Thornton v. City of St. Helens
| Decision Date | 06 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-35994.,03-35994. |
| Citation | 425 F.3d 1158 |
| Parties | Ralph E. THORNTON; Cheryl A. Thornton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. HELENS; Warren Baker; Brian Little, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
James D. Huffman, Huffman & O'Hanlon, St. Helens, OR, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Cecil Reniche-Smith and Janet M. Schroer, Hoffman, Hart & Wagner, LLP, Portland, OR, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; Robert E. Jones, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-02-00325-REJ.
Before GOODWIN, TASHIMA and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Ralph and Cheryl Thornton own the only automobile wrecking yard in St. Helens, Oregon. The Thorntons claim that the City of St. Helens has unlawfully conditioned approval of their annual applications to renew a state wrecker's certificate on compliance with local land use regulations. Following repeated delays in the processing of the Thorntons' renewal applications, they filed suit in district court against the City and certain local officials. The Thorntons alleged, among other claims, that the certificate renewal procedures employed by the City had resulted in delays which amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law. The district court denied relief. The court held that the Thorntons did not have a property interest in the timely approval of their renewal applications and that their related claims were without merit.
We affirm. An adverse judgment in a prior state court action brought by Mr. Thornton bars relitigation of the issue of whether the City has discretion to condition approval of renewal applications on compliance with local regulations. Because we must accept the state court's determination that the City has discretion to deny a renewal application for noncompliance with local regulations, we hold that the Thorntons do not have a property interest in the timely renewal of their wrecker certificate. The Thorntons' related claims fail as a matter of law.
An operator of an auto wrecking yard in Oregon is required to obtain a certificate from the state and must renew the certificate each year. Or.Rev.Stat. § 822.125(1), (3). The procedure for issuing and renewing wrecker certificates is governed by Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 822.110, 822.115, 822.125, 822.135 and 822.140. Once a wrecker certificate is issued, section 822.125(3) provides that the certificate
is valid for a one-year period and may be renewed as provided by the department. The department shall only renew the certificate of any certificate holder who does all of the following:
...
(c) Obtains local government approval under [Or.Rev.Stat. §] 822.140. The department may waive the requirement that an applicant for renewal obtain local government approval under [section] 822.140 of the suitability of the applicant to establish, maintain or operate a wrecking yard or business.
Or.Rev.Stat. § 822.125(3). Section 822.140(2) provides that
[a] city or county governing body shall grant approval of a wrecker certificate or renewal when requested under this section if the governing body:
(a) Approves the applicant as being suitable to establish, maintain or operate a wrecker yard or business;
(b) Determines that the location or proposed location meets the requirements for location under [Or.Rev.Stat. §] 822.110;
(c) Determines that the location does not violate any prohibition under [Or. Rev.Stat. §] 822.135; and
(d) Approves the location and determines that the location complies with any regulations adopted by a city or county under this section.
Or.Rev.Stat. § 822.140(2). If a renewal application is not approved before the existing certificate expires, the wrecking yard must suspend operation until a new certificate is issued. See Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 822.100(1)(a), 822.135(1)(a).
In 1998, final approval of the Thorntons' renewal application for the 1999 wrecker certificate was delayed until April 16, 1999. Because of the delay, the Thorntons were forced to close the wrecking yard for more than three months pending approval of the application. The Thorntons blamed the processing delay on the City's attempt to condition approval of their renewal certificate on compliance with various municipal regulations.
Mr. Thornton filed a declaratory judgment action against the City in state court on May 23, 1999. As amended, the complaint alleged that the City had no power to withhold approval of a renewal application. The lawsuit sought a ruling that the governing state statutes preempted the application of local regulations in the wrecker certificate renewal process.
On December 1, 1999, while the state action was pending, the City adopted Ordinance 2808, which established specific procedures and criteria for reviewing renewal applications. Shortly after Ordinance 2808 was adopted, Mr. Thornton submitted an application to renew his certificate for the year 2000. The application was initially approved and then later denied by the City. The City eventually withdrew its objections to the application and issued a new certificate on March 14, 2000. The wrecking yard was closed for over two months in the interim.
Mr. Thornton moved for summary judgment in the state court action. He argued that the City lacked the power to condition approval of his renewal application on compliance with local land use laws because section 822.140 required local governments to approve any application that complied with sections 822.110 and 822.135. In response the City asserted that the relevant state statutes allowed local land use regulations to supplement state law in the approval process. The trial court denied the motion. In its oral decision, the court held that state law did not preempt local regulation of wreckers after the initial certificate had been granted. Shortly after the court issued its decision, the City moved for summary judgment. The City argued that it was entitled to dismissal because, in denying Mr. Thornton's motion, the court had effectively resolved the action in favor of the City. The court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion on February 6, 2002.
The City replaced Ordinance 2808 with Ordinance 2832 on November 15, 2000. Ordinance 2832 simplified and shortened the application review process, but delays in approving the Thorntons' annual renewal applications continued. As a result of those delays (and time taken by the State to issue and transmit the certificate), the Thorntons have been forced to close the wrecking yard for a number of days at the beginning of each year.
On March 15, 2002, the Thorntons filed the current action in federal district court. The original complaint named the City; the city manager, Warren Baker; the city planner, Brian Little; and certain St. Helens elected officials as Defendants. The complaint alleged that the City lacked the power to enact Ordinance 2808 and that the requirements imposed by that measure deprived the Thorntons of property without due process of law. The Thorntons further alleged that Defendants had conspired to deny them equal protection of the law and had intentionally interfered with contractual relations.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. By order entered November 19, 2002, the district court granted the motion in part. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 231 F.Supp.2d 1019, 1026 (D.Or.2002). The court reasoned that the Thorntons were not precluded from challenging Ordinance 2808 because the validity of that measure was not actually litigated in the prior action. Id. at 1024. The court concluded, however, that the individual defendants were immune from suit generally, that the Oregon Tort Claims Act ("OTCA") insulated the individual defendants and the City from suit on the state law claim and that the Thorntons had not otherwise stated a cognizable claim against the City. Id. at 1026. The court granted the Thorntons leave to file an amended complaint that "(1) eliminate[d] all constitutional claims against the individual City Council members, and (2) allege[d] with specificity their constitutional claim(s) against the City itself." Id.
In their amended complaint, the Thorntons added factual detail to support their allegations and dropped both the state law claim and the allegations against the elected officials. The Thorntons again named Baker and Little as defendants. The first count of the amended complaint largely repeated the claim that Defendants had used Ordinance 2808 to deprive the Thorntons of property without due process of law. The second count alleged that Mrs. Thornton was Native American and that Defendants, acting out of racial animus, had conspired to deny the Thorntons due process and equal protection.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. As for Little and Baker, the court concluded that the Thorntons did not have leave to rename the individual defendants and, even if they had, that the Thorntons had not advanced a meritorious claim against them. Turning to the City, the court reasoned that state law "permits the City to rest its decision to approve or deny a wrecker's certificate on criteria of its own creation" and, further, that the adverse judgment in the prior action barred the Thorntons from relitigating the issue of the City's authority. Accordingly, the court held that the Thorntons did not have "a constitutionally protected property right in the timely annual renewal of their automobile wrecker's certificate." With respect to the Thorntons' conspiracy claim, the court determined that they had failed to show disparate treatment, a conspiracy or racial animus. The Thorntons timely appealed.
Legislators are absolutely immune from liability for their legislative acts. Bogan v....
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