State v. Sanders

• Citation: 425 P.3d 1056
• Decision Date: 13 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. CR-14-0302-AP,CR-14-0302-AP
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Dauntorian Lydel SANDERS, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

425 P.3d 1056

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.Dauntorian Lydel SANDERS, Appellant.

No. CR-14-0302-AP

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed September 13, 2018

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Dominic E. Draye, Solicitor General, Lacy Stover Gard, Chief Counsel, Andrew S. Reilly (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Capital Litigation Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Michael S. Reeves (argued), Phoenix, Attorney for Dauntorian Lydel Sanders

JUSTICE GOULD authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and JUSTICES PELANDER, TIMMER, and BOLICK, and JUDGE CRUZ joined.^*

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 Dauntorian Lydel Sanders was sentenced to death after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse. We have jurisdiction of this automatic appeal pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-4031. We affirm Sanders’ convictions and sentences.

I.

¶ 2 On August 31, 2009, Sanders called 911 to report that his girlfriend’s child, three-year-old Schala Vera, was not breathing.¹ A police officer went to the home, and Sanders directed him to an upstairs bathroom, where he found Schala lying on the floor. Schala’s mother, Susan Witbracht, was kneeling over her, crying and begging Schala to breathe. The officer observed that Schala’s skin was "very light blue in color," her mouth was open, and her eyes were "rolled back in her head." He also noticed that she was "heavily" bruised, particularly between her waist and her knees and from her shoulders to her elbows. The officer performed CPR on Schala until paramedics arrived and transported her to the hospital. The doctors could not revive Schala and she was pronounced dead at the hospital.

¶ 3 Chandler Police Detective Chris Keipert spoke with Sanders at the hospital. Sanders told Detective Keipert that he went to Walgreens to buy cigarettes and left Schala at home with Susan. When he returned to the house to retrieve his wallet, he checked on Schala, who was in the bathroom using the toilet, and "she was fine." He went back to Walgreens and was gone "[f]ive to ten minutes." When he returned home the second time, he checked on Schala again and she wasn’t breathing. Sanders could not explain why Schala stopped breathing, claiming there had been no problems other than "the little girl won’t eat her dinner."

¶ 4 When Detective Keipert asked Sanders about Schala’s bruises, Sanders admitted they were "from when she got a spanking." He said the spanking occurred around 9:00 p.m. the night before and that both he and Susan had spanked Schala with a "cloth-like belt." He claimed that was the last time she had been spanked.

¶ 5 Later that night, and continuing the following day, Detective Ivan Kaminsky interviewed Sanders at the Chandler Police Department. Initially, Sanders essentially repeated the story he had told Detective Keipert. Sanders added, however, that he and Susan had been punishing Schala by spanking her with a belt. He estimated that they would spank Schala "four or five" times "once or twice a week" with either a leather belt or a military belt. He said the discipline began "a couple weeks after" Schala returned to Arizona in late May or early June 2009 after living in Iowa with Susan’s relatives for several months.

¶ 6 As the interview continued, Sanders’ story changed. Sanders admitted that Schala was hit with a belt on the day of her death. He claimed that Susan struck Schala with a leather belt "maybe three or four" times for "not listening." He also stated that Schala’s bruises on both her legs had been there since the Saturday before her death because both he and Susan struck her with a belt that day. Sanders maintained, however, that "[t]he only thing we use is a belt." He also denied hitting Schala with the buckle, because that was the part he held when he was hitting her. Sanders stated that he put tape around the buckle to protect his hand. During a search of the residence, police found a black belt with tape around the buckle on the bathroom counter. Sanders identified the belt as the one he used to strike Schala.

¶ 7 When Detective Kaminsky asked Sanders whose fault it was that Schala was beaten to death, Sanders stated that he would "take full blame" because he’s the male and he’s "more physical." Sanders also admitted that he "accidentally" hit Schala in the head with the bathroom door when he came home from Walgreens to get his wallet. He stated that he beat Schala shortly before he left for Walgreens because "she just didn’t listen at all" and "just kept going." Sanders explained that Schala was supposed to be putting her underwear back on after using the toilet, "but she just sat there" on the bathroom floor. Because she was not listening to him, Sanders started hitting her legs with the belt. She tried to stand up but fell, and he continued to hit her. She then leaned forward with her face between her knees and he struck her on the back.

¶ 8 An autopsy was performed by Maricopa County Medical Examiner Kevin Horn, M.D. Dr. Horn found multiple abrasions on Schala’s head and face. The autopsy revealed a subdural hemorrhage

under her scalp that was, according to Dr. Horn, caused by "more than just an everyday force." Dr. Horn opined that the injury was similar to injuries caused by a fall from a significant height, a blow to the head, or a motor vehicle accident.

¶ 9 There were additional bruises and abrasions on Schala’s torso and above and around her genitalia. Dr. Horn also found abrasions near Schala’s left armpit, arms, back, buttocks, and thighs that he identified as "pattern injuries" consistent with a belt.

¶ 10 The most extensive bruising was to Schala’s arms and legs. Dr. Horn noted "diffuse contusion" to those areas, meaning the bruises overlapped and "cover[ed] the entire surface." He also noted "very severe swelling of all four of her extremities." In both Schala’s arms and legs, Dr. Horn diagnosed rhabdomyolysis

, which he explained "is a long way of saying that the muscle has died and fallen apart." He also diagnosed compartment syndrome, which occurs when the muscle swells so much that it cuts off its own blood supply. Dr. Horn testified that compartment syndrome is typically seen in "victims of crushing trauma, like motor vehicle accidents, people that have been pinned in a wreckage" and in "earthquake areas where people have been crushed in buildings." Dr. Horn opined that it was not possible for a belt alone to have caused these injuries; rather, "[s]ignificant crushing force" must have caused the injuries to Schala’s arms and legs. In his opinion, these injuries showed that Schala must have been squeezed, kicked, punched, and/or thrown against a surface or object in addition to being struck with a belt.

¶ 11 Dr. Horn took tissue samples from Schala’s arms and legs and performed an iron stain test to try to determine the age of her bruises. On one section from her right leg he found "very rare microphages and very rare staining for iron" amongst "a sea of red blood cells," indicating "fresh injury possibly over an older injury." Because her legs were so extensively bruised he noted the newer bruises could be masking older bruises.

¶ 12 Ultimately, Schala’s cause of death was determined to be "multiple blunt force injuries."

¶ 13 Both Sanders and Susan were charged with first degree murder and four counts of child abuse (Susan’s case was later severed from Sanders’ case). The trial court later granted the State’s motion to dismiss two counts of child abuse.

¶ 14 At trial, the jury found Sanders guilty of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse. In the aggravation phase, the jury found three aggravating factors: (1) Sanders was previously convicted of a serious offense (child abuse), see A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(2) ; (2) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, see id. § 13-751(F)(6) ; and (3) Sanders murdered a child under fifteen years of age, see id. § 13-751(F)(9). Based on evidence that both Sanders and Susan beat Schala, the jury also made an Enmund - Tison finding that Sanders killed Schala. See Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782, 788, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) ; Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137, 157–58, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). In the penalty phase, after considering the mitigation evidence, the jury determined that Sanders should be sentenced to death. The trial court imposed consecutive presumptive sentences for the child abuse convictions.

II. Simmons Instruction

¶ 15 Sanders argues the trial court violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by instructing the jurors, over his objection, that a life sentence includes the "possibility of release from prison after serving 35 years." See A.R.S. § 13-751(A). Sanders claims that pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), the trial court reversibly erred by failing to instruct the jury that he was ineligible for release or parole. "We review de novo whether the court properly instructed the jury." State v. Rushing , 243 Ariz. 212, 221 ¶ 36, 404 P.3d 240, 249 (2017).

¶ 16 In Simmons , the United States Supreme Court held that if "the defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible." 512 U.S. at 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 178, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In Kelly v. South Carolina , 534 U.S. 246, 248, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002), the Court stated that a defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue if it is " ‘a logical inference from the evidence,’ or was ‘injected into the case through the State’s closing argument.’ " Id. at 252, 122 S.Ct. 726 (quoting State v. Kelly , 343 S.C. 350, 540 S.E.2d 851, 857 (2001) ); see...