State v. Ramirez

Citation426 P.3d 714,191 Wash.2d 732
Decision Date20 September 2018
Docket NumberNO. 95249-3,95249-3
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. David Angel RAMIREZ, Petitioner.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Kathleen A. Shea, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98101-3647, for Petitioner.

Jessica L. Blye, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, 345 W. Main Street, Chehalis, WA 98532-4802, for Respondent.

STEPHENS, J.

¶ 1 In State v. Blazina , 182 Wash.2d 827, 839, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), we held that under former RCW 10.01.160(3) (2015), trial courts have an obligation to conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant’s current and future ability to pay before imposing discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) at sentencing. This case provides an opportunity to more fully describe the nature of such an inquiry. An adequate inquiry must include consideration of the mandatory factors set forth in Blazina , including the defendant’s incarceration and other debts, and the court rule GR 34 criteria for indigency. Id. at 838, 344 P.3d 680. The trial court should also address what we described in Blazina as other "important factors" relating to the defendant’s financial circumstances, including employment history, income, assets and other financial resources, monthly living expenses, and other debts. Id.

¶ 2 The trial court in David A. Ramirez’s case failed to conduct an adequate individualized inquiry before imposing LFOs on Ramirez. While this Blazina error would normally entitle Ramirez to a resentencing hearing on his ability to pay discretionary LFOs, such a limited resentencing is unnecessary in this case. Engrossed Second Substitute House Bill 1783, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (House Bill 1783), which amended two statutes at issue and now prohibits the imposition of certain LFOs on indigent defendants, applies prospectively to Ramirez’s case on appeal. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial court to strike the improperly imposed LFOs from Ramirez’s judgment and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 A jury convicted Ramirez of third degree assault and possession of a controlled substance, and found by special verdict that he committed the assault with sexual motivation and displayed an egregious lack of remorse. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 63-66.

¶ 4 At sentencing, the State sought an exceptional sentence of 10 years based on Ramirez’s prior record and offender score. 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Mar. 7, 2016) (VRP) at 346. Following the State’s argument for imposing an exceptional sentence, Ramirez took the opportunityto directly address the trial court. Ramirez explained to the court that despite the State’s representations, he "was doing everything right" before his arrest. Id. at 360. Ramirez shared that prior to his arrest, he was working a minimum wage job at Weyerhaeuser as part of a "temporary service team" and paying all his household bills, including a DirecTV subscription that included Seattle Seahawks games. Id. at 359-60, 362-63. Ramirez had opened a bank account for the first time in his life, was planning on getting his driver’s license, and had moved into his own apartment with the help of his wife. Id. at 360, 362. Ramirez discussed these favorable aspects of his life in an effort to show that despite his criminal history, he did not deserve an exceptional sentence. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 3. He lamented that because of his drug relapse and arrest, "I missed out on all of that." VRP at 363.1

¶ 5 The trial court sentenced Ramirez to five years for the third degree assault conviction and two years for possession of a controlled substance, to be served consecutively. Id. at 372-73. The trial court also imposed $2,900 in LFOs, including a $500 victim assessment fee, a $100 DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) collection fee, a $200 criminal filing fee, and discretionary LFOs of $2,100 in attorney fees, and set a monthly payment amount of $25. Id. at 375-76. After the court announced the sentence, Ramirez presented a notice of appeal and a motion for an order of indigency, which the court granted. Id. at 373; Suppl. CP at 1-4. According to the financial statement in his declaration of indigency, Ramirez had no source of income or assets and no savings, and owed more than $10,000 at the time of sentencing (apparently previously imposed court costs and fees). Suppl. CP at 2-4.

¶ 6 Prior to imposing LFOs, the trial court asked only two questions relating to Ramirez’s current and future ability to pay, both of which were directed to the State. First, the court asked, "And when he is not in jail, he has the ability to make money to make periodic payments on his LFOs, right?" VRP at 348. The State responded that Ramirez had the ability to pay his LFOs "[w]hen he’s not in jail and when he is in jail," noting that Ramirez could work while incarcerated. Id. The trial court then asked the State to once more confirm that LFOs were appropriate in Ramirez’s case: "But as far as you are concerned, the LFOs should be imposed." Id. The State answered, "Yes." Id.

¶ 7 The trial court did not directly ask Ramirez or his counsel about his ability to pay at any point during sentencing. The only statement made by Ramirez concerning his ability to pay came after the trial court announced its decision to impose discretionary costs. After finding that Ramirez had "the ability to earn money and make small payments on his financial obligations," the court listed the specific costs imposed and ordered Ramirez to pay "25 bucks a month starting [in] 60 days." Id. at 375-76. Ramirez then asked, "How am I going to do that from inside?" Id. at 376. Ramirez’s counsel responded, "I will explain." Id. The discussion then moved on to a different subject.2

¶ 8 On appeal, Ramirez argued that the trial court failed to make an adequate individualized inquiry into his ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs, contrary to Blazina , 182 Wash.2d at 837-38, 344 P.3d 680.3 In a 2-1 unpublished opinion, Division Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the court "conducted an adequate individualized inquiry and did not err in imposing the discretionary LFOs." State v. Ramirez , No. 48705-5-II, slip op. at 13, 2017 WL 4791011 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2048705-5-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. In reviewing the trial court’s decision to impose discretionary LFOs on Ramirez, the Court of Appeals majority applied an overall abuse of discretion standard; it cited the information offered by Ramirez in his statement to the trial court as sufficient grounds for finding Ramirez able to pay LFOs. Id. at 12-13.

¶ 9 In dissent, Chief Judge Bjorgen argued that the question of whether a trial court made an adequate inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay discretionary LFOs should be reviewed de novo, not for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 16 (Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting). Applying the de novo standard, Chief Judge Bjorgen concluded that the trial court’s inquiry into Ramirez’s financial status fell short of the Blazina standards. Id. at 19.

¶ 10 On March 7, 2018, we granted Ramirez’s petition for review "only on the issue of discretionary [LFOs]." Order Granting Review, No. 95249-3 (Wash. Mar. 7, 2018). On March 27, 2018, just weeks after we granted Ramirez’s petition, House Bill 1783 became law. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269. House Bill 1783’s amendments relate to Washington’s system for imposing and collecting LFOs and are effective as of June 7, 2018. House Bill 1783 is particularly relevant to Ramirez’s case because it amends the discretionary LFO statute to prohibit trial courts from imposing discretionary LFOs on defendants who are indigent at the time of sentencing. Id. at § 6(3).

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 This case concerns Washington’s system of LFOs, specifically the imposition of discretionary LFOs on individuals who lack the current and future ability to pay them.

State law requires that trial courts consider the financial resources of a defendant and the nature of the burden imposed by LFOs before ordering the defendant to pay discretionary costs. See RCW 10.01.160(3).

¶ 12 We addressed former RCW 10.01.160(3) in Blazina and held that the statute requires trial courts to conduct an individualized inquiry into the financial circumstances of each offender before levying any discretionary LFOs. 182 Wash.2d at 839, 344 P.3d 680. As Ramirez’s case demonstrates, however, costs are often imposed with very little discussion. We granted review in this case to articulate specific inquiries trial courts should make in determining whether an individual has the current and future ability to pay discretionary costs.

¶ 13 After we granted review, the legislature enacted House Bill 1783, which amends former RCW 10.01.160(3) to categorically prohibit the imposition of any discretionary costs on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3). House Bill 1783 also amends the criminal filing fee statute, former RCW 36.18.020(2)(h) (2015), to prohibit courts from imposing the $200 filing fee on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 17(2)(h). According to Ramirez’s motion for an order of indigency, which the trial court granted, Ramirez unquestionably qualified as indigent at the time of sentencing: Ramirez had no source of income or assets and no savings, and owed more than $10,000 at the time of sentencing. Suppl. CP at 3-4.

¶ 14 This case presents two issues. The primary issue is whether the trial court conducted an adequate individualized inquiry into Ramirez’s ability to pay, as required under Blazina and former RCW 10.01.160(3). A separate but related issue is whether House Bill 1783’s statutory amendments apply to Ramirez’s case on appeal.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Conduct an Adequate Individualized Inquiry into Ramirez’s Current and Future Ability To Pay LFOs

¶ 15 The threshold issue in this case is whether the trial court performed an adequate inquiry into...

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