White v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 05 October 1976
• Docket Number: No. CIV 76-5031.,CIV 76-5031.
• Citation: 420 F. Supp. 882
• Parties: Georgia WHITE, as guardian ad litem for Florence Red Dog, an incompetent person v. David MATTHEWS, etc., et al. Richard KNEIP, etc., et al., v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE OF the PINE RIDGE RESERVATION, SOUTH DAKOTA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

420 F. Supp. 882

Georgia WHITE, as guardian ad litem for Florence Red Dog, an incompetent person v. David MATTHEWS, etc., et al.

Richard KNEIP, etc., et al., v. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE OF the PINE RIDGE RESERVATION, SOUTH DAKOTA.

No. CIV 76-5031.

United States District Court, D. South Dakota.

October 5, 1976.

Anita Remerowski, Mary Ellen Sloan, Legal Services, Mission, S. D., for plaintiff.

William F. Clayton, U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., Thomas E. Stuen, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., William Janklow, Atty. Gen., Charles L. Dorothy, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of South Dakota, Pierre, S. D., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGUE, District Judge.

I INTRODUCTION

On April 15, 1976, Georgia White petitioned this Federal District Court to appoint her as Guardian Ad Litem for her sister Florence Red Dog whom the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court had found to be mentally ill and in need of immediate commitment for the protection of herself and others. Because it appeared that such appointment was necessary, and it further appeared that Georgia White was a suitable and proper person, the appointment was made. On April 15, 1976 Georgia White, as Guardian Ad Litem for Florence Red Dog, by her counsel filed a complaint which in relevant part alleged: that Florence Red Dog was in a dangerously mentally ill condition and had threatened and physically attacked other persons and attempted suicide; that she was as of April 15 incarcerated in the Pine Ridge tribal jail, was heavily sedated and all her clothing had been taken away to prevent suicide attempts; that state officials had refused to act in accordance with state law to provide necessary emergency medical treatment; and that such refusal was violative of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. A declaratory judgment and immediate injunctive relief were sought. This Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order wherein state officials were ordered to stop persisting in their refusal to commit Florence Red Dog to the Human Services center in Yankton pending a final decision in this matter.

On April 19, 1976 Georgia White (hereinafter Plaintiff) by her attorney filed an Amended Complaint. The cause of action against the state officials was restated and certain federal officials were also named as defendants. As a cause of action against the federal officials plaintiff alleged in relevant part: that these federal officials have a legal duty to provide mental health care for Indian persons; that said officials had refused to carry out their duty to provide health care; and that such refusal had caused Florence Red Dog personal damages in the amount of $100,000.00.

On May 5, 1976, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. In addition to a change in the caption correcting an error as to the identity of a public official named as a defendant, this complaint rearranged the claims of plaintiff and set out with greater clarity the theories advanced in the first amended complaint.

In plain and simple terms plaintiff's claim could be reduced to one assertion; namely, that either state or federal officials, or both, have a legal duty to provide medical care for the mentally ill Indian woman for whom plaintiff was appointed Guardian Ad Litem.

State defendants by an Assistant Attorney General filed an answer, cross claim and third party complaint on June 10, 1976. The state defendants did not contest jurisdiction but did raise as a defense the theory that plaintiff had stated no grounds for relief. State defendants specifically asserted that federal law and treaties required South Dakota to treat Indian persons residing on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation differently than other South Dakota citizens living off of the reservation and that federal law, and treaties precluded South Dakota from assuming jurisdiction over the subject matter of the commitment of a mentally ill Indian person residing on the Pine Ridge Reservation.

In the cross claim against federal officials and third party complaint against the tribe, state officials alleged that either the Oglala Sioux Tribe or the Federal Government was legally responsible for the mental health care of Florence Red Dog. Accordingly, they prayed inter alia for the following relief: that plaintiff's action against state officials be dismissed; that state officials' refusal to give treatment be declared not violative of equal protection; that Florence Red Dog be committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D. C.; and finally that either the federal defendants or the tribe be declared liable for costs and services provided Florence Red Dog.

On June 24, 1976, the federal defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and filed a cross claim against the state defendants. The federal defendants admitted that Florence Red Dog, as of April 15, was mentally ill and was a danger to herself and others but denied that any federal officials had a duty to provide relief. They further raised, inter alia, the following defenses: lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Further, the federal defendants cross claimed against the state defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Particularly, the federal defendants asked this Court to declare that the South Dakota officials had adopted and implemented procedures which had the purpose and effect of preventing the mental health treatment of American Indian residents of the state on the same basis as non-Indian residents thereby violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as Title 27 of the South Dakota Compiled Laws; as injunctive relief these defendants sought, of course, to enjoin the continuation of the allegedly unlawful practices.

On July 9, 1976 state defendants answered federal defendants' cross claim in substance in the same manner they had answered the Second Amended Complaint; i. e. federal law and treaties required that South Dakota treat Indian persons residing on the reservation differently than other South Dakota citizens living off the reservation. Thus they sought dismissal of the cross claim and a declaration that state officials' actions were proper.

The federal defendants moved this Court to dismiss the state defendants' cross claim for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

The Oglala Sioux Tribe moved for dismissal of the third party suit against it for lack of jurisdiction, for failure to allege a violation of any person's rights by the tribe, and because of sovereign immunity.

After the pleadings were at this stage, all parties provided briefs on various points of law, and the Court set a hearing date for argument on the several motions before it. Before the hearing date, the state defendants moved for leave to amend their answer to the federal defendants' cross claim to include a counterclaim. In addition, a struggle over the propriety of discovery by state officials of federal defendants' materials added significantly in this intervening period to the burgeoning file.

On September 15, 1976, this matter came on for hearing in the Federal Courthouse in Rapid City. All parties agreed that no facts were in dispute; and everything to be decided was admittedly a matter of law. It was further agreed that the salient points of law could be covered by concentrating upon the following: (1) the tribe's motion to dismiss; (2) the federal defendants' motion to dismiss the state defendants' cross claim; and (3) the state defendants' motion for leave to amend its answer to the federal defendants' cross claim. The arguments were heard; the tribe's motion to dismiss was granted; and ruling as to the other motions was reserved.

II JURISDICTION

In her Second Amended Complaint plaintiff is suing two distinct groups of persons, i. e., federal officials and state officials. There must be an independent jurisdictional basis for each group as pendent parties are not generally embraced within the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Vol. 13, Wright-Miller-Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3567 (1975).

A. THE STATE DEFENDANTS

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit against the state defendants is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). The complaint plainly states that the federal right allegedly violated by state defendants is the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, it appears that the applicable subsection is § 1343(3) which provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . .

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.

One prerequisite for jurisdiction under this subsection is action "under color of" state law, statute, ordinance, etc. The parties have not raised the issue, but the Court thinks this jurisdictional element needs some examination in this case. The state officials who refused to commit Florence Red Dog made their refusal, not because state law forbade commitment, but rather because they believed federal law precluded state intervention in the matter. Therefore, although the initial refusal to commit Florence Red Dog for treatment in a state facility was made in an official capacity, it was not made on the basis of any state law nor did plaintiff so allege. Thus, upon reflection, we are forced to consider the meaning of the phrase "under color of state law." Two possibilities exist; the phrase could refer to officials' actions even though the officials are not purporting to enforce state law, or the phrase could be limited to "state action" wherein a specific...