424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), 7381, George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.
|Citation:||424 F.2d 25|
|Party Name:||GEORGE R. WHITTEN, JR., INC., doing business as Whitten Corporation, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PADDOCK POOL BUILDERS, INC., et al., Defendants, Appellees.|
|Case Date:||March 25, 1970|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit|
Heard Nov. 3, 1969.
John E. Lecomte, Boston, Mass., with whom Princi & Lecomte, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellant.
John D. Hawke, Jr., Washington, D.C., with whom Paul A. Good, Lynn, Mass., Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., and Butterworth & Good, Lynn, Mass., were on brief, for appellees.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
COFFIN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing plaintiff-appellant's civil antitrust complaint. Appellant, George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. (Whitten) is in the business of designing and manufacturing swimming pool gutters and accessory equipment and of serving as general contractor for the construction of entire swimming pool facilities. Appellees are three affiliated corporations
(hereinafter, singly Paddock) 1 which engage in the same business. Both Whitten and Paddock specialize in the manufacture of prefabricated 'pipeless' pool gutters, which include recirculation equipment as an integral part of the gutter assembly and thus eliminate the need for pipe buried around the perimeter of the pool. Paddock's product, the 'Integral Flow Recirculation System', is patented; Whitten's basically similar product, the 'Uniflow System', apparently is not.
The case arises out of the efforts of both parties to sell their products to public bodies acting under competitive bidding procedures. Whitten's complaint charges that Paddock's selling efforts have violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14. Specifically, counts I through III of the complaint allege that Paddock and its various dealers and representatives violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to require the use of its own specifications in the public swimming pool industry, with the intent to exclude all others, accompanying this effort with misrepresentations regarding Whitten, and threats of litigation and harassment directed to Whitten and its present or prospective customers. Counts III-VI describe roughly the same acts as attempts to monopolize in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Count VII alleges that Paddock has violated the Clayton Act by representing to Public customers that they must use Paddock accessories whenever they use Paddock's patented gutter system.
During the process of taking depositions, Paddock moved for summary judgment, conceding for the purpose of the issue raised by the motion that it had combined with dealers and others to effect the use of its specifications in the public swimming pool industry, that its specifications were so drawn that only it could comply, and that its purpose was to eliminate competition. It further conceded that these propositions 'substantially embody' all of Whitten's Sherman Act allegations. The court granted the motion for summary judgment, without opinion, but in the context of briefs and argument directed to the proposition that Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961) immunizes from antitrust law liability all efforts to induce governmental bodies to take action, notwithstanding the motives of the inducers. The case comes to us on the basis of the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and an affidavit.
Our standard, of course, is whether, viewing the evidence favorably to Whitten, there is any fact in dispute which could be material to resolution of the legal issue. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966). Paddock, using a perfectly proper tactic to bring sudden death to litigation which could be protracted, has conceded far more concerning its motives and techniques than any subsequent proof might establish. We judge it therefore by the following artificially stark set of facts.
The market for pipeless swimming pools is both relatively new and quickly expanding. Thus far, however, the greater initial expense of such pools has limited sales almost exclusively to public bodies or private bodies using public funds and subject to public bidding procedures. Although the number of firms supplying equipment for pipeless pools is unclear, Paddock is apparently the largest by far, doing business to some extent in all states, having at least 45 dealers, and making 20 times the installations as Whitten.
The public and quasi-public agencies who form the primary market for both
Whitten and Paddock operate under a multiplicity of state and local bidding procedures, a factor which poses considerable difficulty in disposing of this case on summary judgment. 2 Nevertheless, the following skeleton procedure seems to be common. When a public body-- for example, a school board-- has received the authorization to construct a pool, it retains an architect or engineer to supervise the job. He then determines what products are available and prepares the technical specifications on which bids will be based. These specifications are then submitted to local authorities for clearance under health and building codes and finally to the school board. The school board, usually placing heavy reliance on the judgment of the architect, approves the specifications and invites bids. At this point, manufacturers may seek to have their products approved as equals to, or acceptable substitutes for, the equipment described in the specifications, but time is extremely short and the protests of rival suppliers are usually referred to the architect who drew up the original specifications.
Obviously, then, the original drafting of specifications is a critical stage for suppliers of pool equipment. Both Paddock and Whitten try to influence architects at this stage by publishing descriptions of their products in architectural catalogues. In addition, when Paddock learns of a forthcoming public pool project, one of its agents or dealers visits the architect charged with supervising the bidding. While whitten also attempts to enter the scene at this early stage, its more limited resources prevent it from doing so on the same broad scale as Paddock. Paddock endeavors, with a high degree of success, to persuade the architect to adopt Paddock's own specifications. One witness deposed that 'a good many architects * * * have evidently not written any specifications at all but allow Paddock to do so or used the specifications which Paddock supplied.' These specifications are on their face neutral technical descriptions of generally available pool accessories, but a closer inspection reveals that they describe Paddock's products-- and only those-- in a variety of ways. They require that the recirculating and filtering systems be purchased from a manufacturer who has produced them for specified number of years-- which only Paddock has done. Much of the equipment is described in a way that would rule out features of Whitten's equipment. The filter specification goes so far as to refer to Paddock equipment by Paddock's catalogue number. While the specifications provide for 'an approved equal' for the described equipment, the specific functional or structural requirements would rule out the practicable possibility of an equal being accepted. Moreover, the time limitations on one who would submit a bid on alternative designs and equipment make such submission next to impossible.
Associated with this pressure to persuade architects to accept Paddock's proprietary and exclusionary specifications is other conduct which, under the ground rules of this case, we are to take as established. This includes falsely advertising that Paddock is the only manufacturer of pipeless swimming pool equipment and that its designs have benefitted from its national swimming program-- which in fact is non-existent; false statements about Whitten's lack of experience; and threats of litigation against public bodies and contractors who have contracted with Whitten or contemplate doing so. 3
We are therefore confronted, for the purposes of this appeal, with government acting in a proprietary capacity, purchasing goods and services to satisfy its own needs within a framework of competitive bidding, where the initial responsibility for recommending specifications has been entrusted to a hired professional, and where the selling effort directed at that professional and his public client by a leading supplier was monopolistically motivated and ran the gamut from high pressure salesmanship to fraudulent statements and threats.
Paddock is willing to present its case in this posture-- as it says, 'The most extreme state of facts imaginable'-- because of its confidence in the proposition that efforts by private parties to influence the actions of government cannot violate the antitrust laws, even though such efforts are intended to eliminate competition. In support of this proposition, Paddock advances two separate but related principles of antitrust exemption. First, drawing on Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943), Paddock argues that restraints of trade which result from valid governmental action cannot give rise to private antitrust liability. Second, relying primarily on Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, supra, and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965), Paddock maintains that joint efforts to influence public officials are beyond the scope of the antitrust laws. 4
These propositions find ample support in the language of the Supreme Court...
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