State v. Thomas, 80-1292

Citation423 N.E.2d 137,66 Ohio St.2d 518
Decision Date24 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-1292,80-1292
Parties, 20 O.O.3d 424 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THOMAS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Syllabus by the Court

Expert testimony on the "battered wife syndrome" proffered to support a defendant's claims of self-defense to killing her husband is inadmissible in evidence where (1) it is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of the shooting; (2) the subject of the expert testimony is within the understanding of the jury; (3) the "battered wife syndrome" is not sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant testimony under the guise of expertise; and (4) its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.

Defendant-appellee, Kathy H. Thomas, was indicted and found guilty by a jury of murdering Reuben Daniels, her common law husband, on January 12, 1978. They had lived together in a stormy relationship for about three years before the killing. It is undisputed that defendant, at their apartment, shot Daniels once in the forehead and once in the left arm. The shot to the forehead, fired at a distance greater than two feet, killed Daniels. However, defendant gave three different versions of the killing to the police.

In one version, the couple had an argument about cooking and burning fish. As a result, Daniels became angry, slapped defendant and pushed her down onto the couch where she picked up the gun. She then walked to the chair where Daniels was sitting and shot him.

In her second story, defendant stated that they argued over a pawn ticket for her watch; and that Daniels pushed her down on the couch and further arguments ensued. As Daniels was rising from the chair to attack her, defendant reached for the gun on the couch and shot him.

The third version, like the first, involved the argument about burned fish in the kitchen. Daniels pushed defendant into the living room and onto the couch. Defendant stated she picked up the gun and Daniels walked away from her. Thereupon she stood up, walked around the coffee table and said, "I've had enough." She pointed the gun at Daniels and shot him two times so that he fell back into the chair.

Defendant is a woman who suffered repeated physical abuse and beatings over a period of more than three years at the hands of her common law husband. Claiming self-defense, she testified to shooting Daniels because she feared for her life, that he had made a move towards her, and that she knew he would take the gun and kill her for daring to pick it up. Before the defense rested, counsel asked to call Gerald Buckley, as an expert witness on battered wives. This was to aid the jury in weighing the evidence concerning defendant's subjective state of mind at the time of the shooting. The expert would have testified on the subject of the "battered wife syndrome" (also referred to as the "battered woman"). The trial court refused to permit the admission of such testimony.

On appeal of the murder conviction and sentence, the Court of Appeals, in a split decision, 1 reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial solely because the trial court erred by refusing to admit, at the request of the defense, this expert testimony on battered wives and the peculiar state of mind which might prompt the shooting of the "battering husband."

This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion and cross-motion for leave to appeal.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Jack H. Hudson, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellant and cross-appellee.

Christopher D. Stanley, Cleveland, for appellee and cross-appellant.

CLIFFORD F. BROWN, Justice.

The sole issue raised by the state in its appeal to this court is whether the trial court committed reversible error by excluding testimony on the subject of the "battered wife syndrome" by an expert on battered wives, where defendant pleaded self-defense to killing her husband. We hold the common pleas court did not commit error in excluding such expert testimony. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals, and affirm the conviction and sentence of defendant.

There are at least eight separate reasons to exclude this proffered expert testimony. See footnote 1, supra. Our conclusion would remain the same even if defendant's expert had personally interviewed defendant before being offered as a witness, even if defendant had conclusively established that defendant was, in fact, a battered wife, and even if defense counsel had propounded a hypothetical question to defendant's expert witness.

In a trial such as this one, where the evidence raises an issue of self-defense, the only admissible evidence pertaining to that defense is evidence which establishes that defendant had a bona-fide belief she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that the only means of escape from such danger was through the use of deadly force. 2 State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 388 N.E.2d 755.

The jury is well able to understand and determine whether self-defense has been proven in a murder case without expert testimony such as that offered here. The jury will base its decision upon the material and relevant evidence concerning the participants' words and actions before, at, and following the murder, including defendant's explanation of the surrounding circumstances.

Also, such expert testimony is inadmissible because it is not distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation so as to be beyond the ken of the average lay person. Furthermore, no general acceptance of the expert's particular methodology has been established. 3 McKay Machine Co. v. Rodman (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 77, 228 N.E.2d 304; Dyas v. United States (D.C.App.1977), 376 A.2d 827, certiorari denied 434 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 529, 54 L.Ed.2d 464; Frye v. United States (1923), 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013. Finally, we believe the expert testimony offered here would tend to stereotype defendant, causing the jury to become prejudiced. It could decide the facts based on typical, and not the actual, facts.

Expert testimony on the "battered wife syndrome" by a psychiatric social worker to support defendant's claim of self-defense is inadmissible herein because (1) it is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of the shooting; (2) the subject of the expert testimony is within the understanding of the jury; (3) the "BATTERED WIFE SYNDROME" IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY Developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant testimony under the guise of expertise; and (4) its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.

There is one claimed error defendant raises as cross-appellant herein which deserves comment. She asserts denial of a fair trial because the trial court failed to instruct the jury concerning the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

At the close of the evidence the trial judge informed counsel for both parties that he intended to instruct the...

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82 cases
  • State v. Kelly
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1984
    ...of victim/husband where prosecution introduced fact of dismemberment as substantive evidence of guilt). But see State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981). 11 Moreover, find that because this testimony was central to the defendant's claim of self-defense, its exclusion, if ot......
  • Jahnke v. State
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    ...430 N.E.2d 267 (1981); People v. White, 90 Ill.App.3d 1067, 46 Ill.Dec. 474, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); and State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 20 Ohio Op.3d 424, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981). The circumstances surrounding the killing are not set forth in either opinion of the Florida Appellate Court ......
  • State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, In and For Maricopa County
    • United States
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    • January 7, 1982
    ...People v. Smith, 110 Misc.2d 118, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1981) (odontological identification of bite marks); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (expert testimony on "battered wife syndrome"); State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981) (multi-system polymorphic e......
  • Tourlakis v. Morris
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    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • May 30, 1990
    ...the shooting of her abusive boyfriend, is relevant and admissible to show the defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing; State v. Kathy Thomas 3. Expert testimony on the "battered woman syndrome," offered to support a claim of self defense, is relevant and admissible in evidence ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • § 24.14 BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (CAP) Title Chapter 24 Expert Testimony: Fre 702, 704, 706
    • Invalid date
    ...& Vidmar, Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the Literature, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273, 281 (1992).[239] 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (Ohio 1981), overruled by, State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).[240] State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984). See also People v......

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