Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1970
• Docket Number: No. 28750.,28750.
• Citation: 428 F.2d 303
• Parties: Willie A. HUTCHINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

428 F.2d 303 (1970)

Willie A. HUTCHINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 28750.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 19, 1970.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Fred J. Finch, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for appellant.

Charles F. Potter, Tyler, Tex., James T. Wright, Houston, Tex., for appellee.

Russell Specter, Acting Gen. Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Julia Cooper, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae.

Before BELL, COLEMAN and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Willie A. Hutchings commenced this action against United States Industries, Inc. (the Company) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. He charged that on two occasions the Company denied him a promotion solely because of his race or color. The District Court granted the Company's motion for a summary judgment. This appeal by Hutchings principally requires us to determine whether an employee who has utilized the grievance-arbitration machinery available to him under a collective bargaining agreement should be deemed to have made an election of remedies in seeking redress under the law of the shop, thereby waiving his right to a Title VII remedy in the federal courts. Issues involving the time period within which charges of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC as a precondition to court action and the applicability of rules of res judicata in Title VII cases are also presented.

Plaintiff, a Negro, was originally employed by the Company at its Petroleum Equipment Division in Longview, Texas, in 1961. The Company is engaged in the manufacture and marketing of metal products used in oil field production pumps. Hutchings was initially employed in the Foundry Casting Department as a Casting Machine Operator. At least until this lawsuit was filed, he was classified as a Metal Pourer in the Department and was paid $2.79 per hour. Employees classified as "leadmen" in the Department retain and accumulate seniority in their basic job classifications, but receive a rate of pay that is 20¢ above the hourly rate of the highest classification led. It is the job of leadman at $2.99 per hour for which Hutchings twice applied and the denial of which he alleges was twice based upon racial grounds.

Employees at the Company's Longview Plant are unionized. In 1964 the Company signed a collective bargaining agreement with two local lodges of the International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO. This agreement covered all production and maintenance hourly rated employees at the Longview Plant, with exceptions not relevant here. The agreement gives each employee company seniority and classification seniority. With respect to promotions, the agreement provides that seniority, skill, and ability in the next lower-rated job classification or classifications in the same seniority group will be given preference before new employees are hired. If skill and ability are relatively equal, seniority will prevail.¹ Disputes involving promotions are subject to resolution under the grievance-arbitration machinery at the Longview Plant. Article IV of the agreement establishes a three-step grievance procedure for the settlement of employees' grievances. If agreement is reached at any of three steps, the matter is ended there.² Article V of the agreement states that grievances will be considered settled by means of the procedures established in article IV unless they are submitted to arbitration within ten days after completion of the "third step" in the article IV procedure. After arbitration, the arbitrator's decision is to be "final and binding on both parties, the Company and the Union," and this decision is to be based solely upon the terms and conditions of the agreement and the evidence presented to the arbitrator. Together, articles IV and V are to "constitute the sole and exclusive method of determination, decision, adjustment or settlement between the parties of any and all grievances and * * * will constitute the sole and exclusive remedy to be utilized by either party for any and all grievances."

In early 1966, the position of leadman on the night shift was temporarily opened. Hutchings applied for this position. The position was thereafter assigned to a white man having less experience and seniority than Hutchings. Hutchings then made a grievance complaining of the awarding of the job to the less senior employee. This grievance was prosecuted through the "third step" of the grievance procedure, at which step the grievance was decided against Hutchings. The matter was not then submitted to arbitration. Instead, on March 1, 1966, Hutchings filed a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This charge was based upon the Company's denial of the promotion to him and was filed within ninety days after the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred.

In September 1966, the leadman on the day shift resigned, and Hutchings applied for his position. The Company did not question Hutchings's ability to perform as a leadman. It did, however, abolish the position. On the ground that the position Hutchings sought no longer existed, his application for promotion was denied. Hutchings again made a grievance. This time, the grievance was prosecuted through all three steps in the grievance procedure and was then submitted to arbitration. On February 18, 1967, the arbitrator determined that the Company did not, under then existing operating conditions at the Longview Plant, violate the collective bargaining agreement in not replacing the services of the resigned leadman with those of Hutchings in the leadman classification. On March 6, 1967, Hutchings filed a second charge with the EEOC. This charge was based upon the Company's discontinuation of the leadman classification after Hutchings had applied for the vacant position. It was filed some 154 days after the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred.

Having considered Hutchings's two charges, the EEOC concluded that reasonable cause existed to believe that the Company was in violation of section 703 (a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).³ After the Commission had failed to obtain the Company's voluntary compliance with Title VII, it notified Hutchings that he was entitled to bring a civil action against the Company. This suit followed.

In the court below, Hutchings claimed that the Company had discriminated against him in violation of Title VII by refusing to promote him to the position of leadman because of his race on two occasions, first in February 1966 and second, in October 1966. As indicated above, Hutchings had previously unsuccessfully invoked his contractual grievance remedies with respect to both occurrences. In addition to these alleged acts of discrimination, Hutchings claimed that the Company has, since October 1966, continually required him to perform leadman functions without either promoting him or paying him for this additional work. He requested that the District Court order that he be promoted and paid for his loss of wages and that the Company be enjoined from performing further acts of racial discrimination against him.

The District Court granted the Company's motion for a summary judgment in its favor. The Court concluded that Hutchings could not maintain a Title VII action based upon the allegedly unlawful denial of a promotion in October 1966 because Hutchings had not filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC regarding this occurrence within the time prescribed by the statute. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 706(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (90 days). The Court further concluded that Hutchings could not maintain a Title VII action based upon either the October or the February denials of a promotion because Hutchings had, in effect, made a binding election of remedies by pursuing to final determinations the processing of his grievances through the grievance-arbitration machinery established at the Longview Plant. Hutchings could not thereafter, the Court decided, pursue a Title VII remedy based upon the claims already privately concluded adversely to him. See Newman v. Avco Corp., Aerospace Structures Division, M.D. Tenn., 1970, 313 F.Supp. 1069 Civ. No. 5258, March 26; Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., C.D.Cal., 1968, 291 F.Supp. 199; Washington v. Aerojet-General Corporation, C.D.Cal., 1968, 282 F.Supp. 517.

For reasons that follow, we hold that the Company was not entitled to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the statute of limitations applicable to the filing of charges with the EEOC, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 706(d), 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(d),⁴ was tolled once Hutchings invoked his contractual grievance remedies in an effort to obtain a private settlement of his complaint. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company, 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 888, 891. Invocation of those remedies, moreover, did not have the effect of barring Hutchings from seeking a Title VII remedy in the federal courts. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 7 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 711. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand this case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The statute of limitations question presented on this appeal is controlled by our recent decision in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company, 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 888, in which we held that the statute is tolled "once an employee invokes his contractual grievance remedies in a constructive effort to seek a `private settlement of his complaint.'" Id. at 891. Therefore, we need discuss here only whether Hutchings is precluded from maintaining this action under Title VII because he first utilized the Plant's grievance-arbitration machinery to prosecute his rights under the collective bargaining agreement governing the...