Clark v. Mitchell
| Citation | 425 F.3d 270 |
| Decision Date | 04 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-4210.,01-4210. |
| Parties | Joseph Lewis CLARK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Betty MITCHELL, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
ARGUED: George C. Pappas, Akron, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephen E. Maher Attorney General's Office of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: George C. Pappas, Akron, Ohio, Kerry O'Brien, Akron, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephen E. Maher, Attorney General's Office of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: MERRITT, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
MERRITT, J. (pp. 290-96), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
The petitioner, Joseph Clark, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. An Ohio state court had sentenced Clark to death for the murder of a convenience store clerk, David Manning, during an armed robbery of the store. On appeal, Clark alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by virtue of (1) his trial counsel's failure to obtain a neuropsychologist and pharmacologist to testify at Clark's suppression hearing and trial about Clark's inability to waive his rights against self incrimination voluntarily and knowingly; and (2) trial counsel's failure to obtain and introduce evidence, at Clark's mitigation hearing, of Clark's organic brain syndrome, drug addiction and withdrawal, and additional evidence of Clark's troubled childhood.1 For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of the writ.
The facts of this case, set forth below, are excerpted from State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 527 N.E.2d 844, 846-47 (1988):
On the night of January 13, 1984, David A. Manning, an employee of the Clark service station at 3070 Airport Highway in Toledo, was shot and killed during an armed robbery of the establishment. The record indicates that defendant-appellant, Joseph L. Clark, entered the service station at approximately 9:00 p.m. armed with a drawn .32 caliber revolver. The victim was working alone and appellant demanded money. According to a statement made by appellant to Toledo police Detective Sergeant Larry Przeslawski, the victim told appellant that there was no money, but appellant repeated his demand for money. The victim then walked to the back room of the service station, returned to the counter, handed appellant approximately $60 from the cash drawer and told him that was all of the money on the premises. Appellant "told him it wasn't all of it." The victim responded that there was no more money, but reached down and produced an envelope containing more cash. According to appellant's statement, the victim then tried to "force his way on me [appellant]" whereupon appellant shot Manning once in the right upper chest. Appellant then ran out the service station door to his car and drove home.
Shortly thereafter, two Toledo police officers arrived on the scene in response to a silent alarm. One of the officers walked through the service station without seeing anyone. Upon looking further, he found the victim slouched behind the service counter.
On January 16, 1984, appellant was arrested after allegedly committing an assault and robbery at the Ohio Citizens Bank. The arresting officer found a .32 caliber revolver in appellant's coat pocket.
The next day, appellant, with the assistance of an appointed public defender, was arraigned in the Toledo Municipal Court for the assault and robbery at the bank. The public defender was aware that appellant was a suspect in the Manning murder, and advised appellant not to discuss it with anyone but him. Later that day, the record indicates that appellant tried to hang himself in his jail cell. Consequently, appellant was taken to St. Vincent's Medical Center for examination.
On January 23, 1984, appellant was released from the hospital and taken to the Toledo Police Detective Bureau where he was questioned by Detective James Lagger and Detective Sergeant Przeslawski. The detectives asked appellant if he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and appellant responded that he was not. The detectives then gave appellant a standard form containing his rights as established in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . . . . Appellant then read each paragraph of the Miranda warnings out loud. After each paragraph was read, the detectives asked appellant if he understood what he had read. Appellant responded each time that he understood what he had read and thereupon initialed each paragraph. After reading his rights, appellant recited and signed the portion of the form waiving his Miranda rights.
Subsequently, appellant was interrogated by the detectives for a period covering one and three-fourths hours. Appellant was then moved to another room where his statements were tape recorded. At that time, Sgt. Przeslawski again read appellant his Miranda rights, and appellant made a statement about a robbery-murder at a Lawson's store in Toledo. After making this statement, the appellant was given another chance to hear his Miranda rights recited when the tape was replayed for him. Eventually, appellant made a tape-recorded statement confessing to the murder of Manning after his Miranda rights were again recited to him. The detectives gave appellant an opportunity to make any corrections in his statement upon replaying the tape for him. Appellant offered no corrections, additions or changes to his tape-recorded statements relating to the Manning murder.
Following Clark's indictment for Manning's murder, Clark challenged the voluntariness of his statement to the police, and an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue. At the suppression hearing, Dr. Emanuel Taney, a psychiatrist, testified on behalf of Clark. Although Dr. Taney had not examined Clark, Dr. Taney had reviewed the medical records from the hospitalization following Clark's suicide attempt, as well as Clark's juvenile records, various police documents, and the court's diagnostic and treatment reports. Based on a review of these records, Dr. Taney noted that Clark's mental function would be considered "borderline defective" based on his reported I.Q. of 75. Dr. Taney also concluded that Clark suffered from acute brain damage and chronic impairment of his mental functioning at the time of his confession (apparently as a result of Clark's recent suicide attempt). Taney testified that Clark's impaired mental condition would have interfered with Clark's ability to make choices in an informed and reasonable manner and would have rendered him more susceptible to pressure or duress from others.
The prosecution offered in response the testimony of the officers who interrogated Clark and the testimony of Clark's attending physician, who concluded that, from a medical-neurological standpoint, Clark was capable of making a decision on waiving his rights. Following the suppression hearing, the state trial court determined that Clark voluntarily and knowingly waived his right against self-incrimination. Clark's confession was subsequently introduced at trial.
On November 6, 1984, Clark was found guilty of the aggravated murder of Manning while committing aggravated robbery. As part of its verdict, the jury also found appellant guilty of the aggravating circumstance, as charged in the specification of the indictment, that Clark was committing, or fleeing immediately after committing, aggravated robbery and that Clark was the principal offender.
At the sentencing phase of the proceedings, Clark's counsel called several witnesses to testify on Clark's behalf. Dr. Hy Kisin, a clinical psychologist, had examined Clark on two occasions for a total of approximately four hours. Dr. Kisin found it significant that Clark had been abusing the drug Preludin and that he was addicted to the narcotic drug Dilaudid. Dr. Kisin described the traumatic effect on Clark of his father's unexpected death. Dr. Kisin testified that Clark's father had disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was found, nine days later, dead in the rear seat of an automobile with another woman. Dr. Kisin testified that Clark's father's death had a negative impact on Clark and left Clark without significant control in his life. Dr. Kisin testified that Clark "at best, operates on a dull normal level of intelligence and at worst in a borderline retarded way." Dr. Kisin testified that Clark also suffered from a "blunted" affect and did not have a normal range for expressing emotions. Dr. Kisin stated that Clark's need for drug money had a contributing effect to Clark's crimes. Dr. Kisin further opined that Clark shot Manning as a result of a perceived threat and that Clark did not intend to kill Manning. Dr. Kisin also concluded that Clark would be able to conform and adjust his behavior to function adequately in a prison environment.
Clark's counsel also called other witnesses to testify on Clark's behalf at sentencing. Stephen McConnell, a professor of sociology, testified that the death penalty did not have a deterrent effect on the crime rate in local communities and that the imposition of the death penalty in this case would not have a deterrent effect on the commission of similar crimes. Clark's mother, Erma Clark, testified about Clark's childhood. Ms. Clark testified that Clark was a quiet child with few friends, that Clark's father had died under unusual circumstances when Clark was a teenager, and that Clark had three children. Two of Clark's children, Clifford and Cheryl Stallworth, testified that they loved their father and hoped that he would not get the death penalty. Father Douglas Siebenaller, a Catholic priest, then testified that the imposition of the death penalty was against certain religious doctrine and that, based upon his conversations with Clark,...
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