People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney

Decision Date17 September 1942
Docket NumberNo. 26599.,26599.
Citation380 Ill. 171,43 N.E.2d 982
PartiesPEOPLE et rel. SCHREINER et al. v. COURTNEY et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Harry M. Fisher, judge.

Taxpayer's suit by the People, on the relation of Edith M. Schreiner and another against Thomas J. Courtney, State's Attorney of Cook County, and others, to recover for the People the difference between amount realized in cash from a tax foreclosure sale and the total amount of the tax delinquency with interest. From an adverse decree, relators appeal.

Affirmed.Thomas Tighe and Charles Liebman, both of Chicago, for appellants.

Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., Winston, Strawn & Shaw, Herbert Decker, David L. Golden, and Seymour R. Blankstein, all of Chicago (Marshall V. Kearney, Jacob Shamberg, Harold L. Reeve, William B. Garrett, James H. Cartwright, and Paul H. Moore, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

GUNN, Justice.

This is a taxpayer's suit brought by the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Edith M. Schreiner and Elizabeth S. Tighe against the State's Attorney and assistant State's Attorney of Cook county, the owner and purchaser of certain property, and the president and board of county commissioners of Cook county, and former owners in the chain of title, to recover for the People the difference between the amount realized in cash from a tax-foreclosure sale, and the total amount of the tax delinquency, with interest.

The jurisdiction of this court is questioned by appellees. The case is somewhat similar in principle to People v. Holten, 259 Ill. 219, 102 N.E. 171, 172. In that case a suit in the name of the People was brought by a taxpayer to recover from the city treasurer and his bondsmer certain amounts retained as commissions for the collection of taxes, and not turned over to the city of East St. Louis. The treasurer retained the commission in addition to his salary, and the court made the distinction, upon a motion to dismiss, between the ques tion as to how revenue should be divided, and the question of whether the money involved in the case was revenue, saying: ‘So far as the question whether a suit relates to the revenue is concerned, there is no distinction between money in the hands of a tax collector claimed as revenue and the same money demanded from the original taxpayers as revenue. * * * If it is not revenue plaintiff cannot succeed in the action, but if it is revenue it belongs in the treasury of the city.’ The situation here, while different, involves the same principle. If the action charged to have been committed by appellees is responsible in depriving the people of revenue which but for such action it would have collected, it is no less revenue when collected from appellee than when collected from the taxpayer. If there is a liability of appellees for taxes it can be enforced by a taxpayer. People v. Holten, supra; Jones v. O'Connell, 266 Ill. 443, 107 N.E. 731;People v. Holten, 287 Ill. 225, 122 N.E. 540. Since the question of deciding whether there is a liability set out in the complaint will necessarily determine whether appellees should pay taxes which become lost through their action, and if collectible, would be revenue, the case comes within the principle of People v. Holten, supra, requiring us to consider the facts on direct appeal.

The case was brought by plaintiffs as taxpayers against three groups connected with the purchase of a piece of real estate on which the taxes were delinquent, and the clearing of the title of such taxes by a tax-foreclosure proceeding. The first group consists of the former owners of the property, the present owner, purchaser and escrow holder of deed and money and attorney connected with the transaction. The second group consists of the State's Attorney and the assistant State's Attorney, who filed a tax-foreclosure suit in the name of the people, which ended in a decree, sale and approval, and a redemption from the tax lien on the property. Included in this group are the official bondsmen of the State's Attorney. The third group represents the board of county commissioners of Cook county both individually and as members of the board. The actions of all of these groups are woven together in a complaint without charging knowledge or notice of the acts of one group being known to those of the others, and, by a statement of alleged duties imposed by law upon the second and third groups, liability is said to exist upon the part of all of them to see that a proper sale at tax-foreclosure sale realizes the full amount of the tax, when the property has such value.

Disregarding conclusions drawn by the pleader, briefly the complaint charges the plaintiffs are taxpayers in Cook county and bring suit on behalf of the people; that there was a certain tract of land owned by Mildred F. Lindop as trustee for John Cummings Lindop, which she acquired in 1937, when the assessed value was $13,974 with tax delinquent thereon from 1931; that she contracted to sell said property in 1939 to the Chicago Rivet & Machine Company for $30,000 subject to the 1940 taxes, and deposited a warranty deed in escrow, subject to the completion of title; that at this time the delinquent taxes with interest amounted to $16,245.09; that said parties and their attorneys agreed they would request the State's Attorney to bring a tax-foreclosure suit, and at the sale have the property purchased by a nominee of the Chicago Rivet & Machine Company, and when the certificate of sale had issued have the latter redeem; and that said parties did employ attorneys, and did induce the State's Attorney to start a foreclosure proceeding, with the understanding there would be a bid of at least $5500 at the sale. This constitutes the substance of the allegations against the first group. There is no claim or allegation that the State's Attorney or the members of the county board had any knowledge of the transactions of the first group, although the complaint avers, if discovery is allowed, they may prove it during the course of the discovery.

The complaint as to the other parties charges the State's Attorney did file a petition to foreclose the lien of taxes upon the property; that answers were filed by the owners and other parties; that a decree of foreclosure for the sale of said delinquent taxes was entered December 18, 1940; that the deed from Lindop to the Chicago Rivet & Machine Company wa filed for record December 20, 1940, from which it is alleged the State's Attorney had full knowledge and notice of the value of the property; after advertisement according to law the property was sold at public sale for $5500 to one George Ott; that the State's Attorney thereupon notified the board of commissioners of Cook county of said sale, in writing, and advised them when the matter would be presented to the court for approval or disapproval, and informed them of the amount of the sale, and the amount of the unpaid taxes, together with the interest and penalties. The court approved the sale February 3, 1941, and February 4 the board of county commissioners concurred in the approval of sale of this particular property and 29 other like cases. After the report of sale had been approved by the court, and the certificate of sale issued it was redeemed from such sale by the then owner Chicago Rivet & Machine Company February 13, 1941, and later a proceeding was brought and a decree entered which enjoined the county clerk and the State's Attorney from collecting any deficiency arising out of such sale from said property, and decreed the property discharged of the lien of taxes.

Up to this point appellees disclaim that the State's Attorney or...

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  • Fields v. Wharrie
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • March 14, 2014
    ...or mistake of judgment in the exercise of their duty in the absence of corrupt or malicious motives.” People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney, 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E.2d 982, 986 (1942) (emphasis added). That's not absolute immunity. But 71 years on, it is doubtful that this is still the law in I......
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    ...done within the scope of the official's authority and not resulting from malicious or corrupt motives. People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney, 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E.2d 982 (1942); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263 (1880); Gilbert v. Bone, 64 Ill. 518 (1872); Anderberg v. Newman, 5 Ill.App.3d 736,......
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