43 N.E. 732 (Ill. 1895), Fuller v. Bradley
|Citation:||43 N.E. 732, 160 Ill. 51|
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM.|
|Party Name:||FULLER et al. v. BRADLEY. |
|Attorney:||[160 Ill. 54] H. W. Wells, for appellants. W. W. Hammond, for appellee.|
|Case Date:||October 11, 1895|
|Court:||Supreme Court of Illinois|
Appeal from circuit court, Peoria county; T. M. Shaw, Judge.
Bill by Lydia Bradley against D. B. Fuller and others to compel the conveyance to her of certain real property. From a decree in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
[160 Ill. 51] The original bill in chancery herein was filed on December 10, 1891, in the Peoria county circuit court, by Lydia Bradley, the appellee, for the purpose of compelling the conveyance to her of an undivided one-eighth interest of lot 29, range 2, Moss' addition in the city of Peoria. She claimed, in her bill, to be the equitable assignee of a bond for a deed to the whole of said lot. It was stated, in said bill, that on May 1, 1852, William S. Moss was the owner in fee of the lot, and that on that day he executed and delivered to William Hughes a bond for a deed, 'whereby he agreed to convey said lot to said William Hughes, upon the payment of $1,500, due ten years after date, with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, payable annually in advance, and took the note of said William Hughes, of the same date, in the sum of $1,500, due ten years after date, with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, as evidence of said indebtedness.' The defendants below, appellants here, answered [160 Ill. 52] the bill, admitting some and denying other of its allegations. They denied that appellee was the owner of or had any title or claim to the share of an undivided one-eighth part of said lot 29 that had belonged to Sarah Bradley, deceased, and claimed that they, appellants, were the owners of such share. They also filed a cross bill for partition of said lot, and for other relief. Issues were formed upon the original and cross bills. There was a reference to the master in chancery, and he reported back to the court the proofs taken in the cause and his conclusions thereon. There were exceptions to the report, interposed by appellants. Such proceedings were had at the hearing before the chancellor as that a decree was rendered requiring the adult defendants in the original bill to convey, within 60 days, to appellee, the premises in controversy, and that, in default of their so doing, the master should convey, and directing the master to convey for the defendants in said bill who were minors, and dismissing out of court...
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