Peoples v. Cca Detention Centers

• Decision Date: 07 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-3071.,No. 04-3124.,04-3071.,04-3124.
• Citation: 422 F.3d 1090
• Parties: Cornelius E. PEOPLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CCA DETENTION CENTERS; Fred Lawrence, Warden; Roger Moore, Sr., Assistant Warden; James Perry, Chief of Security; Jay Foskett, Captain of Security; Corrections Corporation of America; Andre Ford, Chief of Security; Jacquelyn Banks, Assistant Warden; Bruce Roberts, Lieutenant Classification Personnel; Gary Fuller, Legal Services for Prisoners, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

422 F.3d 1090

Cornelius E. PEOPLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CCA DETENTION CENTERS; Fred Lawrence, Warden; Roger Moore, Sr., Assistant Warden; James Perry, Chief of Security; Jay Foskett, Captain of Security; Corrections Corporation of America; Andre Ford, Chief of Security; Jacquelyn Banks, Assistant Warden; Bruce Roberts, Lieutenant Classification Personnel; Gary Fuller, Legal Services for Prisoners, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-3071.

No. 04-3124.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

September 7, 2005.

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Cornelius E. Peoples, pro se, in 04-3124.

Amanda H. Frost, (Brian Wolfman, with her on the briefs), Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant in No. 04-3071.

Michael P. Crow (Martha Burnett Crow, with him on the briefs), Crow, Clothier & Bates, Leavenworth, KS, for Defendants-Appellees in Nos. 04-3071 & 04-3124.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Cornelius E. Peoples filed two separate claims for damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging violations of his constitutional rights while being held in pretrial detention at a privately run prison under contract with the United States Marshal Service. In the first suit (Peoples I), Mr. Peoples alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; in the second suit (Peoples II), he brought a variety of claims based on his Fifth Amendment right to due process. In both suits, Mr. Peoples named the Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA"), the operator of the private prison, and several of its employees ("individual Defendants") as defendants. On appeal, however, Mr. Peoples dropped the claims against CCA, and therefore only the individual Defendants are before us.

In Peoples I, the District Court dismissed the case against the individual Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctr., 2004 WL 74317 at *1 (D.Kan. Jan. 15, 2004) (unpublished). A different district court judge heard Peoples II and took jurisdiction over Mr. Peoples's Bivens claims against the individual Defendants but dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctr., 2004 WL 2278667 at *7 (D.Kan. Mar. 26, 2004) (unpublished). Mr. Peoples timely appeals both Peoples I and Peoples II. We take appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1331 and AFFIRM the dismissal of both complaints.

I. BACKGROUND

We present the facts as alleged in Mr. Peoples's complaints. At the times relevant to these appeals, Mr. Peoples was a federal prisoner held in pretrial detention. CCA is a private, for-profit corporation that operates the Leavenworth pretrial detention center under a contract with the United States Marshal Service. The Marshal Service directed that CCA hold Mr. Peoples at the Leavenworth CCA facility while he awaited trial in the Western District of Missouri. Mr. Peoples was placed in isolation upon his arrival at the CCA facility in July 2001.

A. Facts Relevant to Peoples I

After receiving clearance from the Marshal Service, Mr. Peoples was released into the general prison population. CCA staff placed him in Pod-H. Several members of the so-called Mexican Mafia gang were also housed in Pod-H. Because of his religion, Mr. Peoples feared that the members of the Mexican Mafia would physically assault him. Over several days, he filed several informal and formal grievances to this effect with CCA staff members. Nevertheless, he was not transferred to a new pod.

Early in the morning on August 1, 2001, Mr. Peoples was attacked by members of the Mexican Mafia. After the attack, Mr Peoples was not transferred to a new pod. Later that same day, at approximately 11 A.M., Mr. Peoples was attacked again. This time, the members of the Mexican Mafia struck him with padlocks, chains, and full soda cans. After this second incident, Mr. Peoples was reassigned to Pod-A.

Subsequently, Mr. Peoples, proceeding pro se, brought suit in the District of Kansas seeking compensatory and punitive damages.¹ His suit was construed as raising a Bivens claim, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. The District Court in Peoples I held that Malesko precluded federal jurisdiction over Mr. Peoples's suit against both CCA and the individual Defendants, and the court dismissed the claim. In ruling on the claim against the individual Defendants, the District Court held that because "other remedies are available — including state negligence actions — the Supreme Court would not extend Bivens to private employees of government contractors" and dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. Peoples I, 2004 WL 74317 at *7. With the assistance of counsel, Mr. Peoples timely appeals the District Court's ruling.

B. Facts Relevant to Peoples II

Mr. Peoples was assigned to administrative segregation upon his arrival at CCA because of lack of bed space, and he remained in administrative segregation for a total of thirteen months by order of the Marshal Service. Mr. Peoples's continued segregation resulted from the Marshal Service's and CCA officials' determination that he was an escape risk. He did not receive written notice of the reasons for his segregation immediately upon his placement in segregation and he was not allowed a hearing on his segregation status for five months.

While in segregation, Mr. Peoples did not have access to a law library. He could obtain legal materials through Defendant-Appellee Gary Fuller, who is an attorney, but he was limited to obtaining case law for which he had exact citations. Mr. Peoples acknowledges that he contacted Mr. Fuller and requested various resources from him, which were provided.

Finally, while Mr. Peoples was in the CCA facility, the individual Defendants informed Mr. Peoples that inmate telephone calls are randomly monitored in an effort to deter inmates from using facility phones for criminal or other improper purposes. Mr. Peoples was also told that CCA does not monitor or record calls from an attorney's phone when the attorney has properly requested blocking. Mr. Peoples believes that his phone calls with his attorney were unconstitutionally monitored.

Mr. Peoples, again proceeding pro se, filed a Bivens action, asserting that this conduct violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Like the judge in Peoples I, the judge in Peoples II viewed the Bivens issue as jurisdictional. Though indicating that, after Malesko, a Bivens claim is probably not available to a plaintiff suing an employee of a private prison who has other means of relief, see Peoples II, 2004 WL 2278667 at * 3, the District Court nevertheless rejected the individual Defendants' jurisdictional arguments, stating "because the Tenth Circuit has not fully addressed this issue, the court will assume arguendo that a Bivens action against the individual employees is available and will examine the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint." Peoples II, 2004 WL 2278667 at *4. The District Court then addressed Mr. Peoples's complaint in light of the individual Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion on all of Mr. Peoples's claims. Mr. Peoples timely appeals this ruling, and, unlike the appeal in Peoples I, he proceeds pro se in the Peoples II appeal.²

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

As noted, the District Court in Peoples I held that it did not have federal subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Peoples's suit against both CCA and the individual Defendants and therefore dismissed the suit. The District Court in Peoples II, however, asserted jurisdiction over the claims but dismissed them for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, we begin our analysis by resolving this important jurisdictional issue, which we review de novo. See Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir.2004).

Article III of the Federal Constitution states that lower federal courts have original jurisdiction over "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. Const., Art. III, §§ 1, 2. Congress currently provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

In Bell v. Hood, the Supreme Court explained that "where the complaint . . . is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible exceptions[,] . . . must entertain the suit." 327 U.S. 678, 681-82, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (emphasis added). The two "possible exceptions" are claims that "clearly appear[] to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction" or claims that are "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Id. at 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773; Simmat v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir.2005).

Mr. Peoples's claims easily meet the basic requirements for federal question jurisdiction. He alleges that CCA and the individual Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fifth Amendment right to due process. "[I]t is clear from the way [the complaint] was drawn that [Mr. Peoples] seek[s] recovery squarely on the ground that respondents violated the [Fifth and Eighth Amendments]." Bell, 327 U.S. at 681, 66 S.Ct. 773. Moreover, Mr. Peoples's claims are not immaterial, "but form the sole basis of the relief sought." Id. at 683, 66 S.Ct. 773. "Nor can we say that the cause of action is so patently without merit as to justify . . . the court's...