Lasker v. Burks

• Citation: 426 F. Supp. 844
• Decision Date: 07 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 73 Civ. 552 (HFW).,73 Civ. 552 (HFW).
• Parties: Howard M. LASKER and Irving Goldberg, Plaintiffs, v. Harry G. BURKS, Jr., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

426 F. Supp. 844

Howard M. LASKER and Irving Goldberg, Plaintiffs, v. Harry G. BURKS, Jr., et al., Defendants.

No. 73 Civ. 552 (HFW).

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

January 7, 1977.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Aranow, Brodsky, Bohlinger, Benetar & Einhorn, New York City, by Anthony L. Tersigni, Herbert A. Einhorn, David J. Sweet, Steven Mallis, New York City, of counsel, for plaintiffs.

Seward & Kissel, New York City, for defendant Fundamental Investors, Inc.

Pollack & Kaminsky, New York City, for defendants Anchor Corp., Burr, Chalker, Haire & Hutchinson.

Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, New York City, for defendants Burks, Hopkins, Kemmerer, Monroney, Phillips and Wade.

OPINION

WERKER, District Judge.

This action, brought derivatively by two shareholders on behalf of Fundamental Investors, Inc. ("Fundamental" or the "Fund"), a registered investment company, seeks to recover damages resulting from the Fund's purchase of $20 million in 270-day notes issued by the now bankrupt Penn Central Transportation Company. The defendants are Anchor Corporation ("Anchor"), the registered investment adviser to the Fund, and several past and present members of the Fund's Board of Directors ("Board"). The defendants previously moved to dismiss this suit under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because a voting quorum of disinterested directors found, in the exercise of its business judgment, that maintenance of the suit would not be in the best interests of the shareholders of the Fund. In a memorandum decision on that motion, 404 F.Supp. 1172, this court held that the business judgment rule¹ applied to the actions of the Fund and that it enabled the minority directors of the Board to seek dismissal of this suit provided only that they were "truly disinterested and independent." However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to conduct discovery for a designated period of time to determine whether the minority directors were in fact disinterested or independent, and the motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice to renew at the close of discovery. In accordance with that decision, the defendants have now renewed their motion to dismiss the instant action. The plaintiffs continue to argue that the motion should be denied because, for various reasons, the minority directors did not, and could not, exercise their independent business judgment in moving to terminate this action.

I

The facts surrounding this action have been described at length in my earlier memorandum decision; nevertheless, some repetition of that discussion will facilitate an understanding of the court's action upon the present motion by the defendants.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that Anchor breached its statutory, contractual and common law fiduciary duties by relying exclusively upon the representations of Goldman, Sachs & Co. (a seller of commercial paper), rather than independently investigating the quality and safety of the Penn Central 270-day notes purchased by the Fund. It is further alleged that the defendant directors knew or should have known of Anchor's failure to meet its responsibility; that they violated their common law duties as corporate fiduciaries by acquiescing in Anchor's omissions; that the financial condition of the Penn Central steadily worsened during the period from November 28, 1969 to June 21, 1970, the date that it filed for reorganization; and that during this period of decline all of the defendants failed to investigate and review the financial condition of the Penn Central and the quality and safety of its commercial paper. It is also alleged that during this period Anchor failed to recommend, and the defendant directors failed to attempt, sale of the Penn Central paper held by the Fund.

Prior to the institution of this action, the Fund and other plaintiffs brought suit against Goldman, Sachs seeking rescission of their purchases. See Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F.Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (the "Welch" action). On the motion of all defendants to this action, Judge Gurfein, then a district court judge, granted a stay of further proceedings in this action pending resolution of the Fund's claims in Welch. Thereafter, on July 9, 1974 the Fund agreed to settle its claims against Goldman, Sachs. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Goldman, Sachs was to take back the notes and the Fund was to receive $5,250,000 in cash and a 73.75 percent interest in any proceeds of the notes obtained during the course of the Penn Central reorganization proceeding.

With the claims of Fundamental in the Welch matter resolved, the Board once again faced the question of what to do in the instant action. Briefly, the Board determined that five of its members were disinterested (the "disinterested quorum" or "minority directors") and therefore able to determine the proper course of action for the Fund.² The disinterested quorum then retained the Honorable Stanley H. Fuld, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, to review the circumstances surrounding the purchase and retention of the Penn Central notes and prepare an opinion for its consideration. In a memorandum to the disinterested quorum dated December 5, 1974, Judge Fuld concluded that neither Anchor nor the defendant directors of the Fund had violated the law "in connection with the acquisition or retention of the Penn Central commercial paper." Judge Fuld's memorandum discussed several positions that the disinterested quorum could take on behalf of the Fund, one of which was concluding that the suit lacked merit and moving to dismiss. The minority directors met with Judge Fuld at a special meeting of the disinterested quorum held on December 18, 1974 and requested that he submit a further memorandum before they took any action. The minority directors also questioned several of the defendants before deciding at a second special meeting of the disinterested quorum, held on January 6, 1975, to seek dismissal of the instant action.³ An affidavit submitted by the chairman of the disinterested quorum as part of the earlier motion to dismiss recounts ten factors that the disinterested quorum considered in arriving at its decision. The relevant portion of that affidavit appears in my earlier decision, 404 F.Supp. at 1176-77.

II

On the defendants' initial motion to dismiss, this court considered and rejected the contention of the plaintiffs that the merits of their derivative claim should color the court's consideration of the business judgment "defense." The court also reviewed the claim of the plaintiffs that the strong public policy behind the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1, et seq., and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1, et seq., precluded application of the business judgment rule to the actions of mutual funds. The court observed that

"absent a statutory exception whether a cause of action is expressly authorized or is `implied' the directors of a corporation should be given the chance to perform their duties in running the business of the corporation, including whether to prosecute a cause of action. 404 F.Supp. at 1180.

Both of these contentions have been reasserted in substantially unchanged form in the plaintiffs' papers in opposition to the renewed motion to dismiss. While a certain degree of tenacity is the mark of accomplished counsel, what the plaintiffs now seek is an opportunity to reargue the court's prior decision after the time to do so has passed. To accede to that request would require the court to reconsider arguments previously rejected without having been shown that there is a need to do so. Consequently, the court will only consider the question it did not reach before: whether the minority directors were disinterested and independent.

Since the parties have each submitted affidavits and excerpts from the extensive deposition testimony to assist in the disposition of the instant motion, the court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b), Fed. R.Civ.P.

III

The plaintiffs first contend that the structure of the mutual fund industry, which subjects mutual funds to extensive control by their investment advisers, precludes a finding of independence in this instance.⁴ Specifically, they maintain that the large number of shareholders in the Fund coupled with the small size of each shareholder's interest, makes proxy contests impossible to wage and ensures that the Board will only contain directors amenable to the policies of the Fund's management.⁵ The plaintiffs also suggest that the service of each minority director for compensation on the boards of other "Anchor" funds demonstrates their inability to act independently. In this vein, the plaintiffs maintain that business and personal relationships among the defendants and minority directors make it impossible to conclude that the disinterested quorum acted independently; that even if the minority directors acted in good faith, their loyalties must have been divided.

Plaintiffs have not adduced any factual support for their conclusion that the members of the disinterested quorum acted other than independently. Although each of the minority directors knew someone on the Board at the time that he or she was nominated, the relationships which existed between the minority directors and the defendant directors were de minimis, even as they are stated by the plaintiffs, and do not suggest that the business judgment rule should not be applied.

There is also no reason to conclude that the business judgment rule is inapplicable merely because each minority director receives remuneration for service on the boards of other "Anchor" funds. Most corporate directors receive some compensation for their services, but absent a showing of improper motive they have always been permitted to apply their business judgment to...