been assessed. Such statutes are purely remedial in their nature, and only go to confirm pre-existing rights by adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. And it can hardly be necessary at this day to argue that wherever property has escaped payment of its share of the public burdens it is competent for the legislature to provide for its assessment or reassessment for back years,
Page 475
and for that purpose it may adopt any method which it might have originally adopted for the enforcement of the collection of taxes. There is no difference in principle between a case where property has escaped taxation by reason of its entire omission from the assessment-rolls and a case where it has escaped by reason of defects in attempted proceedings for the enforcement [40 Minn. 517] of the tax. In either case the debt or liability for its share of the public burdens remains, and it may be ascertained and enforced in any subsequent year; and the owner cannot object to any particular method adopted for that purpose, provided it operates equally and justly. The principle of all the cases is that the taxing power, when acting within its legitimate sphere, is one which knows no stopping-place until it has accomplished the purpose for which it exists, viz., the actual enforcement and collection from every lawful object of taxation of its proportionate share of the public burdens; and, if prevented by any obstacles, it may return again and again until, the way being clear, the tax is collected. This right to assess or reassess for back taxes, under appropriate legislation, has been fully recognized by this court in County of Olmsted v. Barber, 31 Minn. 256, (17 N.W. 473,) and County of Ramsey v. Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 537, (24 N.W. 313.) It is laid down as the unquestioned law by every text-writer. Cooley, Tax'n, 309; Blackw. Tax-Titles, §§ 325, 951; Burroughs, Tax'n, § 93; Welty, Assessm. § 197; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 814. It is supported by an unbroken line of decisions, not only in cases where an abortive attempt to enforce the tax had been previously made, but also in cases where it had been assessed against the wrong person, or where, as in this case, property had entirely escaped assessment. Fairfield v. People, 94 Ill. 244; People v. Board of Assessors, 92 N.Y. 430; City of Wheeling v. Hawley, 18 W.Va. 472; Harwood v. North Brookfield, 130 Mass. 561; Hubbard v. Garfield, 102 Mass. 72; Byram v. Detroit, 50 Mich. 56, (12 N.W. 912, and 14 N.W. 698;) Overing v. Foote, 43 N.Y. 290; North Carolina R. Co. v. Commissioners, 82 N.C. 259; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400. The fact that the public expenses have been paid for the years in which the taxes were omitted, or that the particular public purposes for which they were originally required have been met with other funds, or that the collection of the omitted taxes may temporarily create a surplus of public revenue, presents no constitutional ground why omitted property should continue to escape its due share of taxation. When collected, these taxes will still belong to the public, and, like any other surplus, be subject to future appropriation, and thereby lessen future [40 Minn. 518] taxation upon those who have already paid more than their share. Village of Hyde Park v. Ingalls, 87 Ill. 11; Fairfield v. People, supra.
2. Appellant's second point, to wit, that this statute violates section 7, art. 1, of the constitution, is predicated upon the assumption that it provides for the assessment of these back taxes without notice to the property-owner, and without giving him any opportunity of being heard in the matter. Without following counsel through their exhaustive arguments upon this point, it is sufficient to say that it seems to proceed upon what we consider two false assumptions, to wit: First, that in proceedings in the exercise of the taxing power the property-owner is entitled to notice and to be heard in each preliminary step in the proceedings, pari passu with their progress; and, second, that under the tax law (Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, §§ 75, 79) the defences which he may interpose by answer, when the state applies for judgment, are so restricted as not to include all the objections which go to the merits of the proceedings. Where, as in the present case, the tax is levied on property, not specifically, but according to its value, to be ascertained by some person appointed for that purpose, undoubtedly a party is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard; but we know of no case where it was ever held that a party was entitled to notice of, and to be heard in, each step in tax proceedings as it is taken. We doubt whether any tax law ever provided for any such thing. The principle running through all the cases is that a law does not infringe upon the constitutional provision under consideration if the property-owner has an opportunity to question the validity or amount of the tax either before that amount is determined, or in subsequent proceedings for its enforcement. Whenever by law a tax is imposed upon property, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting it in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the person or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 24 L.Ed. 616; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, (4 S.Ct. 663, 28 L.Ed. 569.)
This right is fully given under the sections of the tax law already referred to. Within 20 days after the last publication of the delinquent [40 Minn. 519] list any person may by answer interpose any defence or objection he may have to the tax. He may set up as a defence that the tax is void for want of authority to levy it, or that it was partially, unfairly, or unequally assessed. Comm'rs of St. Louis Co. v. Nettl...
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