People v. Jones
Decision Date | 31 May 1988 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 100090 |
Citation | 167 Mich.App. 424,423 N.W.2d 590 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky Leon JONES, Defendant-Appellant. (On Remand) |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Judy A.H. Hughes, Pros. Atty., and Michael A. Nickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.
State Appellate Defender by Stuart B. Lev, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
ON REMAND
Before MAHER, P.J., and GILLIS and WAHLS, JJ.
This case is before us for a second time, on remand by the Supreme Court, to consider an issue that was not raised in the prior appeal and which was only recently addressed by an appellate court of this state for the first time in People v. Fernandez (On Remand), 164 Mich.App. 485, 417 N.W.2d 540 (1987). 428 Mich. 888 (1987). That issue is whether a person convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, M.C.L. Secs. 750.157a and 750.316; M.S.A. Secs. 28.354 and 28.548, may be, unlike a person convicted of the substantive crime, eligible for parole. In Fernandez, a two-member majority answered that issue in the affirmative. One member, Judge Gillis, dissented. For many of the reasons expressed by Judge Gillis in his dissent, we hold that a person convicted of the offense in question is not eligible for parole and, therefore, certify this case as being in conflict with Fernandez.
In finding that a person convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder was parolable, the Fernandez majority principally relied on the fact that the offense was not expressly mentioned as being one for which there could be no parole in the "lifer law," M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4). 164 Mich.App. 487-488, 417 N.W.2d 540. The lifer law basically provides that persons sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder or for a major controlled substance offense are not eligible for parole. All other prisoners may be eligible for parole after serving ten years of their sentences. Thus, except for first-degree murder and major controlled substance violations, the lifer law does not expressly exclude persons convicted of any other offenses from parole eligibility. Regardless of this, though, we cannot assign the same import to the Legislature's silence as did the Fernandez majority.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing laws upon the same subject. People v. Buckley, 302 Mich. 12, 21, 4 N.W.2d 448 (1942). At the time the conspiracy statute was enacted, the lifer law had been in existence for many years. See Fernandez, supra, p. 489, 417 N.W.2d 540 (Gillis, J., dissenting). Thus, the Legislature is presumed to have known that a person convicted of first-degree murder was not eligible for parole at the time it proclaimed that a "person convicted [of a conspiracy offense] shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit...." M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1)(a). Because of this presumption of legislative knowledge--which was not rebutted in this case--we believe the Fernandez majority incorrectly interpreted the lifer law's silence regarding parole eligibility for persons convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Since the Legislature presumptively knew that conspiracy to commit first-degree murder was punishable by the same penalty as first-degree murder (including not being eligible for parole), we must conclude that had it intended otherwise it would have stated so expressly. Because the Legislature did not state that a person...
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