Neumeyer v. Beard

• Decision Date: 25 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1499.,04-1499.
• Citation: 421 F.3d 210
• Parties: Teresa NEUMEYER; Larry Neumeyer, Appellants v. Jeffrey BEARD, in his official capacity as Secretary of the PA DOC; Kenneth Kyler, in his official capacity as Superintendent of SCI at Huntingdon.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

421 F.3d 210

Teresa NEUMEYER; Larry Neumeyer, Appellants v. Jeffrey BEARD, in his official capacity as Secretary of the PA DOC; Kenneth Kyler, in his official capacity as Superintendent of SCI at Huntingdon.

No. 04-1499.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 11, 2005.

August 25, 2005.

Teresa Neumeyer, Larry Neumeyer, Chesaning, Michigan, Appellants pro se.

Gerald J. Pappert, Attorney General, Francis R. Filipi, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorney General, John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Litigation Section, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellees.

Before SLOVITER and MCKEE, Circuit Judges, and FULLAM,^* District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Acting pro se, Plaintiffs/Appellants Teresa and Larry Neumeyer brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment against Defendants/Appellees Jeffrey Beard, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and Kenneth Kyler, the Superintendent of the State Correctional Institute at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (hereafter "prison officials"), that the practice of subjecting prison visitors' vehicles to random searches violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania rejected this claim as a matter of law and thus entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Neumeyer v. Beard, 301 F.Supp.2d 349 (M.D.Pa.2004). The Neumeyers appeal.¹

I.

Teresa Neumeyer's father ("prisoner") is a prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Huntingdon ("SCIH"), an institution managed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Neumeyer, 301 F.Supp.2d at 350. Mr. and Ms. Neumeyer, who are citizens of Michigan, make fairly regular trips to visit the prisoner at the SCIH.

The SCIH maintains a parking lot for use by visitors such as the Neumeyers while they are visiting the facility. Notably, some inmates have outside work details and such inmates "may have access to visitors' vehicles parked at the prison." 301 F.Supp.2d at 353.

Prison officials have posted large signs at all entranceways to the prison and immediately in front of the visitors' parking lot. In part, these signs read:

THIS IS A STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION. ALL PERSONS, VEHICLES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY ENTERING OR BROUGHT ON THESE GROUNDS ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH. DRUG DETECTION DOGS AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES MAY BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

Kyler Decla. ¶ 8. The signs further inform visitors that anyone caught bringing prohibited items onto the SCIH's property will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

Under SCIH/DOC policy, prison visitor vehicles parked on facility grounds are subject to random searches after the owner or operator signs a pre-printed "Consent To Search Vehicle" form. 301 F.Supp.2d at 350. If an individual refuses to sign this form, SCIH/DOC officials simply refuse the would-be visitor entry to the prison, ask the visitor to leave the premises, and do not pursue further action. As found by the District Court: "If a prison visitor refuses to provide written consent permitting SCIH corrections officers to search his or her vehicle, then the visitor will not be allowed to enter the prison to visit any prisoner on that day." Id. Compare with Spear v. Sowders, 71 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir.1995) ("Spear [a visitor to the prison] claims that [prison] officials told her that she could either consent to the search, or that she would be detained while they secured a warrant and then she would be forcibly searched if necessary."). If, however, the search proceeds and the SCIH/DOC officials uncover contraband or evidence of illegality, they will notify the Pennsylvania State Police.

The SCIH/DOC policy does not require corrections officers to possess a search warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion before they may seek to search a vehicle parked on prison grounds. In addition, the SCIH/DOC officials do not seek permission to search the vehicle of every visitor who parks in the lot. As found by the District Court, "[t]here are no written standards as to how the searches are to be conducted; in general, they are conducted randomly as time and complement permit." Neumeyer, 301 F.Supp.2d at 350.

The Neumeyers have visited the prisoner at the SCIH on approximately ten occasions. On May 28, 2001, and again on May 27, 2002, several SCIH/DOC correctional officers searched the Neumeyers' vehicle. 301 F.Supp.2d at 350. Prior to these searches, Ms. Neumeyer signed the written consent form. Id. According to evidence submitted by the Neumeyers, once the SCIH/DOC officers select a vehicle for inspection and obtain the requisite signature, they require the operator and any passengers to exit the vehicle and open passenger compartments and the trunk for inspection.

The record shows that the two searches of the Neumeyers' automobile did not uncover any contraband or evidence of illegal activity. Indeed, there does not exist any information or allegations in any SCIH/DOC records or reports indicating that the Neumeyers have brought—or attempted to bring—unlawful contraband into the SCIH or possessed the same in their vehicle.

On November 26, 2002, the Neumeyers filed a Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and an order enjoining further searches of their vehicle. The Complaint contended that, inasmuch as the Neumeyers planned to continue to visit their incarcerated relative at the SCIH, they possessed a reasonable fear that SCIH/DOC officials would continue to infringe upon their rights in the future absent judicial intervention. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The Complaint did not seek damages.

Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, filed a Memorandum Opinion, and entered summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. Neumeyer, 301 F.Supp.2d at 353. This appeal followed.

II.

This court reviews the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as did the District Court. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Greentree Transp. Trucking Co., 293 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. "Summary judgment, however, must not be granted where there is a genuine dispute about a material fact, `that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Here, there are no disputed issues of material fact and resolution of this matter turns solely on interpretations of law.

III.

Section 1983, the federal civil rights statute here at issue, "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but [rather] a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). "To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury." Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.2005). Here, the Neumeyers' Complaint averred that the prison officials violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to state actors by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Specifically, the Neumeyers' Complaint contended that the prison officials' program has violated and will continue to violate their constitutional rights because it allows SCIH/DOC correctional officers to conduct vehicle searches without any individualized suspicion.²

The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. Typically, in order to be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, a search must be supported by a warrant, unless the search is supportable under one or more of the "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement. United States v. Brightwell, 563 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir.1977) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the prison officials argue that the SCIH/DOC policy is supportable under both the "consent" exception and the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement. We first consider whether this case falls within the "special needs" exception.

The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that "[n]either a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of [Fourth Amendment] reasonableness in every circumstance." Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). Rather:

[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special government needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.

Id. at 665-66, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (emphasis added). In other words, there are instances when a search furthers a "special governmental need" beyond that of normal law enforcement such that the search, although not supported by the typical quantum of individualized suspicion, can nonetheless still be...