Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 80-2253

• Decision Date: 29 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-2253,80-2253
• Parties: , 57 Ill.Dec. 46 Robert RICKEY, a minor, by Janet Rickey, his mother and next friend, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a municipal corporation, Otis Elevator Company, a foreign corporation, United States Elevator Corp., a foreign corporation, and Midland Elevator Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 596

428 N.E.2d 596

101 Ill.App.3d 439, 57 Ill.Dec. 46

Robert RICKEY, a minor, by Janet Rickey, his mother and next

friend, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a municipal corporation, Otis

Elevator Company, a foreign corporation, United States

Elevator Corp., a foreign corporation, and Midland Elevator

Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 80-2253.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Oct. 29, 1981.

Norman J. Barry, Daniel Cummings, Chicago, for appellant, Chicago Transit Authority; Rothschild, Barry & Myers, Chicago, of counsel.

French & Rogers, Chicago, for United States Elevator Corp.; Dorothy F. French, Chicago, of counsel.

McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, Chicago, for defendant-appellee, Otis Elevator; James P. DeNardo, Chicago, of counsel.

JIGANTI, Justice:

This action was brought by Janet Rickey on behalf of her minor son, Robert Rickey, seeking damages for emotional distress resulting from the alleged negligence of the defendants, the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), United States Elevator Corporation and Midland Elevator Company. Additionally, the plaintiff sought recovery against Otis Elevator Company predicated on a theory of strict product liability. The trial court dismissed the suit on the basis that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and the plaintiff appeals. The issue involved is whether there may be recovery of damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of a contemporaneous physical impact or injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Since this appeal comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all facts properly pleaded together with all reasonable inferences which could be drawn from those facts. (Carroll v. Caldwell (1957), 12 Ill.2d 487, 147 N.E.2d 69.) The complaint, as amended, alleges that the minor plaintiff was present with his parents at a CTA subway station when he observed a serious accident involving his brother, Richard Michael Rickey. Richard's clothing became entangled in an escalator and he was choked and deprived of oxygen for some time. After he was freed, he was found to be in a comatose state and still remains in that condition in a nursing care facility. As a result of observing this incident and its aftermath, the plaintiff experienced severe functional, emotional, psychiatric and behavorial disorders. The symptoms of these disorders are severe depression, permanent mental disturbances, and an inability to conduct the normal affairs of life, whether in school or through employment. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff has undergone and is likely to undergo in the future a great deal of expensive medical psychiatric care for these ailments. The plaintiff specifically asserts on appeal that he is not alleging that he suffered physical injury or impact at the time he observed his brother's accident. The plaintiff does not claim that the injuries of which he complains were caused by an intentional act on the part of the defendants nor does he allege that he was within a "zone of danger."

Illinois has consistently barred recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress unless it arises from and is directly related to a contemporaneous physical impact or injury suffered by the plaintiff. (Cutright v. City National Bank of Kankakee (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 742, 44 Ill.Dec. 50, 410 N.E.2d 1142.) This impact rule, as it is characterized by the parties, was first enunciated in Braun v. Craven (1898), 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657, where the Illinois Supreme Court held that no liability exists for negligent acts which occasion fright or terror where there has been no accompanying physical impact even if nervous shock, which constitutes a physical injury, results. The appellate court has repeatedly followed the Braun decision. See Cutright v. City National Bank of Kankakee; Carlinville National Bank v. Rhoads (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 502, 20 Ill.Dec. 386, 380 N.E.2d 63; Kaiserman v. Bright (1978), 61 Ill.App.3d 67, 18 Ill.Dec. 108, 377 N.E.2d 261; Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing Company, Inc. (1977), 55 Ill.App.3d 959, 13 Ill.Dec. 208, 370 N.E.2d 1235; Benza v. Shulman Air Freight (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 521, 5 Ill.Dec. 91, 361 N.E.2d 91.

The plaintiff concedes that the above rule of law would preclude recovery in this cause. He argues, however, that the majority of jurisdictions have abandoned the impact rule on the grounds that it is arbitrary and obsolete and that it bars meritorious claims. The plaintiff asks us to reconsider the viability of the rule in light of the recent trend of allowing recovery, under certain conditions, to one who is emotionally distressed as a result of observing harm or peril to another.

The defendants, on the other hand, assert that this court lacks authority to award relief in this cause. They argue that we are duty bound to follow the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Braun v. Craven. Ordinarily, we would agree that it is improper for the appellate court to deviate from the decisions of the State Supreme Court. (See Benza v. Shulman Air Freight (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 521, 5 Ill.Dec. 91, 361 N.E.2d 91.) However, the subsequent history of the impact rule and the development of the law in areas dealing with mental distress convince us that a reevaluation of the rule is proper. Braun was decided in 1898, at a time when the impact rule was followed in a majority of jurisdictions. Since then, many of the precedents cited as support by the Braun court have been overruled. (See Benza at 525, 5 Ill.Dec. at 94, 361 N.E.2d at 94 for a listing of these precedents and the cases overruling them.) As will be subsequently detailed, the rationales underlying the impact rule have been rejected as unsound not only by the vast majority of jurisdictions, but also specifically by the Illinois Supreme Court in Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157), where it recognized a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The three-part rationale which provides the basis for the impact rule has been seriously undermined in recent years. The first reason usually asserted for requiring a contemporaneous impact is that mental or emotional injuries suffered in the absence of a physical impact or injury are not readily foreseeable as natural and proximate consequences of the defendant's negligent conduct. This is the position taken in Braun v. Craven. However, this view has been discredited in a majority of jurisdictions. (See Dillon v. Legg (1968), 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912; D'Ambra v. United States (1975), 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524.) These jurisdictions have recognized that under certain circumstances, it is reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that his negligence may cause another to suffer emotional distress. Also, it is illogical to maintain that emotional injury is not foreseeable where the plaintiff receives no impact and yet that it is foreseeable where the plaintiff receives only a slight, almost imperceptible impact. Second, the impact rule has been perpetuated on the basis that its rejection would precipitate a flood of litigation. It is apparent,...