Melanson v. Rantoul

Decision Date19 October 1976
Docket Number75-0008.,Civ. A. No. 75-0036
PartiesGracia L. MELANSON v. Talbot RANTOUL et al. Myrna B. LAMB v. Talbot RANTOUL et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harold H. Winsten, Edward E. Dillon, Jr., Providence, R. I., for Gracia L. Melanson.

Marvin A. Brill, Providence, R. I., for Myrna B. Lamb.

Peter J. McGinn and Richard A. Sherman, Providence, R. I., for defendants Rantoul, Lay and R. I. School of Design.

Allen P. Rubine, Asst. Atty. Gen., R. I., Providence, R. I., for Governor of R. I.

Constance L. Messore, Asst. U. S. Atty., (R. I.) Providence, R. I., for the U. S.

OPINION AND ORDER

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

These cases are presently before the court for consideration of a number of motions to dismiss.1 Each plaintiff complains that she has suffered harm resulting from sex-based discrimination at the hands of defendants Talbot Rantoul, Donald M. Lay, Jr., and the Rhode Island School of Design (hereinafter collectively referred to as RISD). The United States of America and the Governor of Rhode Island, Philip W. Noel, have been named as additional defendants in each case under various theories outlined below.

After receiving oppositions and accompanying memoranda on those motions, the Court on April 29, 1975, ordered the plaintiffs to present further factual data and legal argument in support of their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. More than sixteen months later,2 after numerous difficulties between the parties during discovery, the Court is finally in possession of plaintiffs' factual presentation and of legal argument from all parties. This opinion is concerned only with the resolution of (1) the motion of RISD defendants to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; (2) the motion of Governor Noel to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (3) the motion of the United States of America to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

State Action

It is elementary that the fourteenth amendment is a restriction on the conduct of states, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883), and of actors whose conduct can fairly be attributed to a state, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). RISD denies that its actions with regard to plaintiffs can be so attributed, and has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3

As this Court has had frequent occasion to note, there is no clear line to decide what triggers the fourteenth amendment's prohibitions in any given case. McClellan v. University Heights, 338 F.Supp. 374 (D.R.I. 1972). Courts must proceed by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances", McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 783 (1st Cir. 1971), citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra. The parties are agreed that the general approach of Burton governs the issue of whether the "private entity was so intertwined with the state as to be subject to the standards of lawful activity imposed upon public institutions." Berrios v. Inter American University, 535 F.2d 1330 (1st Cir. 1976).

Plaintiffs first argue that the relationship between the state and RISD evinces "a governmental design for private execution of public functions", Berrios v. Inter American University, 409 F.Supp. 769 (D.P. R.1975), thereby establishing the presence of state action under the principles of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946). They seek to distinguish the holding of the Court of Appeals in Berrios, supra, that higher education is not a public function by pointing to "a plethora of situations and activities where RISD was actually performing specific functions for and on behalf of the state" (emphasis added). These include, inter alia, tours of its museum for public school children, assistance in land-use planning for various towns in the state, and participation in artistic programs on behalf of the Rhode Island Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services.

With due respect, plaintiffs have completely misconstrued the public function theory, which treats as state action only the private exercise of a state-delegated power "which is traditionally associated with sovereignty". Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353, 95 S.Ct. 449, 454, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966). The question is not whether RISD is performing various services for the state, but whether it has been entrusted with state power for use in traditional governmental functions, such as elections, Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984 (1932), or the operation of municipal parks, Evans v. Newton, supra.

Framed this way, the Court has little trouble deciding that higher education in Rhode Island is not a public function such that its delegation to RISD transforms RISD's actions into the actions of the state. The Supreme Court has already rejected (albeit in dicta) the public function theory as applied to higher education. Jackson, supra, 419 U.S. at 353, 354 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 449; Evans v. Newton, supra, 382 U.S. at 300, 86 S.Ct. 486. The First Circuit seems conclusively to have rejected it in Berrios, supra, 535 F.2d at 1333. To the extent that the First Circuit's holding was limited to the facts before it, this Court sees no evidence before it to distinguish the factual situation in the case at bar from Berrios, supra.

Plaintiffs next argue that RISD's actions can fairly be attributed to Rhode Island on the basis of a network of mutual assistance and benefit. In support of their allegation that the state and local governments are "involved in the daily operations and activities of RISD" sufficient to establish "that degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn", Burton, supra, 365 U.S. at 724, 81 S.Ct. at 861, plaintiffs have marshalled extensive evidence of the legal, financial, and programmatic relationships between RISD and Rhode Island. We proceed, as did the district court in Berrios, supra, by analyzing the constituent elements, later determining whether the aggregate of facts indicating governmental involvement supports jurisdiction.

1. State subsidization of RISD

Although RIGL § 16-35-1 authorizes the legislature to make appropriations to RISD, no such appropriations have been made at least as far back as the period covered by this lawsuit. That aid which has been received by RISD from the state has been largely indirect (i. e., tax exemptions). Direct aid has been peripheral to RISD's main function.4 Thus, RISD has received financial support from the Rhode Island State Council for the Arts, largely for projects for the RISD Museum of Art.5 RISD receives $15,000 yearly pursuant to a contract with the state for services provided public school children by way of museum tours. Approximately $20,000 is provided yearly by the state for student scholarships. At various times in the past twelve years, RISD has received assorted other grants from the state for various projects. RISD's total annual operating income has risen from $3 million in 1965 to over $8 million in 1974-1975.

This picture of direct state subsidy6 contrasts sharply with the state aid demonstrated in those few cases cited by plaintiffs where courts have found extensive subsidy, inter alia, sufficient for a finding of state action. In Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F.Supp. 992, 997 (E.D.Pa.1974), for example, the legislature annually appropriated 25% of the university's "hard-core budget", which was defined as the University's educational and housekeeping budget.7 Temple University's actions were attributed to Pennsylvania on a finding of, inter alia, state appropriation of 54% of the university's total operating income. Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 385 F.Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa.1974). Similarly, in King v. Conservatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico, 378 F.Supp. 746 (D.P.R.1974), the defendant university was almost entirely subsidized by annual legislative appropriations. See also Ryan v. Hofstra University, 67 Misc.2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup.Ct.1971) (state action based on state ownership and lease-back of one-half book value of university's assets). In short, using figures which can be compared (direct operating expenses), state aid to RISD is far less than appears in other cases where plaintiffs have prevailed. Rhode Island's direct aid to RISD has not, at least as far back as 1965, totalled more than 2% of RISD's operating income.

Plaintiffs urge the court to include tax exemptions received by RISD in calculating the total state aid it receives. The Rackin court, for instance, seems to have considered tax exemptions in its examination of the broad picture of state subsidization, although the extent on which it so relied is not at all clear. (The 25% direct appropriation, of course, excluded tax exemption. Rackin, supra, at 996-97, 1000.) Courts and commentators are in disagreement over this question. Compare Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) (enjoining the grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminating schools) with Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 699 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions applicable to religious, as well as other, organizations.) See H. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra 19 n. 66 (tax exemption is not state aid for either First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment purposes.)

This Court is inclined to discount such exemptions in the context of the inquiry undertaken here, since weighing such exemptions would tend to convert libraries, art galleries, and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Phillips v. Fisher
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • October 12, 1977
    ...F.2d at 839). A valid claim of racial discrimination is a prerequisite to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F.Supp. 492, 499-500 (D.R.I.1976) (and cases cited therein). Similarly, a claim of some class-based discriminatory animus is an essential element of a......
  • Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hosp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • April 24, 1989
    ...Div., 558 F.2d 480, 486 n. 2 (8th Cir.1977); St. Louis v. Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314, 1317 (7th Cir.1984); Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F.Supp. 492, 499 (D.R. I.1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir.1977). In addition, while courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized a cause of acti......
  • Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents & Associates, Inc. v. Brown
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • June 14, 1989
    ...if joinder deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.1986); Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F.Supp. 492, 501 (D.R.I.1976), aff'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 409 (1st In addition to Hodel, pre-Sierra Club Fifth Circuit cases discuss a private p......
  • Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hosp., s. 89-1624
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • December 5, 1989
    ...to contest the ruling of the district court that Sec. 1981 does not apply to cases of alleged sex discrimination. See Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F.Supp. 492, 499 (D.R.I.1976), aff'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir.1977). Since the validity of that ruling is not properly before us, we ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT