Williamson, In re

• Decision Date: 24 November 1954
• Docket Number: Cr. 5651
• Citation: 276 P.2d 593,43 Cal.2d 651
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: In re WILLIAMSON on Habeas Corpus.

Page 593

276 P.2d 593

43 Cal.2d 651

In re WILLIAMSON on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 5651.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 24, 1954.

L. G. Hitchcock, Santa Rosa, for petitioner.

Joseph Maddux, Dist. Atty. Santa Rosa (Sonoma County), for respondent.

EDMONDS, Presiding Justice.

Alexander Williamson, an inmate of the Sonoma County Jail, by this proceeding in habeas corpus seeks his release from confinement. As ground for relief, he charges that the term of imprisonment specified in the order placing him on probation is for a period in excess of that authorized by law.

Petitioner and four other persons were indicted on three counts of grand theft and one count of 'conspiracy to commit the crime of contracting without a license in violation of Section 7028 of the Business and Professions Code ¹ * * * committed as follows: In that * * * in violation of Subdivision (1) of Section 182 of the Penal Code of the State of California, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly conspire, combine and agree together and with each other, to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a contractor within this State without having a license therefor.' Williamson pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiracy. The other courts against him were dismissed.

Following Williamson's application for probation, it was ordered that 'imposition of judgment herein be suspended for a period of three (3) years, or until further order of this Court, and the defendant be released upon probation under the expressed conditions herein stated: * * *.' As conditions of probation Williamson must make restitution of his pro-rata share of the money received from roofing jobs performed by the defendants, post a bond 'for the successful completion of probation', pay a fine of $300, and be confined in the Sonoma County jail for a period of eight months.

Williamson contends that the crime to which he pleaded guilty, by section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code ² expressly is made a misdemeanor. According to section 19 of the Penal Code, his argument continues, his punishment cannot exceed imprisonment for six months and a fine of $500.

Section 183 of the Penal Code provides that no conspiracies, other than those enumerated in the previous section, are punishable criminally. Section 182 makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire 'To commit any crime' or to do any one of a number of specified acts, and includes penalties for the various violations. Those who conspire to commit a felony, with certain specific exceptions, are punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of the felony. When they conspire to do any of the other acts described in that section they are punishable 'by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in the state prison for not more than three years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) or both.' A further provision is that '(a)ll cases of conspiracy may be prosecuted and tried in the superior court of any county in which any overt act tending to effect such conspiracy shall be done.'

The count of the indictment to which Williamson pleaded guilty charges a conspiracy to violate section 7028 of the Business and Professions Code, such conspiracy being in violation of section 182, subdivision 1, of the Penal Code. Williamson points out that section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code specifically concerns a conspiracy to violate 'any of the provisions of this chapter,' including section 7028, and declares such a conspiracy to be a misdemeanor. The question presented is whether section 7030 was intended to be the exclusive penal provision governing a conspiracy to violate section 7028, or whether the provisions of that section are merely alternative to those section 182 of the Penal Code.

'It is the general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. Where the special statute is later it will be regarded as an exception to or qualification of the prior general one; and where the general act is later the special statute will be considered as remaining an exception to its terms unless it is repealed in general words or by necessary implication.' People v. Breyer, 139 Cal.App. 547, 550, 34 P.2d 1065, 1066, 1067; Riley v. Forbes, 193 Cal. 740, 745, 227 P. 768.

Section 182 of the Penal Code is a general statute which covers the field of conspiracies. One of its provisions includes a conspiracy to 'commit any crime.' Section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code, however, deals with the specific crime of conspiring to violate certain licensing provisions of that code. When both sections are considered, the latter clearly is a specific enactment which controls the former one.

Section 7030 does not prescribe the penalty for a violation of it, other than to specify that any such violation shall constitute a misdemeanor. Section 19 of the Penal Code states: 'Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this state, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both.' No 'different punishment' is fixed by section 7030, and unless some other statute may be said to apply, the maximum period of confinement for a violation of section 7030 is six months.

The only other statute suggested as applicable is section 182 of the Penal Code which...