Butler v. Dexter
| Decision Date | 19 April 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-623,75-623 |
| Citation | 96 S.Ct. 1527,47 L.Ed.2d 774,425 U.S. 262 |
| Parties | Ted BUTLER and Emil Peters v. Richard C. DEXTER |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This is an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 from an order of a three-judge District Court enjoining the appellants from prosecuting the appellee on the felony charge that his motion picture projector is a "criminal instrument" under § 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code.1 Since no substantial question about the constitutionality of § 16.01 has been raised, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction in this Court.2
The facts of this case are relatively simple. The appellee, Richard Dexter, ran the Fiesta Theatre in San Antonio, Tex., which in June and July 1974 was exhibiting the film "Deep Throat." On three 3 separate occasions, an officer of the San Antonio police force paid for admission, entered the theater, and viewed the film. The officer, on each occasion, then wrote out a "Motion for Adversary Hearing" to determine whether there was probable cause to seize the film for violating the Texas obscenity laws. Each time, a magistrate held a short "hearing" in the lobby of the theater, at which he heard the testimony of the police officer, then viewed the film. Each time, the magistrate then issued a warrant to seize the film and to seia "criminal instrument" under § 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code. Appellee was then arrested and charged with "commercial obscenity" in violation of Texas Penal Code, § 43.23, and "use of a criminal instrument" in violation of § 16.01. The charge of commercial obscenity is a Class B misdemeanor, carrying a fine not to exceed $1,000, confinement not to exceed 180 days, or both.4 Appellee did not, according to the trial court, pursue any complaint about these charges in the federal court. He was brought to trial on these charges in the state courts and they are not in issue here. His challenge, rather, was against the prosecutor's charging him with violations of the criminal instruments statute for his possession of ordinary 16-mm. movie projectors. Violation of that statute is a third-degree felony, and carries a penalty of from 2 to 10 years' confinement and a fine not to exceed $5,000.5 Although the felony complaints were lodged and appellee was forced to post some $31,000 in bonds, these charges were never presented to the grand jury.6
A "criminal instrument," for purposes of the Texas statute, is anything "specially designed, made, or adapted for the commission of an offense." 7 From an examination of the "clear language of the statute" and from an examination of the unofficial "practice commentary" to the statute, the District Court concluded that "(b)y no stretch of the imagination could this statute be used to cover the plaintiff's actions or the possession of an ordinary portable 16 millimeter motion picture projector with removable interchangeable reels." 8
From its conclusion as to the obvious inapplicability of the statute, and from the prosecutor's failure to present the charges to the grand jury, the District Court found that 9
Appellants present several contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the District Court and the correctness of its decision. We do not reach these questions, however, as we have concluded that we have no jurisdiction to consider this case on direct appeal. Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1253, granting the right of direct appeal from an order "granting (an) . . . injunction in any civil action . . . required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges." Title 28 U.S.C. § 2281 provides that "(a)n . . . injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute . . . shall not be granted . . . upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges . . . ." Under this statute a three-judge court is required if "a complaint seeks to enjoin a state statute on substantial grounds of federal unconstitutionality, . . . even though nonconstitutional grounds of attack are also alleged . . . ." Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 85, 80 S.Ct. 568, 575, 4 L.Ed.2d 568, 576 (1960). However, in this case the District Court ruled that the actions of the appellants were not taken in the enforcement of the statute and thus no serious question about the constitutionality of the statute was presented.
As noted above, the District Court found that the felony "criminal instruments" charges were made in bad faith and without any design actually to convict appellee on those charges. Rather, the felony charges were made as part of a pattern of harassment by the San Antonio police designed to force appellee to stop exhibiting "Deep Throat." But the arrests and the charges were not made in any attempt to enforce § 16.01.10 Nor was the injunction granted on the ground that § 16.01 was unconstitutional; rather, it was granted on the ground that the local officials had acted unconstitutionally in using that statute as a pretext for arrest and the setting of felony bonds when they knew that the statute was inapplicable and that no conviction could ever be obtained. Since no substantial question concerning the constitutionality of § 16.01 was presented to the District Court, a three-judge court was not required.11 Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962).
A somewhat better argument might be made that the prosecutor's actions were part of an effort to enforce the commercial obscenity statute, albeit in a somewhat irregular manner. However, it could not be contended that the District Court grounded its injunction in any way on the unconstitutionality of the commercial obscenity statute; the constitutionality of that statute was not even considered in this case.12
Since a three-judge court was not required in this case, the appeal should have been taken to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Since the time for appeal may have passed, we vacate the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sovereign News Co. v. Falke
...solely that three judge district court may enter a fresh appealable order to the Court of Appeals. See, Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262, 267 fn. 12, 96 S.Ct. 1527, 47 L.Ed.2d 774. In a series of decisions the United States Supreme Court noted that indictment constitutes the "critical stage" ......
-
Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance
...Additionally, a court may, sua sponte, inquire into the basis for its jurisdiction. E.g., Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262, 263 n.2, 96 S.Ct. 1527, 1529 n.2, 47 L.Ed.2d 774, 776 n.2 (1976); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 979 (2d Cir. 1975); Pacific Towboat & Salvage Co. ......
-
Jagnandan v. Giles
...Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98, 95 S.Ct. 289, 42 L.Ed.2d 249 (1974).6 Cf. Butler v. Dexter, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 1527, 47 L.Ed.2d 774 (1976) (per curiam).7 See generally Note, Edelman v. Jordan : The Case of the Vanishing Retroactive Benefit and the Reappea......
-
Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Azar
...separately to determine whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to consider its merits." Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262, 267 n.12, 96 S.Ct. 1527, 47 L.Ed.2d 774 (1976) (per curiam); see also Rich v. Lambert, 53 U.S. 347, 352-53, 12 How. 347, 13 L.Ed. 1017 (1851) (dismissing three of five......
-
Table of cases
...v. State 505 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) 3:590 Butler v. State 830 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) 6:300, 6:410 Butler v. Dexter 425 U.S. 262 (1976) 5:10 Butterfield v. State 992 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) 9:310 Byler v. State 294 S.W. 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927) 3:490 Bynum v......
-
Criminal instruments
...opinion in Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance , 404 F.Supp. 33 (S.D.Tex.1975), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Butler v. Dexter , 425 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 1527, 47 L.Ed.2d 774 (1976), suggested that the criminal instrument statute was designed to deal with a very small class of prope......