Harrison v. Garrett
| Citation | 43 S.E. 594,132 N.C. 172 |
| Parties | HARRISON v. GARRETT. |
| Decision Date | 17 March 1903 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Appeal from Superior Court, Halifax County; Winston, Judge.
Action by Thomas N. Harrison against Paul Garrett. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
In libel the publication complained of was a letter referring to plaintiff as a populist effusion, constituting part of the scum from a political boil, and a person from whom a few dollars would buy almost any kind of a certificate, and defendant, on cross-examination of plaintiff, examined him as to a rumor that all Fusionists were corrupt, and thereafter plaintiff introduced witnesses as to his good character, who on cross-examination, testified that there was such a rumor. Held, that the fact that such evidence was drawn out on cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses did not make it proper impeaching evidence.
Thos N. Hill, Day & Bell, and F. H. Busbee & Son, for appellant.
E. L Travis, W. E. Daniel, and Claude Kitchin, for appellee.
This is an action to recover damages for libel, in which the plaintiff alleged that on May 30, 1898, the defendant, over the name of Garrett & Co., mailed a certain letter to his agent or employé in Belton, Tex., which contained the following libelous matter:
The court submitted to the jury four issues as follows: (1) Did the defendant compose and publish of the plaintiff the false and defamatory words set out in the complaint? (2) Was the occasion on which they were written privileged? (3) If so, was the defendant actuated by express malice in writing and publishing them? (4) What damage, if any, has the plaintiff sustained by said written and published words?
The plaintiff introduced testimony for the purpose of showing that the alleged libel was published with malice, and on the cross-examination of the plaintiff and of several of the plaintiff's witnesses the defendant's counsel was permitted to prove, over the plaintiff's objection, that in 1898 there was a public rumor that any man who affiliated with the Fusionists was a bad and corrupt man. This evidence was admitted generally, and, if it was competent at all, it was not confined within its proper limits. We do not by any means wish to be understood as ruling that this evidence was competent for any purpose, or that it had in any degree a tendency to prove plaintiff's general reputation, or to impeach his character; but, if it was competent in any view, it certainly was not so as to all of the issues upon which the jury were required to pass, and, when objection was made to the evidence, it was the duty of the presiding judge, either at the time of the objection or in his charge, to have told the jury for what purpose it could be considered by them. We are unable to know what use was made of it, or the impression it may have produced upon the jury, or what influence it had upon the decision of any question to which it could not possibly have been relevant. It has often been held by this court that when testimony proposed to be introduced by a party is competent for one purpose, and not for another, and is objected to in apt time, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to how it shall be considered and applied by them. Burton v. Railroad, 84 N.C. 192; State v. Powell, 106 N.C. 635, 11 S.E. 191; State v. Ballard, 79 N.C. 628; State v. Oxendine, 107 N.C. 783, 12 S.E. 573; Tankard v. Railroad, 117 N.C. 558, 23 S.E. 46. The charge of the court is fully set out in the record, and it does not appear that the court, either at the time the objection was made or in its instructions to the jury, cautioned them as to their duty in regard to this testimony.
But this evidence was incompetent in another respect. The plaintiff was introduced as a witness in his own behalf, and it appears that evidence of mere rumor in the community as to the standing of persons of certain political affiliations was admitted generally, and not confined to any purpose for which it was competent. The defendant, therefore, was left unrestrained in the use he could make of it, and he may have used it, and no doubt did, for the purpose of assailing the plaintiff's credibility as a witness. Whether it was used for this purpose or not by counsel in argument, the jury were left without any instructions from the court as to the legal nature and effect of the evidence, and they were at liberty to consider it as impeaching the plaintiff and impairing his credibility. Public rumor is not always the equivalent of general reputation, and certainly not of general character so as to be competent for the purpose of discrediting a witness. That will depend largely upon the character of the rumor and the extent of its circulation, and finally upon the impression it has made upon the minds of the people in the community where the party whose credibility is in question lives. The question was not what was the rumor, but what was the general reputation or character of the witness, and it is only the latter that can be given in evidence for the purpose of supporting or...
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