Montrym v. Panora
| Decision Date | 25 March 1977 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. CA 76-2560-F. |
| Citation | 429 F. Supp. 393 |
| Parties | Donald E. MONTRYM, Individually and in behalf of all others similarly situated, v. Robert A. PANORA, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, and his successors in office. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Robert Hagopian, Cambridge, Mass., for plaintiff.
Steven A. Rusconi, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., for defendant.
Before CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, and TAURO and FREEDMAN, District Judges.
Plaintiff, Donald E. Montrym, brings this suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts implied consent statute, M.G.L. c. 90 § 24(1)(f). That statute provides for an automatic ninety-day suspension of one's driver's license for refusal to take a chemical test or analysis of one's breath after having been arrested for operating a motor vehicle on a public way while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.1 A three-judge court has been convened to hear this case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.2
Plaintiff contends that the statute violates due process because it fails to provide any type of hearing or procedure whereby a licensee may respond to the state's assertion that he has refused to take a chemical test before his license is suspended by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. Plaintiff now moves for a partial summary judgment3 declaring M.G.L. c. 90 § 24(1)(f) unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied as well as an injunction against its enforcement.4 For the reasons set forth below we hold that the Massachusetts implied consent statute violates due process and therefore grant plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and injunctive relief.
On May 15, 1976, at approximately 8:15 p. m., the plaintiff, while driving his station wagon upon a public way in the Town of Acton, was involved in a collision with a motorcyle. At approximately 8:30 p. m., the plaintiff was arrested by an Acton police officer and charged with operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor, driving so as to endanger the lives or safety of the public, and failing to have the motor vehicle registration in his possession. The police officer issued a citation to the plaintiff pursuant to M.G.L. c. 90 § 1. The plaintiff was then brought to the Acton police station where he declined a police request to take a breathalyzer test. He alleges he was not informed that his license would be suspended upon such refusal. The police officer's Report of Refusal to Submit to a Chemical Test (Report) lists the time of refusal as 8:45 p. m. There is some question as to what next transpired. Plaintiff asserts that he subsequently requested and was wrongfully denied an opportunity to take the test.5 The Report makes no mention of this. In any case, it is agreed that no test was administered.
On May 25, 1976, the defendant Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Robert A. Panora, received the Report from the Acton police. The Report was made on the form approved by the Registrar which complied with the statutory requirements of M.G.L. c. 90 § 24(1)(f).6
On June 2, 1976,7 a hearing was held in the appropriate state district court on a criminal complaint alleging the three offenses. The driving under the influence charge was dismissed. The plaintiff was found not guilty on the driving to endanger charge and guilty on the registration charge for which he was fined $15.
On the same day, June 2, 1976, plaintiff's attorney wrote the Registrar requesting a stay of any possible action that might be taken with respect to the plaintiff's license. This letter was received by the Registrar on June 3, 1976. Nevertheless, on June 7, 1976, the defendant Registrar suspended the plaintiff's driver's license on the basis of its receipt of the Report as required by M.G.L. c. 90 § 24(1)(f). On June 11, 1976, the Registrar responded to the plaintiff's attorney's letter of June 2, 1976 and informed him that plaintiff's license had already been suspended.
On June 7, 1976, plaintiff's attorney wrote the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds for a hearing pursuant to M.G.L. c. 90 § 28,8 stating that he had not refused to submit to a breathalyzer test within the meaning of M.G.L. c. 90 § 24(1)(f). This letter was received by the Board of Appeal on June 8, 1976. Plaintiff surrendered his driver's license, as required, to the Registrar on June 8, 1976.
On June 10, 1976, plaintiff's attorney received a reply from the Board of Appeal, dated June 8, 1976, which requested plaintiff to complete certain enclosed forms in duplicate. The forms were completed and mailed back to the Board on the same day. They were received by the Board on June 11, 1976. On June 24, 1976, the Board of Appeal notified plaintiff that he could have a hearing on July 6, 1976.
On June 28, 1976, plaintiff, by his attorney, demanded the return of his driver's license from the Registrar on the basis that the state court had allegedly made a "specific finding on the face of complaint that the police refused to give Mr. Montrym a breathalyzer test after he requested one," that he was "acquitted" of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors, and that suspension of his license "without affording him a prior hearing is a patent deprivation of his liberty and property without due process . . . in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."
Although the Registrar refused this demand, Mr. Montrym's license was returned on July 15, 1976 pursuant to an order issued by a single member of this court on July 9, 1976.9
The state may not confiscate one's driver's license without affording the licensee procedural due process. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1973); Pollard v. Panora, 411 F.Supp. 580 (D.Mass.1976). However, due process is a flexible concept. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). "A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case." Bell v. Burson, supra, 402 U.S. at 540, 91 S.Ct. at 1590. The question which thus remains in the present case is what process is due. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593.
In Bell v. Burson, supra, the Supreme Court held that Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act violated due process. The statute required the suspension of the driver's license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident unless he posted security to cover the amount claimed by an aggrieved party. There were several statutory exceptions. No suspension would occur if, prior to suspension, either the injured party executed a release from liability or there was an adjudication of nonliability. Either occurrence would also lift a suspension once it had been imposed. However, the hearing which was provided prior to suspension excluded consideration of the motorist's fault or liability for the accident. The Supreme Court concluded that:
since the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.
Id., 402 U.S. at 541, 91 S.Ct. at 1590.
In considering what process was due, the Court rejected Georgia's argument that a post suspension hearing would be sufficient.
Other federal courts have applied the Bell decision to facts similar to those presented here. In Holland v. Parker, 354 F.Supp. 196 (D.S.D., C.D.1973), and Chavez v. Campbell, 397 F.Supp. 1285 (D.Ariz.1973), three-judge courts held the South Dakota and Arizona implied consent statutes to be unconstitutional because they failed to provide a pre-suspension hearing.10 While recognizing a public interest in keeping drinking drivers off the road, the courts concluded that the automatic suspension of one's license for failure to take a breathalyzer test did not further this goal since "a drunk who takes the breath test continues to drive and keeps his license, while a driver who may be completely sober, and who refuses to take the test finds himself excluded from the highways." Chavez v. Campbell, supra at 1288. Both courts rejected the argument that the situation presented was an emergency or so extraordinary as to justify postponement of due process. Both courts noted that the license of a driver who had submitted to a chemical test and was ultimately convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor would not have been suspended until he had been afforded a full trial. This was found to militate against the contention that summary license suspension was "necessary to facilitate immediate removal of drunks from the road." Id.; accord, Slone v. Kentucky Department of Transportation, 379 F.Supp. 652, 657 (E.D.Ky.1974) (), aff'd on other grounds, 513 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1975).
The defendant argues that Holland and Chavez are inapposite to the present case for two reasons. First, those decisions were rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in ...
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Montrym v. Panora
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...of the Maine statute the two-to-one decision by a three-judge district court in the District of Massachusetts, Montrym v. Panora, 429 F.Supp. 393, 438 F.Supp. 1157 (D.Mass.1977), prob. juris. noted, --- U.S. ----, 98 S.Ct. 1603, 56 L.Ed.2d 58 (1978), which declared unconstitutional and enjo......