425 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2005), 05-55995, Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc.
|Citation:||425 F.3d 683|
|Party Name:||Ronald BUSH; Juliane Dyer; Josh Kramer; Ana Lopez; Ashley Salisbury, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CHEAPTICKETS, Inc.; Cendant Corporation; Expedia, Inc.; IAC/ Interactivecorp; Hotels.Com, L.P.; Hotels.Com GP, LLC; Orbitz, Inc.; Orbitz LLC; Priceline.Com, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.|
|Case Date:||October 06, 2005|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Argued and Submitted September 16, 2005.
Gordon Greenberg, McDermott Will & Emery, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellant.
Martha Boersch, Jones Day, San Francisco, California, for defendant-appellant.
Darrel Hieber, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellant.
Michael Reese, Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, New York, New York, for plaintiff-appellee.
Blake Harper, Hulett Harper Stewart, San Diego, California, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, D.C. No. CV-05-02285-PA, Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding.
Before: Jerome Farris, David R. Thompson, and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.
BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
The question before us is when is a class-action suit "commenced" for purposes of the effective date of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA," or "the Act"), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). The plaintiffs-appellees, Ronald Bush and others ("Bush"), filed suit in state court against various internet-based travel companies ("Cheaptickets"). Cheaptickets removed the case to federal court, but the district court ordered the case remanded to state court. Bush claims that removal was not authorized because the suit was filed on the day before CAFA became effective. Cheaptickets argues that the suit was commenced when it was removed to federal court; alternatively, it argues that the action was not commenced in state court until the defendant received service of process. We reject both assertions and affirm the district court's remand of the class action to state court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On February 17, 2005, Bush filed a civil class action in Superior Court, Los Angeles County, alleging that Cheap- tickets had imposed illegitimate "taxes and fees" in connection with the sale of online travel and accommodations services, and that this conduct violates California's Unfair Business Practices Act and constitutes unlawful conversion. Cheaptickets responded that there are multiple lawsuits asserting similar charges and seeking nationwide class certification, that several of the named plaintiffs-appellees appear in a number of these cases, and that these plaintiff classes are represented by many of the same attorneys.
On February 18, 2005, the day after Bush filed his complaint in state court, the President signed into law the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). CAFA amends, inter alia, the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and now vests original jurisdiction for class actions in federal court where there is minimal diversity and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). By its own terms, the Act became effective for all actions that "commenced on or after" February 18, 2005. Pub. L. 109-2, § 9.
On March 28, 2005, Cheaptickets removed the class action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), the new codification of CAFA's jurisdictional prerequisites. The district court remanded the action to state court on May 5, 2005, holding that a class action was "commenced" for purposes of CAFA when the original complaint was filed in state court, not when it was removed to federal court, and finding that the action commenced in state court on February 17, 2005, the day before CAFA's enactment. The remand order was entered on May 9, and Cheaptickets filed its appeal on May 16, 2005. We accepted the appeal on July 13.
We have jurisdiction to hear Cheaptickets' petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), recently enacted as part of CAFA. Section 1453(c) provides that an appellate court "may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court," provided that the appeal is filed "not less than 7 days" after entry of the remand order.
We have a preliminary question to resolve: whether Cheap-tickets filed a timely appeal from the district court's order. The statute provides that application must be made "not less than 7 days after entry of the order." 28 U.S.C. § 1454(c)(1) (emphasis added). Literally, a party who filed an appeal "less than" seven days after the district court entered its remand order would have appealed too early. Only if the appeal is filed seven or more days after entry of the order would the appeal be "not less than" seven days. Moreover, there is apparently no upper limit on when an appeal may be taken so long as it is filed after more than seven days.
The Tenth Circuit has recently offered its opinion that the statute contains a "typographical error" and must be read to say "not more than 7 days after entry of the order." Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Given Congress' stated intent to impose time limits on appeals of class action remand orders and the limited availability of appeals prior to the statute's enactment, we can think of no plausible reason why the text of the Act would instead impose a seven-day waiting period followed by a limitless window for appeal.").
Fortunately, though we note the apparent drafting error and the Tenth Circuit's analysis, we are not called upon to speculate whether it is appropriate or even permissible for this Court to correct Congress's "typographical" mistake in this case.1 Cheaptickets filed its appeal on the seventh day following the district court's remand order which is, happily for Cheaptickets, "not less than" seven days after the district court ordered the remand. Even under the Tenth Circuit's "corrected" reading of the Act, Cheaptickets filed a timely appeal because, having filed on the seventh day, it was "not more than" seven days.
Cheaptickets filed a timely appeal. We accepted the appeal on July 13, 2005, set a briefing schedule, and set oral argument for the next available panel. Unless extended, the period within which we must issue judgment would expire on September 12, 2005, four days prior to oral argument
(set for September 16, 2005).2 The parties have filed a joint supplemental brief, agreeing under § 1453(c)(3)(A) to such time as the court needs to render judgment following oral arguments, and we have issued an order extending the time for judgment.
Cheaptickets advances two primary arguments in their petition. First, Cheaptickets asserts that the action "commenced" when it was removed to federal court. Since the action was removed in March 2005, more than a month after the enactment of CAFA, Cheaptickets contends that CAFA applies and the remand was in error. Second, Cheaptickets avers that for purposes of removal, an action is "commenced" when process is served upon a defendant; given that Cheaptickets was served with process on February 24, 2005, a week following CAFA's enactment, Cheaptickets argues that removal was timely. As we consider CAFA's requirements, we may review the construction, interpretation, or applicability of a statute de novo. United States v. Ventre, 338 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
Section 9 of CAFA provides that "[t]he amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act." Pub. L. 109-2, § 9. CAFA broadens diversity jurisdiction for certain qualifying class actions and authorizes their removal; given its context, CAFA's "commenced" language surely refers to when the action was originally...
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