Board of Ed. of Marion City School Dist. v. Board of Ed. of Elgin Local School Dist.
| Decision Date | 13 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1134,80-1134 |
| Citation | 420 N.E.2d 990,20 O.O.3d 165,66 Ohio St.2d 152 |
| Parties | , 20 O.O.3d 165 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MARION CITY SCHOOL DIST., Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ELGIN LOCAL SCHOOL DIST. et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The act of the Ohio State Board of Education disapproving a transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 is a legislative act, and, as such, is not appealable pursuant to R.C. 119.12.
In January 1977, appellant, Board of Education of the Marion City School District, requested the transfer to its district of certain parcels of land previously annexed to the city from three adjacent school districts, Pleasant, River Valley, and Elgin locals. The boards of education of these districts are designated appellees herein. R.C. 3311.06 requires the approval of appellee Ohio State Board of Education (state board) of any such transfer. 1 Accordingly, application for this transfer was to the state board which, at the request of appellees, appointed a referee to conduct hearings on the matter pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119 et seq. After the adjudication hearing, the referee recommended approval of some parcels for transfer, and disapproval of others. Objections to the referee's report and recommendations were filed and thereafter, on March 12, 1979, the state board disapproved the transfer of any of the requested territory.
Appellant timely filed an appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, asserting that no reliable, probative or substantial evidence supported the state board's denial of the transfer of territory. The court determined that there was "some reliable, probative and substantial evidence in support of the Board's order and it was issued in accordance with law," and thereupon ordered the appeal dismissed.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals ordered "that the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County is modified to show (a) lack of jurisdiction in accordance with this decision and, as modified, is affirmed." The Court of Appeals held that the disapproval of the requested transfer was a legislative act of the State Board of Education and, as such, was not appealable to the common pleas court.
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Knepper, White, Arter & Hadden and William L. Clark, Columbus, for appellant.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Mr. Gary Brown, Columbus, for appellee State Board of Education.
Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson, Newman & Gee, Rankin M. Gibson and Howard B. Abramoff, Columbus, for appellees local school boards.
The sole issue for determination here is whether the act of the state board disapproving the transfer of land from one school district to another is a legislative act not subject to review by the courts. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding the action legislative and not appealable.
Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution gives the courts of common pleas "original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law." Prior cases have established that quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies are not susceptible to judicial review. Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371, paragraph three of the syllabus.
In Rankin-Thoman v. Caldwell (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held R.C. 119.11 unconstitutional, since it contemplated judicial review only of quasi-legislative proceedings, thereby violating Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. In light of this holding, and the subsequent repeal of R.C. 119.11 effective September 30, 1976, the primary provision for appeal from state administrative agency adjudications is R.C. 119.12, 2 which allows appeals by "(a)ny party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to an adjudication denying an applicant admission to an examination, or denying the issuance or renewal of a license, registration of a licensee, or revoking or suspending a license * * * (or) any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication." It is under this statutory provision that appellant brought its appeal to the common pleas court.
In Board of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 117, this court, in a per curiam opinion, held at page 120, 341 N.E.2d 589, that "the act of the board in approving a transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 is itself a legislative act * * *." It necessarily follows that the decision of the state board disapproving a transfer is similarly legislative. As a legislative act, it is not appealable pursuant to R.C. 119.12.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
POTTER, J., of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting for PAUL W. BROWN, J.
PALMER, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for SWEENEY, J.
The majority, by one wide sweep of the decisional pen, has revolutionized the rather longstanding law of the appealability of adjudicatory orders emanating from administrative procedure hearings that have been conducted pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119. This hearing was conducted by a referee having much experience in state school board administrative hearings, designated by the Ohio State Board of Education pursuant to R.C. 119.09. Such hearings were conducted on four separate dates with the designated parties afforded the statutory right of counsel and full right of examination and cross-examination, presentation of evidence, exhibits, etc., the hearing officer making rulings on objections and motions including the question of who were parties for purposes of the hearings.
It is my view that everyone involved, counsel for the school districts, counsel for the state school board, and certainly the referee, thought that they were involved in a proceeding adjudicatory in nature. Indicative of this, the referee set forth the following procedural considerations in his report:
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