Caulk v. Caulk

Decision Date09 August 1947
Docket Number15981.
PartiesCAULK v. CAULK.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

George W. Freeman, Jr., of Bennettsville, and Samuel Want, of Darlington, for appellant.

Tison & Miller, of Bennettsville, for respondent.

OXNER Justice.

The appellant (plaintiff below) and the respondent (defendant below) are husband and wife. At an auction sale held in September, 1939, appellant purchased for $310 a tract of land containing 7.13 acres situate about four miles from Bennettsville, South Carolina, and at his request the property was conveyed to his wife. Thereafter appellant erected certain buildings hereinafter referred to on the property. Claiming that title was placed in the name of his wife under a verbal agreement that upon his request she would at any time convey the property to him and that she had declined to do so, this action was commenced on September 1 1945 for the purpose of obtaining a decree for specific performance of the alleged agreement. Respondent denied making any such agreement, claimed that she owned the property together with all improvements thereon, alleged that appellant had unlawfully moved a two room house from the property, and asked that appellant be required to account for the value of the building removed and to pay a reasonable sum for his use and occupancy of the premises.

The case was heard by the Resident Judge of the Fourth Circuit. The testimony was taken before him on August 26 and September 14, 1946, and a decree filed on January 15 1947. The Court held (1) that there was no agreement by respondent to convey the property to appellant, (2) that appellant voluntarily made the improvements thereon with full knowledge that the title was in the name of his wife, (3) that the buildings on the property and fixtures attached thereto belonged to respondent, (4) that appellant was liable for the value of the house which he removed from the premises and for the reasonable value of the use of the premises, and (5) that respondent was entitled to immediate possession. The complaint was dismissed and respondent was awarded judgment against appellant for $5203.28 which the Court found was proper compensation for the value of the building removed and for the use and occupancy of the premises. This appeal followed.

Appellant was respondent were married on January 30, 1928. They have two children, a daughter 17 years of age, now married, and a boy 14 years old. They lived together until April 25, 1943 when they separated. Respondent claims that appellant deserted her at this time. The children now reside with respondent. For a number of years appellant has operated a liquor store in the town of Bennettsville. Appellant says that on account of the unsatisfactory income from the operation of the liquor store, he decided in 1939 to also operate a grocery store and filling station and purchased the 7.13 acres in controversy with the view of conducting such business at that location. One-third of the purchase price was paid in cash and a purchase money mortgage given for the balance which appellant subsequently paid. The filling station and grocery store were erected on the premises and a mortgage given to the builder for the cost of the construction. Appellant operated the filling station and grocery store for a period of six or eight months when he decided to convert the place into a restaurant or tavern. He commenced operation of this business during the early part of 1940. The equipment for the tavern was purchased largely on credit. For awhile the tavern was operated at a loss. In 1941 the Government established an aviation training school in this area and a number of soliders were stationed around Bennettsville. Business in general then began to prosper. There was then a considerable increase in the income from both the tavern and the liquor store. From time to time expensive equipment was installed in the tavern so that it is now elaborately furnished with all modern fixtures, including mirrors around the dining room, large electric refrigerators and complete kitchen equipment. Appellant has since been successful in all lines of his business. He purchased from time to time government bonds aggregating approximately $25,000 and at the time of the hearing in the Court below had invested more than $25,000 in his various enterprises.

Since the parties separated respondent and the children have lived in the home. There is a mortgage on it and title is in respondent's name. She has no source of income. Appellant testified that after the separation he left instructions with those in charge of the liquor store to permit his wife to draw the necessary money to support herself and the children and that she has received approximately $25 per week in addition to which he has paid the light and fuel bills and taxes, furnished his wife with a car and bought some clothing for the children. Respondent testified that for a long period of time she was only given $10 or $15 per week which was finally raised to $25. No action has ever been brought to determine the question of separate maintenance and support.

Appellant testified that at the time he purchased the property in controversy he owed considerable money which he has since paid; that he felt it would be easier to finance the cost of improving the property if title was taken in the name of his wife; that in the conduct of his new business he did not want to be harassed with his old obligations; and that he explained this situation to his wife who agreed to convey the property to him at any time he requested her to do so. Respondent denied that she ever made any suchagreement with her husband. She testified that her husband told her he was placing title to the property in her name so that if anything happened to him, she and the children would have a place to live and to earn a livelihood. So far as the record discloses there was at this time no rift in the domestic life of this couple.

It is undisputed that appellant paid the purchase price for the land and the cost of all improvements thereon. He has also paid the taxes and insurance premiums. The tavern was operated by him. His wife worked there occasionally during emergencies and baked practically all the pies that were served. The deed to the property was promptly recorded and has since remained in possession of appellant.

The general rule is that when real estate is conveyed to one person and the consideration paid by another, it is presumed that the party who pays the purchase money intended a benefit to himself, and accordingly a resulting trust is raised in his behalf. Elrod v. Cochran, 59 S.C. 467, 38 S.E. 122; Dumas v. Carroll et al., 112 S.C. 284, 99 S.E. 801. The presumption, however, may not be in accord with the truth. It may be rebutted and the actual intention shown by parol evidence. Larisey v. Larisey, 93 S.C. 450, 77 S.E. 129. But when the conveyance is taken to a wife or child, or to any other person for whom the purchaser is under legal obligation to provide, no such presumption attaches. On the contrary, the presumption in such case is that the purchase was designed as a gift or advancement to the person to whom the conveyance is made. This presumption, however, is one of fact and not of law and may be rebutted by parol evidence or circumstances showing a contrary intention. Douglass et al. v. Brice et al., 4 Rich. Eq. 322; Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S.C. 595, 10 S.E. 1078; 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, § 459, page 1391; 26 Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, Section 100 and 101. 'The fact that the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the payor is more than merely a circumstance tending to rebut the inference of a resulting trust. It is of itself a circumstance sufficient to raise an inference that a gift was intended, and the burden is upon the payor seeking to enforce a resulting trust to prove that he did not intend to make a gift to the transferee'. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, American Law Institute, Section 442, Comment on page 1356.

It is equally well established that where improvements are made by the husband upon property which he knows belongs to his wife, the law presumes a gift to her of all such improvements. Nelson v. Nelson, 176 N.C. 191, 96 S.E. 986; Hoef v. Hoef, 323 Ill. 170, 153 N.E. 658; Aycock et al. v. Bottoms et al., 201 Ark. 104, 144 S.W2d 43.

If appellant had established the agreement which he claims he had with his wife, this would have rebutted the presumption of a gift. But the Court below found as a fact that there was no such agreement. After carefully reading the testimony we are inclined to agree with this conclusion, but in no event can it be said that such conclusion on the part of the trial Judge, who had the opportunity of seeing the parties and observing their demeanor on the witness stand, is against the weight of the evidence.

Having concluded that there was no agreement on the part of respondent to convey the property, it follows that appellant took title in the name of his wife and with full knowledge of that fact made extensive improvements on the property without any agreement or understanding that he was to retain any beneficial interest. Under these circumstances there is nothing to rebut the presumption of a gift of the land and the improvements. At this time apparently the domestic life of this couple was harmonious and it was reasonable to suppose that appellant would participate in the enjoyment of the use of the property. Th...

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2 cases
  • Bates v. Bates
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1948
    ...and there is nothing in the evidence in this case to rebut the presumption. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 153, page 626; Caulk v. Caulk, 211 S.C. 57, 43 S.E.2d 600, authorities there cited. Question III is of no consequence in view of the decision hereinafter upon the main question. The at......
  • Legendre v. South Carolina Tax Commission
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 7, 1949
    ...is one of fact and not of law and may be rebutted by parol evidence or circumstances showing a contrary intention.' Caulk v. Caulk, 211 S.C. 57, 43 S.E.2d 600, 603. 26 Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, Section 103, it is said: 'There is a conflict of authority as to whether a trust or presumption ......

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