Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info Solutions

• Decision Date: 07 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1127.,04-1127.
• Citation: 422 F.3d 603
• Parties: Mary RUFFIN-THOMPKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

422 F.3d 603

Mary RUFFIN-THOMPKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-1127.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued November 8, 2004.

Decided September 7, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Larry P. Smith (argued), Krohn & Moss, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Karey Skiermont, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, Daniel H. Bromberg (argued), Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Mary Ruffin-Thompkins filed suit against Experian Information Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Experian. We affirm.

I. Background

This claim arose because of a dispute between Ruffin-Thompkins and Grossinger City Toyota. Ruffin-Thompkins filed a lawsuit against Grossinger alleging violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and the Deceptive Business Practices Act relating to Grossinger's sale of a car to Ruffin-Thompkins. The parties settled. According to the July 2002 settlement agreement, Grossinger agreed to pay off any remaining loan balance, to void Ruffin-Thompkins's obligation to buy the car, and to pay Ruffin-Thompkins $5000. In spite of this settlement, the lender that issued the automobile loan, U.S. Bank, incorrectly reported to Experian that the U.S. Bank account in Ruffin-Thompkins's credit report should read: "Repossession/Past Due 30 Days."

In early October 2002, Ruffin-Thompkins requested a credit report from Experian and discovered the U.S. Bank notation. She sent a dispute letter to Experian on October 3 which stated:

I am requesting that repossession of an automobile be deleted immediately from my credit report. The Grossinger City Toyota, Inc. was sued because they presented a contract with fraudulent signatures to a bank, therefore I never had an account with this company, as a result o[f] their action Grossinger City Toyota was sued. . . . The case was settled in our favor on July 8, 2002. A copy of the disposition is [inclosed].

Included with the letter was an incomplete Credit Report Dispute Form with the "Creditor Information" and "Dispute/Comments" lines left blank. Ruffin-Thompkins also included a letter from her attorneys to Grossinger City Toyota stating their intent to represent her in the lawsuit against Grossinger. None of these documents mentioned U.S. Bank or specified which account she was disputing. Experian therefore issued a response on October 14, 2002, stating, "[u]sing the information provided the following item was not found: Grossinger City Toyota."

Ruffin-Thompkins contends that she sent another letter on October 21 to U.S. Bank and Experian requesting that the repossession notation be removed from her account. Experian claims that it never received the letter, and Ruffin-Thompkins was unable to produce the document during discovery.

On December 10, 2002, Ruffin-Thompkins sent another letter to Experian, this time specifying that she was "disputing the U.S. Bank's report to your Credit Bureau," and including a letter from her attorney informing her of the settlement with Grossinger and another copy of the same letter from her attorney to Grossinger that she sent with the October 3 dispute letter. Experian received this information on December 23.

Now on notice of the dispute, an Experian customer service representative reviewed the materials sent by Ruffin-Thompkins and generated a Consumer Dispute Verification form ("CDV"). The CDV, briefly explaining the nature of Ruffin-Thompkins's dispute and asking the bank to verify or amend the reported information, was sent to U.S. Bank on January 2, 2003. In the CDV, Experian described the nature of the dispute as "Claims Company Will Change or Delete." Experian gave no additional explanation, nor did it send the documents that Ruffin-Thompkins provided.

US Bank's response, received by Experian on January 9, stated, "Account Closed at Consumer's Request" and "Acct Closed Zero Balance." US Bank did not request that Ruffin-Thompkins's account be deleted; instead, the account was updated. On January 16, Experian sent confirmation of the reinvestigation to Ruffin-Thompkins. The reinvestigation summary explained that the U.S. Bank account would still be reported in the credit report as "Paid/Was a repossession," but that a comment had been added stating, "Account closed at consumer's request." The summary also provided that if Ruffin-Thompkins disagreed with this outcome, she could contact the creditor directly or, according to the FCRA, she could "add a statement [to the credit file] disputing the accuracy or completeness of the information."

Instead of using one of the proposed remedies, Ruffin-Thompkins filed this FCRA claim against Experian on January 30, 2003. On April 5, 2003, pursuant to U.S. Bank's instructions, Experian deleted the U.S. Bank account from Ruffin-Thompkins's credit file.

II. Analysis

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Lamers Dairy Inc. v. USDA, 379 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is properly granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit" under the applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We view the facts in the light most favorable to Ruffin-Thompkins, the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Experian has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, Ruffin-Thompkins retains the burden of producing enough evidence to support a reasonable jury verdict in her favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "[A] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial." Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir.1988) (emphasis in original). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original).

Ruffin-Thompkins argues that Experian willfully and negligently failed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of her dispute and failed to delete the inaccurate information from her file after investigation in violation of § 1681i(a).¹ The parties agree that Experian is the type of "consumer reporting agency" that is regulated by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).

The FCRA provides that, "[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates." 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). "Once a consumer report exists, [the FCRA] triggers various duties on the part of a reporting agency, including the obligation to reinvestigate when a consumer contends that [her] consumer report is inaccurate or incomplete[.]" Wantz v. Experian Info. Solutions, 386 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir.2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)). If Experian negligently violated any duty imposed by the statute, Ruffin-Thompkins may collect "actual damages," costs, and fees. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. If there was a willful violation, punitive damages are also available. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.

Ruffin-Thompkins alleges that Experian did not perform a reasonable reinvestigation of her dispute under § 1681i, which states:

[I]f the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer's file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly . . . of such dispute, the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file . . . before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer[.]

15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). Before any discussion of the reasonableness of the reinvestigation is necessary, however, Ruffin-Thompkins must show that she "suffered damages as a result of the inaccurate information." Sarver v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir.2004); see also Wantz, 386 F.3d at 833 ("It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that [s]he is entitled to damages.") (citation omitted). "Without a causal relation between the violation of the statute and the loss of credit, or some other harm, a plaintiff cannot obtain an award of `actual damages[.]'" Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). Our analysis, therefore, begins with a discussion of damages.

The district court found that Ruffin-Thompkins did not show that she suffered any damages because of the inaccuracy in her credit report during Experian's period of liability. "Experian must be notified of an error before it is required to reinvestigate. As we have made clear, the FCRA is not a strict liability statute." Sarver, 390 F.3d at 971 (citation omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (...