State Mut. Life & Annuity Ass'n v. Baldwin
| Decision Date | 09 January 1903 |
| Citation | 43 S.E. 262,116 Ga. 855 |
| Parties | STATE MUT. LIFE & ANNUITY ASS'N v. BALDWIN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. An essential ingredient of libel is malice, express or implied.
2. Where a promissory note has been satisfied in full, and the payee, instead of complying with a promise to return it to the maker, negligently sends it to a bank "for collection, with instructions to protest said note if not paid," and it is accordingly protested for nonpayment such negligent conduct on the part of the payee amounts to an actionable wrong, if injury results therefrom to the maker's financial standing.
3. While in such a case it is the right of the injured party to maintain an action of tort for the recovery of all actual damages sustained by him, he is not entitled to punitive damages.
4. That the note was one which was not subject to protest can constitute no valid defense by the payee, if it was in fact protested at his instance, and injury to the credit of the maker actually resulted.
Error from superior court, Floyd county; W. M. Henry, Judge.
Action by J. C. Baldwin against the State Mutual Life & Annuity Association. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed in part.
Dean & Dean, for plaintiff in error.
Seaborn & Barry Wright, for defendant in error.
An action was brought by J. C. Baldwin against the State Mutual Life & Annuity Association, the plaintiff basing his alleged right to recover upon the following recitals of fact: He "carried a policy with said corporation, and had given [to it] his note for" $23.76, "due on February 1 1901, which represented the premium on said policy for the quarter ending on or about the date of the maturity of said note." Just prior to its maturity, "one J. V Sparks, a representative of said corporation, called upon petitioner, *** and agreed to allow petitioner to give his note for the amount of the said note falling due on February 1, without interest, and to fix the time of maturity of same ninety days from the date of the new note, provided petitioner would pay for the quarterly premium on his said policy ending April 9, 1901." In accordance with this understanding, he "paid the premium on his said policy for" that quarter, and, "in consideration of said payment as agreed, the new note was to be signed, due ninety days after date, and the old note, due on the 1st of February, 1901, was to be delivered to petitioner." On January 30, 1901, "the premium paid by petitioner having been forwarded to said corporation, the new note was sent to petitioner for his signature, which he signed on said date, *** and immediately returned to said corporation." In the letter which it sent to him, it inclosed the new note, saying this note was "to take the place of the old note." which would be forwarded to him "in lieu of the new one." Yet, "notwithstanding he had paid the note falling due on February 1, 1901, in the manner alleged," he subsequently "received notice from the Fourth National Bank of Atlanta, Ga., that it held same for collection, and petitioner immediately wrote to said defendant corporation of the notice he had received, requesting that the note be recalled from the bank and delivered to petitioner; but, notwithstanding said request, said corporation negligently failed and refused to take up same and deliver to petitioner according to agreement, but several days later, to wit, on the 4th day of February, 1901, allowed same to go to protest." He had "a good financial credit before said note was wrongfully and negligently allowed to go to protest by defendant corporation, and his credit has been damaged by defendant because of said wrongful protest." Furthermore, "in addition to the damage to his credit because of said protest, petitioner has been humiliated and greatly embarrassed because of the wrongful and negligent allowing of his note which had been settled to go to protest, for which said corporation is liable for punitive damages." By reason "of the facts set forth, he has been injured and damaged in the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars." The defendant corporation filed a demurrer based on several grounds, one of which presented the objection that the plaintiff did not allege that the note was protested "at the instance and direction of defendant." This point was met by an amendment to the petition, in which was set forth the allegation that "Defendant sent said note to said bank for collection, with instructions to protest said note if not paid." The demurrer also embraced the following grounds: "First, there is no cause of action against the defendant stated in plaintiff's petition; second, no damage has been specified in plaintiff's petition, upon which a recovery could be had; third, it is not shown by plaintiff's petition that the note" alleged to have been paid "was protestable"; and, lastly, that paragraph of plaintiff's petition in which he alleges he suffered embarrassment and humiliation "should be stricken, for there is no cause shown for punitive damages." The trial judge passed an order overruling the demurrer, and to this judgment exception was taken.
1. The foregoing epitomizes the case presented by the record transmitted to this court. It is essentially different in principle from the case to which counsel called our attention, arguing that the principles decided controlled the legal points involved in the present record. For a notary public "falsely and maliciously to protest for nonpayment" commercial paper, and to then make publication of his wrongful protest, is undoubtedly libelous; and not only he, but all other persons participating with him in such unlawful conduct, may be held accountable therefor in an action for libel. May v. Jones, 88 Ga. 308, 14 S.E. 552, 15 L.R.A. 637, 30 Am.St.Rep. 154. But an essential ingredient of libel is malice, express or implied (Civ. Code, §§ 3832, 3833), and there is no claim on the part of the plaintiff below that the defendant corporation willfully and maliciously allowed his note to go to protest. Counsel for each party, in their briefs and arguments before this court, treated the action as one of libel; but as the petition not only did not allege that the protest of the note was falsely and maliciously caused by the defendant, but, by the use of apt words, negatived the idea of malice, the action cannot be treated as one of libel, and the principle of law cited from May v. Jones, supra, is not authority applicable to the facts of this case.
2. We understand the first ground of the demurrer as presenting the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff's grievance is not one which the law recognizes as an actionable wrong, or, in other words, that the act of the defendant corporation was injuria sine damno,--a mere petty annoyance, of so trivial a character as not to call for legal redress. This position very naturally suggests the inquiry was not the conduct of the defendant well calculated to arouse the righteous indignation of any reasonable, well-thinking, and law-abiding man? This inquiry cannot, of course, be said to furnish the test for determining whether or not the plaintiff has a cause of action; but it is nevertheless pertinent, as shedding some light on the question of what was meant by the sages of the law, themselves reasonable and well-thinking men, when they gave sanction to the doctrine that mere imaginary grievances, without tangible injury to any vested legal right, do not call for recognition by the courts. Now what, in good faith and in good conscience, was the defendant association under a duty to do with the plaintiff's note, after promising to return it to him in lieu of the new note which he duly signed and forwarded to it, relying upon its promise to comply with its agreement? Clearly, the old note should have been promptly surrendered into his possession; and, this being so, the association was wholly unauthorized, either under that agreement or under any principle known to the law, to transmit the note to the bank for collection, with direction to protest the same if not paid. Such an unauthorized act is surely a civil wrong, if done without any valid legal excuse. A mistake induced by the offending party's inexcusable negligence and neglect of duty cannot be relied on as a justification, for a person to whom another owes a specific legal duty is entitled to protection not...
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