New Hampshire v. Maine

Decision Date14 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 64,64
Citation48 L.Ed.2d 701,96 S.Ct. 2113,426 U.S. 363
PartiesState of NEW HAMPSHIRE, Plaintiff, v. State of MAINE. Orig
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Following institution of this original action by New Hampshire against Maine to locate the lateral marine boundary separating the States between the mouth of Portsmouth Harbor and the entrance to Gosport Harbor in the Isles of Shoals, a settlement agreement was reached and a joint motion was filed for entry of judgment by consent, together with a proposed decree, based on a stipulated record, which the Special Master concluded should be submitted to the Court, at the same time expressing the view that the decree was impermissible under Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 94 S.Ct. 2248, 41 L.Ed.2d 61, but recommending its entry if the Court concluded otherwise. Thereafter the Special Master declared the entire case, including the proposed consent decree, to be under submission. The States had agreed with the Special Master's conclusion that King George II's decree of 1740 fixed the boundary in the Piscataqua (now Portsmouth) Harbor area but had differed over the location of certain points by the terms of the decree. The consent decree embodied the States' agreement upon the meaning of those terms. Held :

1. Entry of the consent decree proposes a wholly permissible final resolution of the controversy both as to the facts and the law and comports with the Court's Art. III function. The States' agreement can therefore be effectuated. The proposed decree in Vermont v. New York, supra, provided that "no findings shall be made" and that "it shall not constitute an adjudication of any issue of fact or law, or evidence, or any admission by any party with respect to any such issue," whereas the proposed consent decree here records the States' agreement as to the meaning and extent of hitherto imprecisely described locations in line with the relevant evidence; nor is anything like the "arbitral" function for resolution of future disputes in Vermont v. New York involved in the proposed consent decree here. Pp. 367-369.

2. Adoption of the proposed consent decree does not involve a compact under Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, requiring the consent of Congress. The application of that Clause is limited to agreements "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon . . . the just supremacy of the United States," Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519, 13 S.Ct. 728, 734, 37 L.Ed. 537. Here the litigant States are not adjusting the boundary between them, which was fixed by the 1740 decree; the consent decree simply locates precisely the already existing boundary, and neither State is enhancing its power and threatening supremacy of the Federal Government. Pp. 369-370.

Edward F. Bradley, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Richard F. Upton, Concord, N. H., for defendant.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Both New Hampshire and Maine have filed exceptions to the Report of the Special Master in this original action brought by New Hampshire against Maine, 414 U.S. 810, 996, 94 S.Ct. 25, 233, 38 L.Ed.2d 45, 348 (1973), to locate the lateral marine boundary separating the States between the mouth of Portsmouth Harbor and the entrance to Gosport Harbor in the Isles of Shoals.1 Prior to trial the At- torneys General of New Hampshire and Maine agreed upon a settlement and jointly filed a "Motion for Entry of Judgment by Consent of Plaintiff and Defendant," together with a proposed consent decree, based on a stipulated record.2 The Special Master thereafter, without further hearing but with supplemental briefs, declared the entire case, including the proposed consent decree, to be under submission.

The Special Master "concluded that the proposed consent decree should be submitted to the Court for its consideration," Report of Special Master 3, but expressed the view that rejection of the decree must be recommended as not permissible under the principle of Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277, 94 S.Ct. 2248, 2252, 41 L.Ed.2d 61 (1974), that "mere settlements by the parties acting under compulsions and motives that have no relation to performance of (the Court's) Art. III functions" do not relieve the Court of its constitutional duty to decide the merits of the controversy between the States. However, the Special Master recommended entry of the consent decree if its entry would be consistent with performance of the Court's Art. III function.3 We hold that entry of the consent decree is consistent with that function. We therefore sustain Maine's exception to the rejection of the proposed consent decree. Accordingly, we have no occasion to address the other exceptions filed by the States.

The boundary in dispute was in fact fixed in 1740 by decree of King George II of England. That decree set the boundary as follows:

"That the Dividing Line shall pass up thro the Mouth of Piscataqua Harbour and up the Middle of the River . . . . And that the Dividing Line shall part the Isles of Shoals and run thro the Middle of the Harbour between the Islands to the Sea on the Southerly Side. . . ."

The historical events that produced this 1740 decree, summarized briefly here, are detailed in the Special Master's Report. In the early 18th century, a major boundary dispute arose between the provinces of New Hampshire and Massachusetts regarding the southern border of New Hampshire. The legal issues focused on the Merrimack River, but the boundary between New Hampshire and the Maine portion of Massachusetts was also involved. When representatives of the two provinces were unable in 1731 to reach agreement, the New Hampshire representatives presented the matter to King George II. The King referred the dispute to the Board of Trade, which in 1735 recommended that commissioners from the other New England Colonies be designated to resolve the question. In 1737 the King ac- cordingly appointed 20 members of the Provincial Councils of New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Nova Scotia to serve as commissioners. Although much of the debate related only to the Merrimack question, the Piscataqua boundary between Maine and New Hampshire was also a point of controversy. The commission rendered its decision later that year, but both provinces appealed the decision to the King. In 1738 the King referred the matter to the Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council for Hearing Appeals from the Plantations which recommended acceptance of the commission's resolution without change. In 1740 King George II signed a decree accepting this recommendation and, employing the quoted language, thereby permanently fixed the Maine-New Hampshire boundary. This boundary was the fixed boundary when the Union, including Massachusetts and New Hampshire, was formed, and when Maine was formally separated from Massachusetts and admitted to the Union.

The States expressly agree with the conclusion of the Special Master that "the decree of 1740 fixed the boundary in the Piscataqua Harbor area." Their quarrel was over the location by the decree of the "Mouth of Piscataqua River," "Middle of the River," and "Middle of the Harbour" within the contemplation of the decree. The proposed consent decree embodies the States' agreement upon the meaning of those terms, and we hold that the Court may give effect to the States' agreement consistently with performance of our Art. III function and duty.

The Special Master found that a "case or controversy" existed when this original action was filed, but that the effect of the compromise represented by the joint motion for entry of the consent decree was that "(a)t this point in time . . . the moving papers do not propose a case or controversy in which the Court might apply 'principles of law or equity to the facts, distilled by hearings or stipulations.' (Vermont v. New York, supra, at 277, 94 S.Ct. at 2252.)" Report of Special Master 3-4. This was true of the circumstances before the Court in Vermont v. New York, but it is not true of the circumstances before the Court in this case.

The proposed consent decree in Vermont provided that "no findings shall be made" and that "it shall not constitute an adjudication on any issue of fact or law, or evidence, or any admission by any party with respect to any such issue." 417 U.S., at 271, 94 S.Ct., at 2249. The decree also provided for appointment by the Court of a Special Master authorized to consider all future disputes, after exhaustion of administrative and other remedies, and to file recommendations with the Court; these recommendations were to become decisions of the Court unless disapproved. Obviously this proposal "would materially change the function of the Court in these interstate contests." Id., at 277, 94 S.Ct., at 2252. If we were to agree to police prospectively the conduct of the parties, "we would be acting more in an arbitral rather than a judicial manner." Ibid.

In contrast, the 1740 decree, not the proposed consent decree, permanently fixed the boundary between the States; the proposed consent decree does nothing except record the States' agreement upon the location of the "Mouth of Piscataqua River," "Middle of the River,"...

To continue reading

Request your trial
33 cases
  • United States Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • February 21, 1978
    ...or more States. The court cited Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 13 S.Ct. 728, 37 L.Ed. 537 (1893), and New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 96 S.Ct. 2113, 48 L.Ed.2d 701 (1976), in support of its holding that consent is necessary only in the case of a compact that enhances the politic......
  • Cuyler v. Adams
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • January 21, 1981
    ...(1978), quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519, 13 S.Ct. 728, 734, 37 L.Ed. 537 (1893); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-370, 96 S.Ct. 2113, 2117, 48 L.Ed.2d 701 (1976). But where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subj......
  • Star Scientific Inc. v. Beales, 01-1502.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • January 22, 2002
    ...States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471, 98 S.Ct. 799, 54 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369, 96 S.Ct. 2113, 48 L.Ed.2d 701 (1976). The Master Settlement Agreement principally operates vertically between each State and the signatory tobacco ......
  • South Carolina v. North Carolina, 138, Orig.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • October 13, 2009
    ...941, 100 S.Ct. 1335, 63 L.Ed.2d 774 (1980); United States v. California, 377 U.S. 926, 84 S.Ct. 1330 (1964); cf. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 365, n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 2113, 48 L.Ed.2d 701 (1976), and in equitable apportionment actions specifically, see, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • An American (State) in Paris: The Constitutionality of U.S. States' Commitments to the Paris Agreement
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Reporter No. 48-11, November 2018
    • November 1, 2018
    ...should not. 198. 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 199. Id . at 517-18. 200. Id . at 518. 201. Id . at 519. 202. 153 U.S. 155, 168-70 (1894). 203. See 426 U.S. 363, 370 (1976). 204. 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 205. Id . at 479. 206. Id . at 472-78. 207. Id . at 489 (White, J., dissenting). 208. See id . 209. S......
  • A PROPHYLACTIC APPROACH TO COMPACT CONSTITUTIONALITY.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 98 No. 3, March 2023
    • March 1, 2023
    ...(24) See infra Section II.A. (25) U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976) (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, (26) Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 2......
  • Constitutionalizing Interstate Relations: The Temptation of the Dark Side.
    • United States
    • Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol. 44 No. 1, January 2021
    • January 1, 2021
    ...has sovereign authority over the "new" land added to Ellis Island through land reclamation projects). (35.) See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 364-65 & n.1 (1976) (resolving a dispute between the two states over lobster fishing rights in a shared (36.) See Anne-Marie C. Carstens,......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT