423 U.S. 147 (1975), 74-1287, Weinstein v. Bradford

Docket Nº:No. 74-1287
Citation:423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350
Party Name:Weinstein v. Bradford
Case Date:December 10, 1975
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 147

423 U.S. 147 (1975)

96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350

Weinstein

v.

Bradford

No. 74-1287

United States Supreme Court

Dec. 10, 1975

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Where respondent was paroled after the Court of Appeals upheld his claim in his action against petitioner parole board members that he was constitutionally entitled to certain procedural rights in connection with petitioners' consideration of his eligibility for parole, the case is moot, and does not present an issue "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since the action is not a class action and there is no demonstrated probability that respondent will again be subjected to the parole system. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, distinguished.

519 F.2d 728, vacated and remanded.

Per curiam opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Bradford sued petitioner members of the North Carolina Board of Parole in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, claiming that petitioners were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to accord him certain procedural rights in considering his eligibility for parole. Although respondent sought certification of the action as a class action, the District Court refused to so certify it and dismissed the complaint. On respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that court sustained his claim that he was constitutionally entitled to procedural rights in connection with petitioners' consideration of his application for parole. Because the conclusion of the Court of Appeals was at odds with the decisions of several other Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari on June 2, 1975, 421 U.S. 998, and the case was set for oral argument during the December calendar of this Court.

Respondent has now filed a suggestion of mootness

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with this Court, and petitioners have filed a response. It is undisputed that respondent was temporarily paroled on December 18, 1974, and that this status ripened into a complete release from supervision on March 25, 1975. From that date forward, it is plain that respondent can have no interest whatever in the procedures followed by petitioners in granting parole.

Conceding this fact, petitioners urge that this is an issue which is "capable of repetition, yet...

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