State v. Roussel

• Decision Date: 29 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82-KA-0630,82-KA-0630
• Citation: 424 So.2d 226
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Roland ROUSSEL, Jr.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 226

424 So.2d 226

STATE of Louisiana v. Roland ROUSSEL, Jr.

No. 82-KA-0630.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 29, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 21, 1983.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry J. Morel, Jr., Dist. Atty., Harry R. Morgan, Kurt Sins, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

Julian R. Murray, Jr., Murray, Murray, Ellis, Braden & Landry, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

MARCUS, Justice.

Roland Roussel, Jr. was indicted by the grand jury for first degree murder. Prior to trial, the indictment was amended to second degree murder (La.R.S. 14: 30.1). After trial by jury, defendant was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to serve twenty-one years at hard labor plus an additional term of two years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, suspension of sentence or credit for good time for the use of a firearm at the time of the crime. La.R.S. 14:95.2. On appeal, defendant relies on four assignments of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

The record reveals that Roland Roussel, age 21, fatally shot his wife, Dara Ann Roussel. Although they had been married only four months, they had separated on several occasions due to Dara Ann's alleged use of drugs which was contrary to Roland's beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. Prior to the shooting, they had again separated. Testimony indicated that Dara Ann had been having an affair with another man. Dara Ann had spent several nights prior to the shooting at the trailer of her grandparents (the Oubres).

On the day of the shooting, Dara Ann picked up defendant at his place of employment. They returned to the trailer to get her belongings before returning home. While Dara Ann was packing, defendant left to purchase some beer at a nearby convenience store. Upon returning, Dara Ann's behavior had dramatically changed to that consistent with her behavior when on drugs. She was extremely upset about losing her purse. Defendant called her cousin, Leatrice Mitchell, to come to the trailer which she did. David Mitchell followed his wife a short while later. According to his testimony, Dara Ann was visibly upset. Defendant was in possession of a .22 caliber revolver which he carried for protection in connection with his employment. Defendant removed the gun from his pants and placed it in the right pocket of his jacket. Defendant testified that David Mitchell was carrying a shotgun. Mitchell's wife made him put the shotgun in the trunk of their car. At that point, Mr. Oubre arrived. According to his testimony, Dara Ann stated that Roland was going to kill her. Mr. Oubre told defendant to leave if he had a gun and then left to pick up his wife.

Mrs. Oubre testified that she questioned defendant about the gun when she arrived. Upon denying he had one, she suggested it would be better if he left. Defendant agreed to go but did not leave immediately because he wanted to explain to Mrs. Oubre that what Dara Ann was saying about him was not true. Several witnesses testified that defendant stated Dara Ann had too many people involved in her business. According to David Mitchell, defendant also said, "Now you have done it." Then the phone rang; it was Dara Ann's mother. Dara Ann told her that defendant was going to kill her; Mrs. Oubre took the phone. Defendant asked to talk with Dara Ann's mother. Mrs. Oubre passed him the phone but Dara Ann's mother had hung up, whereupon defendant commented, "That's the best thing you could have done."

Defendant testified that he was very nervous and upset at this point and had decided to leave. The "noise and hostility" from his wife's family had him crying and his hands were bunched in his pockets, his right hand wrapped around the outside of his pistol, squeezing it very tightly. He remembered walking toward Dara Ann and her grandmother (Mrs. Oubre) who were standing near the table where his belongings were located and hearing a shot fired, but did not know how it was fired, by whom, or that anyone was hit. The next thing he remembered he was on the floor being strangled by David Mitchell. He recalled that his gun was still in his pocket because he was trying to get it out to protect himself. Mitchell testified that after the first shot, defendant turned and tried to shoot him saying, "You're next...." The gun jammed; defendant then took it out of his pocket and aimed it at Mitchell who tackled him and held him down until Mr. Oubre took the gun out of defendant's hand. Mitchell held defendant down until the police arrived shortly thereafter. When they arrived, defendant was taken to the patrol car and informed of the charges against him and his Miranda rights. The arresting officer testified that defendant did not seem to be aware that he had shot his wife. Ballistics experts found that defendant's gun could have been accidentally discharged by fingers curled around the outside of the trigger housing. They also confirmed Mitchell's testimony that the gun had jammed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

Defendant contends the trial judge erred in refusing to allow expert testimony relative to the genuineness of his purported amnesia. He argues that the testimony was offered solely to corroborate the credibility of his testimony as to his inability to remember the moment of shooting.

Defendant was initially indicted for first degree murder to which he entered a plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity." A sanity commission was appointed to evaluate his mental capacity to proceed and his mental condition at the time of the offense. Defendant stated that the sole reason for his insanity plea was his amnesia as to the moment of shooting. Two of the three psychiatrists on the sanity commission found defendant had repressive amnesia, limited to the moment of shooting. The third psychiatrist considered defendant's "patchy" memory to be a sign that his purported amnesia was not genuine. All reported that defendant had the mental capacity to proceed and was capable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the offense. Because there was a possibility that defendant's memory would return within six months, or under hypnosis or drugs, the court held its decision open until such measures could be taken. Dr. Scrignar, the member of the sanity commission who administered the hypnosis and drugs, found that defendant had no recollection of any intent to shoot anyone and could not remember the moment of shooting, although his memory of the events immediately before and after the shooting improved. After the hearing, the trial judge ruled that defendant had the mental capacity to proceed. ¹

On the day of trial, the indictment was amended from first degree murder to second degree murder. Defendant withdrew his former plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity" and entered a plea of "not guilty." After the close of the state's evidence, defendant took the stand in his own behalf. During direct examination, he was questioned as to his state of mind at the time of the offense. The state objected to any testimony, either from this witness or Dr. Scrignar (one of the psychiatrists on the sanity commission whom defendant intended to call as a witness), relative to a mental defect at the time of the offense. The state argued that in the absence of a special plea of insanity, evidence of a mental defect (amnesia in this case) was not admissible, either as a complete defense or for the purpose of negating a specific intent and reducing the degree of the crime. Defendant responded by asserting that he was not trying to show "reduced capacity or mental incapacity of any way, shape, or form" but rather only sought to introduce the evidence on the issue of credibility and agreed to a limiting instruction to that effect. The trial judge ruled that while defendant could testify as to his state of mind at the time of the shooting including his inability to remember the moment of shooting, neither he nor the psychiatrist could testify relative to the issue of amnesia.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(1). La.Code Crim.P. art. 651 provides:

When a defendant is tried upon a plea of "not guilty", evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense shall not be admissible.

The defenses available under a combined plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity" shall be tried together.

In State v. James, 241 La. 233, 128 So.2d 21 (1961), we stated that "[t]here can be no question that amnesia is a mental defect." In James, defendant testified that he had a loss of memory (amnesia) during the commission of the murder for which he was charged. Subsequently, the trial judge sustained the state's objection to the testimony of a psychiatrist relative to "mental defect, mental condition, or loss of memory" of the accused. In affirming the ruling of the trial court, we held that in the absence of a special plea of insanity, evidence of a mental defect at the time of the crime was not admissible. In State v. LeCompte, 371 So.2d 239 (La.1978), we held that under art. 651, evidence of a mental condition or defect is inadmissible when the defendant failed to plead not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Moreover, a mental defect or disorder short of insanity cannot serve to negate specific intent and reduce the degree of the crime. On rehearing, in affirming our holding on this issue, we stated:

[B]y offering evidence of mental illness as vitiating intent as an essential element of the crime, the defendant attempts to come through the back door to prove lack of mental responsibility to commit the offense charged. The real danger in permitting psychiatric evidence of mental or emotional disorders short of insanity to negate intent is to practically destroy the M'Naughten rule and to clutter practically...