State v. Ainsworth

• Decision Date: 05 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 20160173,20160173
• Citation: 423 P.3d 1229
• Parties: STATE of Utah Petitioner, v. Thomas Randall AINSWORTH Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

423 P.3d 1229

STATE of Utah Petitioner,

v.Thomas Randall AINSWORTH Respondent.

No. 20160173

Supreme Court of Utah.

Filed September 5, 2017

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Solic. Gen., Sandi Johnson, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Lori J. Seppi, David P.S. Mack, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Durham, Justice Pearce, and Judge Powell joined.

Having recused himself, Justice Himonas does not participate herein; Fourth District Court Judge Kraig J. Powell sat.

Associate Chief Justice Lee, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 The Utah Code prescribes two sets of offenses for drivers who cause death or serious bodily injury with alcohol or drugs in their system. Under the DUI provisions of the code it is a third degree felony to cause death or serious bodily injury while under the influence of alcohol or any drug "to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle."¹ The "measurable substance" provisions set forth a related offense. Under these provisions it is a second degree felony to cause death or serious bodily injury with any "measurable" amount of a Schedule I or Schedule II drug in the person's body.²

¶ 2 Thomas Ainsworth challenges the constitutionality of these provisions. Ainsworth was convicted of three second degree felonies under the measurable substance provisions. But he asserts constitutional grounds for a reduction of each charge to a third degree felony under the DUI provisions. And he also challenges the decision to impose consecutive sentences for the three counts against him.

¶ 3 The court of appeals agreed with Ainsworth in part. It deemed the measurable substance crime a "lesser offense" because the measurable substance provisions do not require proof of a driver's impairment. With this in mind, the court of appeals concluded that the classification of Ainsworth's crimes as second degree felonies under the measurable substance provisions ran afoul of the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. And it accordingly vacated Ainsworth's convictions and remanded for the entry of third degree felony convictions and for resentencing. In so doing, however, the court of appeals rejected Ainsworth's challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences, affirming the district court's sentencing to that degree.

¶ 4 We reverse in part and affirm in part. First, we uphold the constitutionality of the legislature's classification of offenses in the DUI and measurable substance statutes and reverse the court of appeals' decision vacating Ainsworth's second degree felony convictions under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. Second, we affirm the court of appeals' decision upholding the imposition of consecutive sentences for the three counts of conviction. Accordingly, we reinstate the convictions and sentences as entered and imposed against Ainsworth in the district court.

I

¶ 5 On Christmas Eve 2011, Thomas Ainsworth drove his car over a median and crashed head-on into another vehicle. An 18-month-old boy was killed and both of his parents were seriously injured in the accident.

¶ 6 Ainsworth had methamphetamine in his system at the time of the accident. He was charged with three counts of causing substantial bodily injury or death while negligently driving a car with a measurable amount of a Schedule II controlled substance in his body. The charged offenses were second degree felonies under Utah Code section 58–37–8(2).

¶ 7 Ainsworth moved to amend the charges on constitutional grounds. First, he challenged the classification of his alleged offenses—as second degree felonies—under the measurable substance provisions of the Utah Code. He noted that the alleged offenses would have been classified as third degree felonies if charged under the DUI provisions of the code. And he challenged the rationality of the legislature's decision to increase that classification through the measurable substance provisions under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution.

¶ 8 Ainsworth also asserted an alternative basis for challenging the measurable substance charges under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. He noted that the measurable substance provisions recognize a defense for those who have a prescription for the controlled substance, or otherwise use the substance in a legal manner. And he alleged that this amounts to irrational discrimination in favor of those who have a prescription and against those who don't.

¶ 9 The district court rejected both arguments. It upheld the prosecution's decision to classify the charges against Ainsworth as second degree felonies under the measurable substance provisions.

¶ 10 Ainsworth reserved his right to appeal but pled guilty to the three second degree felonies under the measurable substance provisions. The district court then sentenced Ainsworth to three prison terms of one to fifteen years. Over Ainsworth's objection, the district court ordered that those sentences should be served consecutively.

¶ 11 Ainsworth filed a timely appeal. The court of appeals endorsed the first of Ainsworth's uniform operation arguments. It noted that the measurable substance statute applies "in an offense not amounting to a violation of [the DUI statute]" where the defendant "knowingly and intentionally [has] in the person's body any measurable amount" of a controlled substance and "operates a motor vehicle ... in a negligent manner." State v. Ainsworth , 2016 UT App 2, ¶ 8, 365 P.3d 1227 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting UTAH CODE § 58–37–8(2)(a)(i), (g) & (h)(i) ). Thus, the court of appeals observed that the measurable substance provisions do not require proof of actual impairment of the driver. Id. ¶ 17. And on that basis the court of appeals deemed the measurable substance crime a "lesser crime." Id. ¶ 16. It accordingly held that the classification of this crime as a greater offense—a second degree felony rather than a third degree felony—ran afoul of the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. Id. ¶ 17. Thus, the court vacated Ainsworth's sentence and remanded for resentencing—with the direction that Ainsworth be resentenced to three third degree felonies.

¶ 12 In so doing, the court of appeals nonetheless proceeded to affirm the district court's decision to impose Ainsworth's sentences consecutively. It acknowledged that the question presented was moot because there was no longer a sentence to evaluate. Id. ¶ 19. But the court of appeals still addressed the issue because it had been fully briefed and was likely to arise again on remand. Id. On this point the court of appeals affirmed the district court. It found no abuse of discretion because the district court considered all of the factors of relevance to this decision and balanced them in a permissible way. Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 13 We granted the State's petition for certiorari and Ainsworth's cross-petition on the imposition of consecutive sentences. We review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, without according any deference to its analysis. Wasatch Cty. v. Okelberry , 2008 UT 10, ¶ 8, 179 P.3d 768. In so doing, however, we note that our review of the correctness of the court of appeals' analysis may depend in part on whether it afforded the appropriate level of review to the district court's decisions. Id.

II

¶ 14 The State challenges the court of appeals' decision overriding the classification of Ainsworth's offenses on uniform operation of laws grounds. And Ainsworth on cross-petition asserts error in the decision upholding the imposition of consecutive sentences. We reverse the court of appeals on the first point but affirm it on the second.

A

¶ 15 Ainsworth advances two uniform operation grounds³ for questioning the classification of his offenses as second degree felonies under the measurable substance provisions of the Utah Code. First is the assertion that it is irrational to classify a measurable substance-based offense as a more serious crime than a DUI-based offense. Second is the alleged lack of a rational basis for the distinction between those who have a prescription for a controlled substance and those who do not.

¶ 16 The court of appeals endorsed the first argument but rejected the second. We reject both. We uphold the constitutionality of the classification of Ainsworth's offenses as second degree felonies under the measurable substance provisions.

¶ 17 A driver who causes death or serious bodily injury with alcohol or drugs in his body may be subject to one of two offense classifications under the Utah Code. The crime could be a third degree felony under the DUI provisions of the code—if it can be shown that the alcohol or drug influenced the driver "to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle."⁴ And the crime could be a second degree felony under the measurable substance provisions—without any proof of impairment of the driver's ability to safely operate a vehicle.⁵

¶ 18 This was the basis for the court of appeals' decision to override the classification of Ainsworth's crimes as second degree felonies. Because the measurable substance provisions do not require proof of impairment, the court of appeals viewed crimes charged under those provisions as "lesser crime[s]." Ainsworth , 2016 UT App 2, ¶ 16, 365 P.3d 1227. And it accordingly found the governing statutory scheme unconstitutional under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause. It concluded, specifically, that there was no "rational basis for punishing individuals who have ‘any measurable amount ’ of controlled substance in their bodies more harshly than individuals who have an incapacitating amount of the substance in their bodies." Id. ¶ 9 (emphases added). And it accordingly endorsed Ainsworth's assertion that the code "punishes less culpable offenders with a significantly higher level of punishment." Id. ¶ 13.

¶ 19 We view the matter differently. The measurable...