Clark v. Naufel, 27
| Decision Date | 11 September 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 27,27 |
| Citation | 328 Mich. 249,43 N.W.2d 839 |
| Parties | CLARK v. NAUFEL et al. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Alexander Cholette, Buchanan, Perkins & Conklin, by Robert E. Fox, Detroit, for appellant.
Edward N. Barnard, Detroit, for appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
This is an intersection automobile accident case. On trial by jury plaintiff had verdict and judgment thereon. Defendant James C. Naufel has appealed. Plaintiff's case against defendants Sanford was dismissed by stipulation.
The collision occurred in the afternoon of June 30, 1945, at the intersection of Wyoming avenue and West Outer drive, in the city of Detroit. Both streets are paved. There were no abnormal conditions as to pavement, weather, or traffic. Wyoming avenue extends north and south and intersects West Outer drive at right angles. Plaintiff was proceeding south on Wyoming, while defendant was approaching the intersection from the west on Outer drive, which just west of the intersection is divided into a west lane of traffic 36 feet wide and an east lane of traffic 36 feet wide. The east and west lanes of traffic at this intersection are divided by so-called islands. This intervening island space is about 38 feet in width. At the trial it was assumed that the southerly or east bound portion of Outer drive was divided into three equal lanes for traffic, each 12 feet wide.
Plaintiff testified that as she approached the intersection from the north she stopped and made an observation for traffic when at the north curb line of Outer drive. Then she proceeded, crossed the northerly or west bound traffic lane of Outer drive to a point where the island would be at her right and the front of her car about even with the southerly edge of the island. There she stopped a second time and made an observation to her right. At this point she had a view to her right of 100 to 125 or 150 feet, and it might have been a little more. Shrubbery on the island space obstructed further view at this point, and plaintiff's view was also restricted in consequence of a curve to the north in the highway about 275 feet to the west of plaintiff's position. A further material circumstance disclosed by the record is that when defendant's automobile was first observed by plaintiff he had proceeded only about 200 feet after he had rounded the curve in Outer drive. If, as some of the testimony disclosed, defendant was driving 55 to 60 miles per hour, at most his car had been within plaintiff's possible range of vision only two or three seconds. Plaintiff, after looking and seeing no approaching traffic, started to cross the southerly portion of Outer drive, and she testified: 'I should judge I had extended into the southerly section of Outer Drive probably 16 or 18 feet before I made the second observation,' which would bring the front of her car into the middle of the three east bound lanes. Then, when plaintiff's car was moving 5 to 8 miles per hour, she saw the Naufel car approaching on her right about 75 feet away, and being apprehensive that an accident might occur, plaintiff, as she testified, 'thought it was my best bet, my best judgment I could use was to get the rest of the way across the street, which I attempted to do.' She testified that she 'took a good look' at the approaching Naufel car and estimated its speed at 55 or 60 miles per hour.
As plaintiff's car was approximately three-fourths of the way across the southerly or east bound portion of Outer drive it was struck on the right hand side 'slightly to the rear of the car.' The impact caused plaintiff's car to veer somewhat to the east from its southerly course and toward a truck standing at the southeast corner of this intersection with which it collided, and when it came to rest plaintiff was found by the truck driver underneath her car. Plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries and also damage to her car.
Defendant's Negligence. A Question of Fact. Defendant's contention that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on his part to go to the jury is not maintainable. The maximum rate of speed at the point of accident was 35 miles per hour. Defendant testified he was going 25 or 30 miles per hour; but plaintiff testified that just prior to the impact of the two cars she saw defendant's car approaching about 75 feet to her right at an estimated speed of 55 to 60 miles per hour. And perhaps a matter more persuasive with the jury was that if defendant was driving only 25 or 30 miles per hour as he testified and had been keeping a proper lookout, he would have observed plaintiff's car at the intersection in time to avoid the accident, and in failing to do so he was negligent. Further, there is the testimony of a disinterested witness, Nelson H. Freeman, who was operating a truck which was standing at the southeasterly corner of this intersection, with which truck plaintiff's automobile collided as a result of being struck by defendant's car. Witness Freeman testified that immediately following the impact defendant Naufel 'leaped from his car * * * and he hollered rather loudly, several times as a matter of fact, 'My God, I didn't see her, I was watching the truck.'' This latter testimony might also have indicated to the jury that defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to make proper observation as he was approaching the intersection. The issue of whether there was testimony of negligence on the part of defendant which was a proximate cause of the collision between these two cars was a question of fact for the jury's determination.
Plaintiff's Contributory Negligence. A Question of Fact. We are not in accord with defendant's contention that under the record in this case the trial court should have held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a...
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Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co.
...the well-established requirement of mutuality. We are unwilling to depart from the law recognized and reiterated in Clark v. Naufel (1950), 328 Mich. 249, 43 N.W.2d 839, 6 for the following reasons. First, it is apparent from a review of the general authorities that those few jurisdictions ......
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Mackris v. Murray
...Judge observed: "The Michigan Supreme Court has not directly faced the issue in recent years. As late at 1950 in Clark v. Naufel, 328 Mich. 249, 250 43 N.W.2d 839, mutuality of estoppel was still He also recognized that had the Common Pleas case resulted in judgment for defendant, plaintiff......
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Curry v. City of Detroit
...v. Hartman, 306 Mich. 346, 10 N.W.2d 910 (1943); Turok v. Dombrowski, 341 Mich. 562, 67 N.W.2d 798 (1954).6 See Clerk v. Naufel, 328 Mich. 249, 43 N.W.2d 839 (1950); Prawdzik v. Heidema Brothers, Inc., 352 Mich. 102, 89 N.W.2d 523 (1958) and Jordan v. C. A. Roberts Co., 379 Mich. 235, 150 N......
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Earls v. Herrick
...negligent as a matter of law, a fact question was raised. See Rathburn v. Riedel, 291 Mich. 652, 289 N.W. 285 (1939), Clark v. Naufel, 328 Mich. 249, 43 N.W.2d 839 (1950). We now turn to the question of whether the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient e......